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THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS 
AND TRADE IN UNITED STATES 
DOMESTIC LAW 
John H. Jackson* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
T HE General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,1 "GATT," is a multilateral international agreement which is today the prin-
cipal instrument for the regulation of world trade. Over eighty 
nations, including the United States, participate in GA TT and it 
has been estimated that about eighty per cent of world trade is 
governed by this agreement.2 With the recent completion of five 
agonizing years of "Kennedy Round"3 tariff negotiations under 
GATT auspices, tariffs for many goods will be reduced to a point 
where they will no longer be effective barriers to world trade.~ For 
this reason, non-tariff trade barriers of wide variety and ingenuity5 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1954, Princeton University; J.D. 
1959, University of Michigan. Editorial Board, Vol. 57, Michigan Law Review.-Ed. 
The author is indebted to Walter Hollis, Legal Advisor's Office, United States State 
Department, who generously read the manuscript of this article and made a number of 
useful suggestions. The author is also indebted to members of the CATT Secretariat 
in Geneva for assisting his general research into GATT.-J.H.J. 
I. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 61 Stat. pt. 5, at A3 (1967); 55 
U.N.T.S. 194 (1967) (hereinafter referred to as GAT'I). CATT has been extensively 
amended and modified, as can be seen from app. C. A more current version of CATT 
can be found in CATT, 3 Basic Instruments and Selected Documents (rev. vol. 1958) 
(hereinafter referred to as BISD). Subsequent changes may be found in CATT Doc. 
IPRO/65-1 (1965) (which added pt. IV) and CATT Doc. INT(61) 34 (1961) (which 
modified art. XIV:1). 
Although the full text of GA TT is not being reprinted in this article, the general 
subject matter of each article can be seen from the table in app. A. On GA TT gener-
ally, see Jackson, The Puzzle of GATT-Legal Aspects of a Surprising Institution, 1 
J. WORLD TRADE L. 131 (1967) and authorities cited therein. For an economist's view, 
see G. CURZON, MULTILATERAL COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY (1965). As to CATT documents 
in general and their availability, see GATT Docs. INF/121 & INF/122 (1966); Jackson, 
supra at 131 n.2. 
2. Statement issued by the Director General of CATT, CATT Press Release 990, 
reprinted in N.Y. Times, May 16, 1967, at 20, col. 3; GATT Press release 973 (Nov. I, 
1966). 
3. See Farnsworth, Kennedy Round Succeeds, N.Y. Times, May 16, 1967, at I, col. 8. 
See also International Monetary Fund, Kennedy Round Agreements, 19 INT'L FINANCIAL 
NEWS SURVEY 213 (1967). 
4. See Statement by Eric Wyndham-White, Director General of CATT, to the 
Deutsche Gesellschaft fiir Auswiirtige Politik at Bad Godesberg, GATT Doc. INT(66) 
567 (Oct. 27, 1967); address by Eric Wyndham-White at the meeting of the Trade 
Negotiating Committee at Geneva, CATT Press Release 993, at 4 (June 30, 1967); Chase 
Manhattan Bank, Perspective on World Business, 7 WORLD Bus. 3 (July 1967). 
5. See, e.g., Lawrence, State "Buy U.S." Laws on Increase, J. Commerce, June 15, 
1967, at 1, col. 2. See also Not for State Capitals, J. Commerce, July 25, 1967, at 4, col. 1; 
Lawrence, Anti-dumping Code Foes Face Stiff Odds, J. Commerce, July 5, 1967, at 1, col. 
1; Lawrence, No U.S. Push on Non-tariff Walls Likely, J. Commerce, July 3, 1967, at 
1, col. 7; Revised Wool Import Testing Rule Reviewed, J. Commerce, June 28, 1967, 
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are now becoming relatively more significant.6 In the United States, 
federal, state, and local legislators and officials, under pressure from 
special interest protectionists, have been experimenting with various 
types of barriers on foreign imports.7 Since much of the general 
language of GATT concerns non-tariff barriers, GATT's position 
in United States domestic law8 may well take on increasing impor-
tance. However, determining the status of GA TT in domestic law 
is a surprisingly complex problem, partly because of uncertainties 
that still lurk in our constitutional law relating to executive agree-
ments, 9 and partly for reasons unique to GATT.10 
GATT was negotiated at Geneva in 1947 at the same time that 
the final preliminary draft of the Charter for the International 
Trade Organization (ITO) was being prepared.11 GATT was 
intended to embody concrete tariff commitments within the frame-
at II, col. 4; Milche, Buy U.S. Laws: A.re They Legal, N.Y. Times, July 23, 1967, at 
lF, col. l; Reed, President Orders a Slash in Imports of Dairy Products, N.Y. Times, 
July 1, 1967, at 1, col. 3. 
6. There have been over 100 bills introduced in the current session of Congress 
relating to non-tariff import restrictions of one kind or another. See CCH CoNGRES· 
SIONAL INDEX for the 90th Congress under the subject headings Dairies a- Dairy Prod., 
Imports c- Importation, and Meat c- Meat Prod. 
7. &e cases cited in notes 261-64 infra; articles cited in note 5 supra; discussion in 
text at pt. m.B. In August 1967 the Pennsylvania legislature passed a bill which would 
have required all state-financed projects in Pennsylvania to use only steel produced 
in the United States. The bill was vetoed, however, in response to State Department 
opposition. Walker, Steel Bill Vetoed in Pennsylvania, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1967, at 
·U, col. 1. 
8. Often the tenn "municipal law" is used by international lawyers to describe 
the law of one country as distinguished from international law. See I. BROWNLIE, PRIN-
CIPLES OF PUBUC INTERNATIONAL LAW 29 (1966). The term "national law" is also used. 
See w. BISHOP, GENERAL CoURSE OF PUBUC INTERNATIONAL LAw, 1965, 191 in 2 ACAD· 
EMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, RECUEIL DES CoURS (1965). In this article the term 
"domestic law" is used synonymously with "municipal law" and "national law" and 
unless the context indicates otherwise will refer to United States domestic law. 
"Domestic law" seems to be more understandable to the American lawyer and is the 
term used by the American Law Institute. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW, Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States (1965) (hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT). 
9. See, e.g., E. BYRD, TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 
(1960); w. McCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS (1941); MacDougal & Lans, 
Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable In-
struments of National Policy (pts. I & 2), 54 YALE L.J. 181, 534 (1945); Comment, 
Presidential Amendment and Termination of Treaties: The Case of the Warsaw Con-
vention, 34 U. Cm. L REv. 580 (1967); Note, 61 CoLUM. L. REv. 505 (1961). 
10. In particular, the Protocol of Provisional Application and art. XXIV, para. 12 
of GATT introduce complexities. See the discussion in text at pt. III, especially pts. 
111.A.2 & 111.B.2. 
11. The relationship of the preparatory work for the International Trade Organiza-
tion (ITO) and that for GATT is described in Jackson, supra note I, at 134. Four 
international conferences were held to draft the ITO Charter. The first three of these 
conferences were officially titled Meetings of the Preparatory Committee, and were held 
in London from October 15 to November 26, 1946; in Lake Success, New York from 
January 20 to February 25, 1947; and in Geneva from April IO to October 30, 1947. 
Most of GATT was actually negotiated at Geneva, but portions of the preparatory 
work at the previous two meetings are also relevant. 
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work of the ITO when the latter came into existence.12 The United 
States failed to aq:ept the ITO Charter, however, and the ITO 
conseque11tly failed to materialize;13 thus, GA TT became, by de-
fault, the general regulatory institution for world trade, filling the 
gap left by the demise of the ITO. This misdirected beginning, the 
political sensitivity and trade protectionism in the United States 
in the late 1940's, and the shifting of the power over foreign eco-
nomic affairs from the legislative to the executive branch in this 
country14 all caused GATT to be established in a halting "provi-
sional" manner that continues to make it an anomaly among major 
international institutions.15 
This article will undertake a two-step analysis. First, in Part II, 
the question whether GA TT is legally a part of United States 
domestic law will be examined. Then, assuming GA TT is part of 
this law, Part III will examine the extent of GATT's domestic 
law effect and its general relationship to other law, both federal 
and state. The chosen focus of this article thus excludes treatment 
of substantive obligations under specific GATT clauses.16 It also 
excludes intensive development of the myriad details of the scope 
of executive authority to negotiate particular trade concessions 
under legislation such as the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,17 espe-
cially since the extent of this authority is perhaps more heavily 
12. For instance, para. 2 of GA'IT, art. XXIX states: "Part II of this agreement 
shall be suspended on the day on which the Havana Charter enters into force.'' 
13. The Administration had repeatedly stated to Congress that, while GA'IT was 
being negotiated pursuant to authority which the Executive already possessed, the 
ITO would be submitted to Congress for approval. S. REP. No. 107, 81st Cong., 1st 
Sess., pt. II, at 4 (1949) (minority report); Hearings on House Joint Resolution 2,6 
Providing for Membership and Participation by the U.S. in the ITO Before the House 
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 81st Cong., 2d Sess, (1950); Hearings Before the Senate 
Finance Comm., 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 549-50 (1949); Hearings Before the House Comm. 
on Ways and Means, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1947); Hearings Before the Senate 
Comm. on Finance, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1947). Finally, however, the executiye 
branch decided not to resubmit the ITO to Congress. State Department Press Release, 
Dec. 6, 1950, reprinted in 23 DEP'T OF STATE :BULL, 977 (1950); Hearings Before the 
Senate Finance Comm., 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 13, 1247 (1951). For a further descrip-
tion of the causes behind the clecision not to submit the ITO, see R. GARDNER, STERLING 
Dou.AR DIPLOMACY (1956); Diebold, The End of the ITO (Princeton Essays in Inter-
national Finance No. 16, 1952). 
14. See text accompanying notes 27 & 135 infra. 
15. See discussion in text at pt. ID.A.2; Jackson, supra note 1. Provisional applica-
tion means, among other things, that a nation may withdraw upon only sixty days 
notice. Protocol of Provisio-!lal Application, 61 Stat. pt. 6, at A2051 (1947), 55 U.N.T.S. 
308 (1950). 
16. Examination of certain of the clauses may be found in Jackson, supra note I. 
17. See list of statutes in app. D. The U.S. Tariff Schedules in GATT contain 
literally tens of thousands of items, and the question can be raised as to executive 
authority to negotiate any one of them. There are a number of especially interesting 
cases, many of which do not appear on the record and are known only to government 
officials who have spent lifetimes dealing with the subject. 
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dependent upon executive-congressional political relationships than 
upon legal notions. 
II. GATT AS UNITED STATES DOMESTIC LAW 
Even though GA TT is binding on the United States under in-
ternational law,18 it could fail to be effective as domestic law if 
either the agreement were not validly entered into under United 
States constitutional law or, though validly entered into and recog-
nized by this country as an international legal obligation, it were 
not under its own terms or for United States constitutional reasons, 
domestic law.19 
A. Authority for United States Participation in GATT 
It is generally settled that under our Constitution international 
"treaty"20 obligations can be established in any of the following 
ways: (I) an agreement negotiated by the President, with advice 
and consent by a two-thirds vote in the Senate; (2) an executive 
agreement of the President, acting under authority delegated by an 
act of Congress; and (3) an executive agreement of the President, 
acting under his constitutional power to conduct foreign affairs. 21 
The adherence of the United States to GATT rests upon the so-
called "Protocol of Provisional Application," which was signed in 
Geneva October 30, 1947.22 GATT has never been submitted to the 
Senate; in fact, there was never even a plan to do so.23 Thus the 
18. It is accepted, by some at least, that a nation may be bound under inter-
national law to a treaty, even though it has not followed its own internal constitu-
tional or domestic law in accepting the treaty. See International Law Commission of 
the United Nations, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties and Commentaries, UN 
Doc. A/6309/Rev. I, reproduced in 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 248, 291 (comment 9 to art. II) 
(1967): R.EsTATEMENT § 123. GATT was made effective by the Protocol of Provisional 
Application, which was signed by the requisite number of states to bring it into 
effect, including the signature of the United States representative with full powers. 
55 U.N.T.S. 308, 312 (1950). See also Hearings Before the Senate Finance Comm., 81st 
Cong., 1st Sess. 1092 (1949). 
19. R.EsTATEMENT § 141; BISHOP, supra note 8, at 201. 
20. The term "treaty" has two senses. On the one hand it is a generic term re-
ferring to all international agreements. See International Law Commission, supra 
note 18, at comment 2 to art. 2. This is the use in the text above. On the other hand, 
in the United States constitutional law sense the word "treaty" refers only to those 
international agreements to which the Senate must and does give its "advice and 
consent." This country, then, can enter into "treaty" obligations in the international 
sense without Senate consent. See R.EsTATEMENT § 123 (comment). 
21. See RESTATEMENT §§ 130, 131; MacDougal &: Lans, supra note 9. 
22. 61 Stat. pt. 6, at A2051 (1947), 55 U.N.T.S. 308 (1950). The Protocol was signed 
on behalf of the United States by Winthrop Brown, then Chief, Division of Commer• 
cial Policy, Dep't of State, who acted with full powers. 
23. See State Department Press Release, Dec. 13, 1945, reprinted in 13 DEP'T STATE 
BuLL. 970 (1945), announcing that invitations had been sent to a group of countries 
for negotiations on trade matters, and stating: "The latter agreements, so far as the 
United States is concerned, would be negotiated under the Reciprocal Trade Agree-
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authority for American participation in GA TT must stem from 
one of the two types of executive agreement mentioned above. 
Representatives of the executive branch have not always displayed 
certainty as to the true legal basis for GA TT: some have stated that 
the executive agreement was based entirely upon congressional 
authorization;24 others have said that the basis, at least in part, was 
the independent constitutional power of the President to conduct 
foreign affairs. 25 
I. Congressional Delegation of Authority to the President 
The United States Constitution provides in article I that "[t]he 
Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imports 
and Excises [and] ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Na-
tions .... "26 Thus, it seems clear that congressional participation 
is essential for entry into any broad and detailed international trade 
agreement, such as GA TT. But, although Congress at one time 
legislated tariff matters in great detail, this, as its own members 
have stated, proved to be unsatisfactory. Not only was it unduly 
burdensome, but the results by any fair appraisal were abominable. 
As one Senator put it in 1934: 
[O]ur experience in writing tariff legislation ... has been discourag-
ing. Trading between groups and sections is inevitable. Log-rolling 
is inevitable, and in its most pernicious form. We do not write a 
national tariff law. We jam together, through various unholy alli-
ances and combinations a potpourri or hodgepodge of section and 
local tariff rates, which often add to our troubles and increase world 
misery .... 27 
Consequently, in the last three decades, there has been an accelerat-
ing shift of power over foreign economic affairs from Congress to 
the executive. Moreover, because of GATT's unusual and unex-
pected origin, Congress has played a relatively minor role in the 
ments Act." See also statements made by executive branch spokesmen in Hearings on 
the International Trade Organization Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 80th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 70-74 (1947): Hearings on the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Program 
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1947). 
24. 94 CONG. R.Ec. 12662 (1949). 
25. See H.R. REP. No. 2007, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 113 (1955): Hearings on Exten-
sion of the Trade Agreements Act Before the Senate Finance Comm., 82d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 1153 (1951); Hearings on the Extension of Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act 
Before the Senate Finance Comm., 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1051 (1949); Statement by the 
Legal Advisor to the State Department, reprinted in Hearings of the Senate Finance 
Comm. on the ITO, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 173-76 (1947). See also app. B for the State 
Department analysis of authority for entry into GATT on an article-by-article basis. 
26. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8. 
27. 78 CONG. R.Ec. 10379 (1934) (remarks of Senator Cooper), quoted in S, REP, No. 
258, 78th Cong., 1st Scss. 49 (1943). 
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development of our relationship with GA TT as an instrument of 
United States policy.28 While admittedly these factors must be 
distinguished from the legal questions involved, their presence must 
also be noted since it colors those legal questions and influences the 
advocates of differing legal positions. 
The basic congressional delegation of power relied upon by the 
President in accepting the GA TT Protocol of Provisional Applica-
tion is contained in the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act as 
amended and extended for three years in 1945.29 The acceptance by 
28. Congressional complaints about this can be found sprinkled throughout the 
large number of hearings on extensions of the Trade Agreements Acts from 1947 
down to the present. For some particularly salient examples, see H.R. REP. No. 2007, 
84th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1956) (supplemental views of Representative Thomas B. 
Curtis); Hearings on the Extension of the Trade Agreements Act Before the Senate 
Finance Comm., 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 1096 (1951); Hearings on the Extension of the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Before the Senate Finance Comm., 81st Cong., 1st 
Sess. 1253 (1949). 
29. 59 Stat. 410 (1945). See app. D for a complete listing of the citations to the 
successive trade agreements acts. The basic trade agreements authority delegated by 
the 1945 statute was in the following terms: 
Sec, 350. (a) For the purpose of expanding foreign markets for the products of 
the United States (as a means of assisting in the present emergency in restoring 
the American standard of living, in overcoming domestic unemployment and 
the present economic depression, in increasing the purchasing power of the 
American public, and in establishing and maintaining a better relationship among 
various branches of American agriculture, industry, mining, and commerce) by 
regulating the admission of foreign goods into the United States in accordance 
with the characteristics and needs of various branches of American production 
so that foreign markets will be made available to those branches of American 
production which require and are capable of developing such outlets by affording 
corresponding market opportunities for foreign products in the United States, the 
President, whenever he finds as a fact that any existing duties or other import 
restrictions of the United States or any foreign country are unduly burdening 
and restricting the foreign trade of the United States and that the purpose 
above declared will be promoted by that means hereinafter specified, is autho-
rized from time to time-
(!) To enter into foreign trade agreements with foreign governments or 
instrumentalities thereof; and 
(2) To proclaim such modifications of existing duties and other import re-
strictions, or such additional import restrictions, or such continuance, and for 
such minimum periods, of existing customs or excise treatment of any article 
covered by foreign trade agreements, as are required or appropriate to carry out 
any foreign trade agreement that the President has entered into hereunder. No 
proclamation shall be made increasing or decreasing by more than 50 per_centum 
any rate of duty, however established, existing on January I, 1945 (even though 
temporarily suspended by Act of Congress), or transferring any article between 
the dutiable and free lists. The proclaimed duties and other import restrictions 
shall apply to articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of all foreign coun-
tries, whether imported directly or indirectly: Provided, That the President may 
suspend the application to articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of any 
country because of its discriminatory treatment of American commerce or because 
of other acts including the operation of international cartels or policies which in 
his opinion tend to defeat the purposes set forth in this section; and the pro-
claimed duties and other import restrictions shall be in effect from and after such 
time as is specified in the proclamation. The President may at any time terminate 
any such proclamation in whole or in part. 
(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the application, with 
respect to rates of duty established under this section pursuant to agreements with 
countries other than Cuba, of the provisions of the treaty of commercial reci-
procity concluded between the United States and the Republic of Cuba on Decem-
256 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 66:249 
the United States of subsequent amendments to GATT depends on 
later versions of this Act, and will be discussed below.80 The ques-
tion before us at this point, then, is whether this 1945 Statute 
authorized the President to bind the United States to GA TT, which 
at the time consisted of approximately 45,00031 tariff concessions 
(commitments as to maximum tariffs on items listed) and thirty-four 
(later thirty-five) articles obligating the signatory governments on 
such matters as most-favored-nation treatment, non-discrimination 
in internal taxation, quantitative restrictions on imports, duties of 
consultation with other signatories, and duties to act "jointly" with 
other parties to GA TT in certain situations.82 If this question is 
answered in the negative, then the source of authority must be 
sought in the President's independent constitutional powers or in 
other legislation.88 
Legal attacks on the argument that our adherence to GA TT is 
properly based upon this Statute have usually been on two fronts: 
(I) the Statute unconstitutionally delegated legislative power;34 
ber II, 1902, or to preclude giving effect to an exclusive agreement with Cuba 
concluded under this section, modifying the existing preferential customs treat-
ment of any article the growth, produce, or manufacture of Cuba: Provided, 
That the duties on such an article shall in no case be increased or decreased by 
more than 50 per centum of the duties, however established, existing on 
January 1, 1945 (even though temporarily suspended by Act of Congress). 
(c) As used in this section, the term "duties and other import restrictions" 
includes (I) rate and form of import duties and classification of articles, and 
(2) limitations, prohibitions, charges, and exactions other than duties, imposed 
on importation or imposed for the regulation of imports. 
(d) (1) When any rate of duty has been increased or decreased for the dura-
tion of war or an emergency, by agreement or otherwise, any further increase 
or decrease shall be computed upon the basis of the post-war or post-emergency 
rate carried in such agreement or otherwise. 
(2) Where under a foreign trade agreement the United States has reserved 
the unqualified right to withdraw or modify, after the termination of war or 
an emergency, a rate on a specific commodity, the rate on such commodity to be 
considered as "existing on January I, 1945" for the purpose of this section shall 
be the rate which would have existed if the agreement had not been entered into. 
(3) No proclamation shall be made pursuant to this section for the purpose of 
carrying out any foreign trade agreement the proclamation with respect to 
which has been terminated in whole by the President prior to the date this 
subsection is enacted. 
30. See discussion in text at pt. lI.A.3. 
31. See H.R. REP. No. 2009, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1948). 
32. See app. A for list of the GATT articles and their general subject matter. See 
also note I supra. 
The strongest legal battles over the validity of GA TT have been fought not in 
the courts, but in the congressional hearings. See the list of renewal acts and related 
House and Senate Reports in app. D. See also Hearing on the ITO Before the 
House Foreign Affairs Comm., 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); Hearings on Operation of 
the Trade Agreements Act and the Proposed ITO Before the House Ways and Means 
Comm., 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); Hearings on the Operation of the Trade Agree-
ments Act and the Proposed ITO Before the Senate Finance Comm., 80th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1947). 
33. See discussion in text at pt. II.A.2. 
34. See Hearings on the Extension of the Trade Agreements Act Before the 
Senate Finance Comm., 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 143 (1943); Hearings on the Extension of 
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(2) an agreement such as GA TT is beyond the scope of the authority 
delegated by the Statute. At least one court has upheld this Statute 
in the face of the constitutional argument.35 Indeed, the history of 
similar delegations, which goes back almost to the beginning of the 
Republic,36 and several Supreme Court opinions37 rendered on 
similar statutes confirm the many memoranda38 contained in the 
congressional committee reports on the Reciprocal Trade Agree-
ments Act and its extensions which conclude that the Statute is not 
challengeable for unconstitutionality. 
The second line of attack, that GA TT goes beyond the author-
ity delegated by the Statute, is more complex. The arguments that 
the Statute does not delegate such power can be sorted into three 
groups: (1) GATT is a multilateral agreement, whereas the Act 
authorized only bilateral agreements; (2) various specific substan-
tive clauses of GA TT go beyond the statutory authorization (for 
example, provisions on quantitative restrictions, national treatment 
of imported goods, dumping, and customs valuation); and (3) 
GA TT is an international organization, with voting and other ad-
ministrative clauses, and the United States executive was given no 
authority to enter such an organization. Let us deal first with the 
multilateral question. 
By the time the trade agreements authority was renewed in 
1945, this country had entered into thirty-two separate trade agree-
ments under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act and its exten-
the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Before the Senate Finance Comm., 76th Cong., 
lid Sess. 698 (1940); Hearings on the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Before the 
Senate Finance Comm., 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1934). 
35. Starkist Foods, Inc. v. United States, 47 C.C.P .A. 52 (1959). See also Note, 61 
COLUM. L, REv. 505 (1961). 
36. See S. REP, No. 1297, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 5 (1940); Hearings on Extension of 
Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act Before the Senate Finance Comm., 81st Cong., 1st 
Sess. 1095 (1949); memorandum of the State Department entitled Congressional 
Legislation and Reciprocal Executive Agreements Concerning Tariff and Related 
Matters, reprinted in Hearings on Reciprocal Trade Agreements Before the Senate 
Finance Comm., 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1934). The effect of practice over a period of 
time was succinctly stated by Secretary Dulles when, in reference to the Trade Agree-
ments Acts, he said: "I don't believe that this law which has remained on the books 
21 years unchallenged is unconstitutional •••• " Hearings on the Trade Agreements 
Extension Before the Senate Finance Comm., 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1252 (1955). 
37. Hampton &: Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 
649 (1892). 
38. See H.R. REP. No. 2007, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. app. G, at 113 (1956); Hearings 
on the Extension of the Trade Agreements Act Before the Senate Finance Comm., 
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1059 (1949); Hearings on Extension of the Trade Agreements 
Act Before the Senate Finance Comm., 80th Cong., 2d Scss. 470-71 (1948); Hearings 
on Extension of Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Before the Senate Finance Comm., 
76th Cong., 3d Sess. 729 (1940); State and Justice Departments memoranda reprinted 
in Hearings on Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Before the Senate Finance Comm., 
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1934). See also Note, 61 COLUM, L. REv. 505 (1961). 
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sions since the original Act was adopted in 1934.311 Except for an 
agreement with the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union,40 these 
agreements were all bilateral. A search of the legislative history for 
the 1945 Act, as well as that for the predecessor enactments in 1934, 
1937, 1940, and 1943, reveals no explicit mention of the possibility 
of a multilateral agreement pursuant to the authority delegated, 
although one statement spoke of the agreements being "reciprocal 
rather than bilateral."41 On the other hand, several statements in 
the 1945 legislative history refer to the Act as one of several postwar 
economic policy building blocks, side by side with such others as 
the Bretton-Woods Agreements, which did set up two multilateral 
organizations.42 In addition, some of the early congressional criti-
cism of the trade agreements program was directed at the most-
favored-nation policy, which allowed some nations to reap the 
benefits of bilateral negotiations between the United States and 
third countries.43 The logical way to prevent these "free rides" was 
to develop some sort of multilateral procedure for negotiation.44 All 
39. These agreements are listed in Hearings on the Extension of the Reciprocal 
Trade Agreements Act Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 79th Cong., 
1st Sess. 932 (1945). 
40. Agreement between the United States of America and the Belgo-Luxembourg 
Union. 49 Stat. 3680 (1935). 
41. 91 CoNG. R.Ec. 5049 (1945). See app. D for a list of the acts and some of their 
legislative history. 
42. Hearings on the Extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Before the 
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 45-46, 819 (1945); 91 CONG. 
R.Ec. 4885, 6019 (1945). 
43. H.R. REP. No. 594, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1945); Hearings of the House Ways 
and Means Comm., 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 41, 432, 819, 837 (1945); 91 CONG. R.Ec. 4979, 
5049, 5086, 5089, 5100, 5142, 6210 (1945). 
44. The policy of unconditional most-favored-nation application of foreign trade 
agreements was adopted by the United States in 1923 [91 CONG. R.Ec. 4979 (1945)], 
and enacted into law as § 350(a){2) of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 
1934, 48 Stat. 943. The statute provides: "The proclaimed duties and other import 
restrictions shall apply to articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of all foreign 
countries, whether imported directly or indirectly •.•. " The most favored nation 
clause was typically worded like that in the United States-Mexico Reciprocal Trade 
Agreement of 1942 (57 Stat. 833) which read: 
\Vith respect to customs duties •.• [etc.] any advantage, favor, privilege, or 
immunity which has been or may hereafter be granted by the United States of 
America or the United Mexican States to any article originating in or destined 
for any third country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the 
like article originating in or destined for the United Mexican States or the 
United States of America, respectively. 
Id. at 835. Thus, if the United States agreed with Great Britain that it would limit 
the amount of tariff on widgets to 10%, it was committed by the MFN clause in 
various other treaties to limit its tariff on widgets to the same amount when those 
widgets were imported from those other countries. If the United States negotiated 
with Great Britain for the lowering of widget tariffs, it would usually receive some 
benefit or concession in return from Great Britain. But if the percentage of its total 
imports of widgets which originated in Great Britain were 50%, then another 50% 
of widget imports would come in under the same duty reduction, without anything 
having been received in compensation to the United States. The rationale or justifica-
tion for this type of policy is that when all trading partners apply it, then the United 
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things considered, however, it is understandable that Congress was 
surprised when, less than six months after it extended the Trade 
Agreements Act without discussion of the possibility of a multi-
lateral trade agreement, it learned that the executive branch had 
called on fifteen other nations to join with it in multilateral tariff 
negotiations.411 
From examining the text of the Statute, 46 one can see that it 
places no explicit hurdle against multilateral trade agreements. 
Furthermore, it was stressed in testimony before the congressional 
committee47 that the 194 7 GA TT negotiations would in reality be 
"bilateral," as before, with the results of the many bilateral negotia-
tions simply drawn together in one instrument, for the sake of 
convenience. Even an opposing Congressman commented that 
merely because the result was one instrument signed by all, did 
not in itself mean that the President had exceeded his statutory 
authority.48 Thus, one can conclude that GATT does not go beyond 
the statutory authority merely because of its multilateral nature. 
A more serious statutory assault on GA TT is the argument that 
specific provisions of GA TT exceed the authority delegated to the 
President by the Trade Agreements Act. Careful analysis is re-
quired to evaluate this argument, but to discuss each clause of 
GATT here would be tedious and lengthy. Appendix A outlines 
the sources, if the reader wishes to pursue the matter as to any 
specific article of GA TT. Without reference to specific GATT pro-
visions, however, the arguments for the statutory validity of our 
adherence to GATT can be summarized as follows: (1) the language 
States also reaps the benefit of negotiated concessions between other countries. Never-
theless, there is the danger of the free ride by third parties whenever the United States 
negotiates a tariff concession with another country. One way to prevent this is to 
develop multilateral negotiations (as was done in GATI), so that a tentative con-
cession could be arranged between country A and country B, and then the importing 
country could go to its other trading partners who exported the same item and ask 
for compensatory concessions for the advantage they would receive by the lower tariff 
on those items. Thus if country B and C each exported 50% of the imports of widgets 
into A, and A negotiated a tentative tariff concession with B, A could then go to C 
during the multilateral negotiations and ask for some compensatory concession for 
the advantage C would receive by the lowering of the tariff on the widget. 
45. State Department Press Release, Dec. 16, 1945, reproduced in 13 DEP'T STATE 
BULL. 970 (1945). See also Hearings on the Operation of the Trade Agreements Act and 
the Proposed International Trade Organization Before the House Foreign Affairs 
Comm., 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 6 (1947). 
46. See note 29 supra. 
47. Hearings on Operation of the Trade Agreements Act and Proposed ITO 
Before the House Ways c- Means Comm., 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 191-95, 235 (1947). 
48. Id. at 235. The author has been informed that United States participation 
in the multilateral Universal Postal Union is also based on statutes which had been 
drafted with bilateral agreements in mind. This could be a precedent for GATT 
participation. 
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of the Statute can be read to permit United States entry into GA TT, 
since it authorizes "trade agreements" either without explicit limita-
tion or with limitations that can be interpreted not to preclude an 
agreement such as GA TT; (2) the legislative history shows that 
provisions such as those in GA TT were contemplated by Congress; 
(3) prior trade agreements known to Congress had provisions like 
those of GATT, thus further evidencing congressional intent; 
(4) later actions of Congress can be taken as recognizing or accepting 
GA TT; and (5) several court cases, while not directly litigating the 
validity of GA TT, have resulted in decisions and opinions that 
necessarily imply its validity. 
In a very real sense, one of the most telling arguments is simply 
the passage of time. The practice today of all three branches of our 
government recognizes the legal existence of GA TT;49 to disown 
GATT at this point would be a jolt to this nation's foreign policy 
and, indeed, to the stability of international economic relations 
throughout most of the world. While the political arms of the 
government might administer such a jolt, one can only conclude 
that, in any imaginable test of GATT's legality in American courts, 
the agreement as a whole will continue to be upheld. The legal 
arguments, however, can directly influence the future scope and 
extent of the impact of GATT. Additionally, legal arguments illus-
trate aspects of the congressional-executive relationship concerning 
GATT which have already affected GA TT to a great extent and 
which will continue to do so. 
The statutory language. The language of the Statute is curiously 
bifurcated in form: it makes two grants of power to the President, 50 
first to "enter into foreign trade agreements," and second "to pro-
claim such modifications of existing duties and other import restric-
tions ... as are required or appropriate to carry out any foreign 
trade agreement . . . ." Then follow certain limitations on the 
power to proclaim. 51 
It has been argued52 that the first clause is unlimited: the 
President is given the power to enter into any "foreign trade 
49. As to the effect of passage of time on the legal issue, see note 36 supra. The 
executive branch initiated GATT and has, of course, continuously argued for its 
validity. When faced with a GATT question, the judiciary has assumed the valid 
existence of GATT. See notes 108 &: 109 infra and accompanying text. As for Congress, 
even it today recognizes and relies on the validity of GATT; for example, legislation 
authorizing the Kennedy Round would make little sense unless the background of 
GATT existed. See note 108 infra and accompanying text. 
50. See § 350(a) of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1945, quoted in 
note 29 supra. 
51. Id. 
52. Memorandum of the Department of State, printed in H.R. REP. No. 2007, 
84th Cong., 2d Sess. 113 (1956). 
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agreement," the only limitation on this power being implicit in 
the definition of "foreign trade agreement." This does not neces-
sarily mean that the President could carry out all parts of such 
an agreement (for instance, domestic legal action might be necessary 
to do so), but merely that he has the authority to obligate the 
United States in the international sense to anything that can reason-
ably be called a "foreign trade agreement." If this be the case, it 
is possible to test the validity of GATT as an international obliga-
tion by checking each of its parts to see if it appropriately belongs 
in a "foreign trade agreement." Historical examples would help 
define "trade agreement," and the analysis below as to prior trade 
agreements known to Congress53 would certainly be relevant, al-
though not determinative. The broadest scope that can be argued 
for the Statute is that anything that affects foreign trade (and, as 
nations are learning, there is little that does not)54 is appropriate in 
a foreign trade agreement. The provisions of GATT would fall 
easily within this definition. 
Arguably, the definition of "trade agreement" is much more 
restricted: it is possible to read the limiting language in the second 
clause, relating to the proclamation power, as also attaching to the 
grant of power in the first clause. The propriety of this reading is 
reinforced by the notion that it is idle ( or worse, bad policy) to 
authorize the President to commit the United States internationally 
without giving him sufficient means to carry out this commitment; 
such would be the case if the powers of implementation were re-
stricted in a way that the power to agree was not. This interpreta-
tion would result in limiting the President's authority to enter into 
"trade agreements" to those agreements concerned with "duties and 
import restrictions." An examination of GA TT provisions, how-
ever, reveals that most of the general articles~5 can be justified as 
5!1. See text following note 72 infra. 
54. Even interest rates in the respective countries are now becoming a subject 
of international understanding or agreement. See Cowan, U.S. and 4 Nations Join 
To Seek Cuts in Interest Rates, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1967, at 1, col. 8. The potential 
broad reach of this argument was recognized in the 1949 Senate Finance Comm. Hear-
ings, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1156: 
Senator Millikin: I think you gave us a measuring stick a while ago that 
gave us, as I see it, a glimpse of your philosophy. Is it your contention that you 
can take any economic situation, any place, and say that this puts a hindrance 
upon trade, or puts up a hurdle to trade, export or import, and that if you find 
that to be a fact you can make an agreement of any nature that in our [sic] 
opinion will remove or tend to remove that hurdle? 
Mr. Brown: No, sir. 
55. The original General Agreement, as drafted at Geneva in 1947 and implemented 
on January 1, 1948, contained thirty-four articles. As a result of some changes made 
in 1948, a new article, art. 35, was added to GATT. Since this article was added so 
soon after the origin of GATT, it is generally considered that GATT has always 
had thirty-five articles. Today, of course, due to the addition of pt. IV to GATT, 
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embraced within the term "import restriction."116 Of the remaining 
articles, some merely contain exceptions to commitments against 
tariff or non-tariff barriers and thus are within the statutory lan-
guage.117 The articles which deal with administrative matters, such 
as consultation over disputes, accession of new parties, "waivers," 
amendments, and withdrawal, however, are the hardest to bring 
within the statutory language. Clearly, some of these provisions may 
be implicitly authorized as essentially concomitant to any foreign 
agreement, especially a foreign trade agreement.158 
The scope of executive authority might also be limited by stat-
utes other than the Trade Agreements Act, however, most such 
problems were avoided when Part II of GATT, the "trade conduct 
code" containing most of the questionable articles, was made sub-
ject to "existing legislation."159 Likewise, the President might turn 
to other statutes to expand the scope of his authority to enter trade 
agreements, as appears necessary to support the GA TT clauses that 
deal with export controls.60 
In sum, looking only at the explicit language of the statutory 
delegation, the argument that GATT is within its scope as a "trade 
agreement" appears persuasive. But even if one chooses to apply 
other limiting language in the Statute to the scope of authority to 
enter agreements, most of GA TT can be justified under the express 
language. 
Legislative history. It is clear from the legislative proceedings in 
1945 that Congress contemplated that provisions in trade agreements 
which came into force in June 1966, GATT has a total of thirty-eight articles. See 
note 160 infra. In addition, there arc the various annexes and bulky schedules of tariff 
concessions which are incorporated by reference. 
56. The general subject matter of each article is stated in app. A, which also 
indicates a congressional justification or precedent for each article. As to the limits 
of tariff cutting authority, see DEP'T OF STATE, ANALYSIS OF GENERAL AGREEMENT ON 
TARIFFS AND TRADE (Commercial Policy Series 109, Publ. No. 2983, 1947), which 
states that the limits on executive negotiating power as to tariff rates were observed. 
57. If authority exists to negotiate on a subject, such authority would seem usually 
to extend to negotiating exceptions to commitments regarding the subject. 
58. See discussion in text at pt. ill.A.2; note 56 supra; text following note 111 infra. 
59. See discussion in text at pt. m.A.2; lists of "inconsistent legislation" cited in 
notes 250 &: 251 infra. 
60. GATT articles and paragraphs which mention "exports" are 1:1, VI:l; VI:5; 
VI:6(b); VI:7(a); VIII:1 8: 4; IX:2; XIII:1; XI:l; XVI:B; XX:i. At the time GATT 
was negotiated, the President had authority to govern exports under § 6(d) of the 
Act of July 2, 1940, 54 Stat. 714, as amended by 56 Stat. 463 (1942) and 61 Stat. 946 
(1947). A thorough study of United States export controls can be found in Bermann 
8: Garson, United States Export Controls-Past, Present, and Future, 67 Couru. L. 
REv. 791 (1967). See also app. A. President Truman's 1947 Proclamation of GA TT 
relies not only on § 350 of the Tariff Act [19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1964)], but also upon 
§ 304(3) [19 U.S.C. § 1304 (1964)] which embodied a 1938 amendment relating to 
marking requirements. 
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authorized under the Statute would go considerably beyond tariff 
concessions. Not only did Congress have before it previously nego-
tiated trade agreements with extensive non-tariff provisions, 61 but 
criticisms of these agreements as well as other statements made in 
committee hearings show clearly that Congress was cognizant of the 
importance of non-tariff barriers to international trade and of the 
dangers of tariff concessions being effectively nullified by import 
quotas, currency devaluations, and other ingenious devices.62 One 
Congressman listed twenty-nine trade barriers that he claimed had 
been used against the United States.63 To have concluded a foreign 
trade agreement without provisions to protect the value of tariff 
concessions would have run counter to congressional intent; indeed, 
American negotiators at Geneva in 1947 refused to enter into tariff 
commitments without the protection of the general provisions which 
were included in the GATT agreement.64 Likewise, there was con-
siderable discussion in Congress about the most-favored-nation 
clause65 and about the "escape clause"66 (including an informal 
commitment by the Administration to include the escape clause in 
all future trade agreements). 61 In fact, most of the individual pro-
visions of GATT, when matched against pertinent legislative his-
tory, relate to specific discussions in the latter (see Appendix A). 
61. See text accompanying note 72 infra. 
62. H.R. REP. No. 594, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 43, 51 (1945): 91 CONG. REc. 4876 
(remarks of Congressman Knutson), 4886 (remarks of Congressman Robertson), 
4998-99 (remarks of Congressman Reed), 5070 (remarks of Congressman Curtis) (1945); 
Hearings on the Extension of the Redprocal Trade Agreements A.ct Before the Senate 
Comm. on Finance, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 41-42, 83, 92 (1945); Hearing on the Extension 
of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Before the House Ways and Means Comm., 
79th Cong., 1st Sess. 63, 194, 226, 307, 309, 409, 576, 2337, 2339 (1945). 
63. 91 CONG. REc. 4999 (1945) (remarks of Congressman Reed). 
64. Meeting of the Trade Agreement Committee in Geneva, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/-
TAC/PV/3, at 17-19 (1947). Preparatory materials for drafting GATT, which were 
prepared in 1946-1947 under the auspices of the United Nations, bear the document 
identification U.N. Doc. E/PC/T. For purposes of simplification, these documents 
will be cited as EPCT /. 
65. H.R. REP. No. 594, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1945); 91 CONG. REc. 4979 (remarks 
of Congressman Cooper), 5049 (remarks of Congressman Mills), 5086 (remarks of 
Congressman McCormack), 5100 (remarks of Congressman Lewis), 5142 (remarks of 
Congressman Hale), 6210 (remarks of Congressman Thomas) (1945); Hearings on the 
Extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements A.ct Before the House Comm. on Ways 
and Means, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 41, 432, 819, 837 (1945). 
66. H.R. REP. No. 594, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1945); 91 CONG. REc. 4872, 4891 
(1945); Hearings on the Extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Before 
the Senate Finance Comm., 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 84, 86, 90, 459 (1945); Hearings on the 
Extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements A.ct Before the House Comm. on Ways 
and Means, 79th Cong., 1st Scss. 273 (1945). 
67. 91 CoNG. REc. 4872 (1945) (remarks of Congressman Doughton). Later the 
President issued an executive order providing that an escape clause similar to that 
found in the Mexican Treaty would be included in all future trade agreements. See 
Executive Order No. 9832 of Feb. 25, 1947. 3 C.F.R. 1943-1948 Comp. 624. 
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The clauses which do not so relate are of three types: (1) those 
concerned with administrative matters;68 (2) those which deal with 
import barriers not specifically mentioned in the legislative history, 
but similar to barriers expressly mentioned, and thus arguably 
within the scope of the general authority to protect the value of 
tariff concessions against non-tariff barriers;69 and (3) two clauses 
which except economic development arrangements70 and regional 
trading blocks71 from the application of the agreement. 
Previous foreign trade agreements. During the 1945 debate, Con-
gress had before it the previous thirty-two trade agreements nego-
tiated under the authority of the Trade Agreements Acts.72 It is 
logical to conclude that, as Congress extended the authority to enter 
into "foreign trade agreements," it intended to grant authority 
which at least encompassed subjects dealt with in prior agreements. 
Consequently, it is useful to compare the subject matter of some of 
these previous agreements with that of GA TT, to see in what 
respects, if any, GATT departs from precedent and tradition.73 It 
may be noted that the GA TT negotiators at Geneva expressed the 
view on several occasions that GA TT was to take merely the "usual 
form of trade agreements," and should include only clauses which 
were normally found in such agreements74 and which were essential 
to safeguard the value of the tariff concessions negotiated.75 
An analysis comparing GA TT with certain of these prior agree-
ments is also contained in Appendix A. It shows that almost the 
entire range of GATT's substantive subject matter had been dealt 
with in one or more prior United States trade agreements, including 
the regulation of exports. (The only exceptions to this are films and 
export or import-reduction subsidies.) Of course, the GATT ad-
ministrative provisions are different from those of prior agreements 
due to the multilateral nature of GATT, but many of these 
68. GATT, arts. XXII-XXXV and specific portions of other articles. 
69. See app. A. 
70. GATT, art. XVIII. 
71. GATT, art. XX.IV. 
72. See list of the agreements reproduced in the Hearings on Extension of the 
Trade Agreements Act Before the House Comm. on ·ways and Means, 79th Cong., 
1st Sess. 38, 636, 932 (1948). A list of U.S. agreements with most-favored-nation clauses 
appears at p. 837 of these hearings. A full reprint of the agreement with Mexico, 
which is representative, may also be found at p. 237. 
73. See app. A. 
74. Report of the Tariff Negotiation Working Party-General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, U.N. Doc. EPCT/135, para. 6, at 2 (1947); U.N. Doc. EPCT/ 
TAC/PV.3, at 19 (1947). 
75. Report of the First Session of the Preparatory Committee of the U.N. Con-
ference on Trade and Employment 50 (Oct. 1946); U.N. Doc. EPCT/TAC/ PV.2, at 19 
(1947). 
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prov1S1ons are simply multilateral parallels to bilateral prov1S1ons 
in prior agreements.76 Given the complexity and comprehensiveness 
of United States trade agreements prior to the 1945 Act, and allow-
ing for GATT's multilateral nature, it is hard to conclude that 
GA TT was a radical or even a substantial departure from the pat-
tern of prior agreements. Arguably, then, the general subjects of 
GATT were within the contemplation of Congress when it ex-
tended the authority to the President to enter "trade agreements." 
This, however, is a conclusion as to the then-existing intent; it may 
well be that Congress did not envision the resultant vast extension 
of power by the President. Particularly, GATT may have resulted 
in an unforeseen extension of executive power, simply because the 
same provision may have a greater impact in a multilateral context 
than in the context of bilateral relations. 
Congressional ratification. The GATT provisions have never 
been formally submitted to Congress. The theory of the executive 
branch has been that GA TT was authorized by a combination of 
existing statutes and presidential power, and that therefore there 
was no need to submit it to Congress.77 It was intended that the ITO 
agreement be submitted to Congress;78 this would have given Con-
gress a formal opportunity to review provisions many of which are 
identically worded in GA TT. The ITO was abandoned, however, 
so that, while the GA TT provisions were extensively discussed in 
committee,79 Congress has never formally approved them. 
Congress has been acutely aware of GA TT over the two decades 
of GATT's existence. Each time it extended the Trade Agreements 
Act, GATT was debated.80 In 1955, the Draft Charter for the Or-
ganization for Trade Cooperation (OTC), which was prepared at 
GA TT meetings and would have set up a formal international 
organization to oversee GATT, was submitted to Congress,81 but 
76. For an example of administrative provisions in a bilateral trade agreement, 
see clauses VI 8: X of the Agreement between the United States and the Netherlands 
regarding, inter alia, "sympathetic consideration" and the appointment of a committee 
to handle certain disputes. 50 Stat. 1504 (1935). 
77. State Department Press Release, Dec. 13, 1945, reprinted in 8 DEP'T STATE 
BULL. 970 (1945); Hearings on ITO Before the Senate Finance Comm., 80th Cong., 
1st Sess. 71 (1947); Hearings on ITO Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 
80th Cong., 1st Sess. II (1947). 
78. Hearings on ITO Before the House Foreign Affairs Comm., 81st Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1950); Hearings on the Operation of the Trade Agreements Act and the Proposed 
ITO Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. II (1947). 
79. Hearings on the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 Before the Senate 
Finance Comm., 82d Cong., 1st Sess. II42 (1951). 
80. See app. D; note 78 supra. 
81. H.R. REP. No. 2007, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956). 
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Congress did not approve it.82 Arguments for and against the legal-
ity of GA TT have continued in congressional proceedings at least 
up to the end of the 1950's.83 
Congressional enactments have mentioned GA TT explicitly 
only a few times. The first of these was in the 1950 amendment to 
section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA).84 This section 
concerns import quotas on agricultural goods, a subject to which 
article XI of GATT is intimately related. In 1948, just after GATT 
came into being, Congress had amended section 22(£) to read: 
No proclamation under this section shall be enforced in contra-
vention of any treaty or other international agreement to which the 
United States is or hereafter becomes a party.85 
In 1950, certain Senators had attempted to reverse this order of 
precedence by proposing the following amendment: 
No international agreement hereafter shall be entered into by 
the United States, or renewed, extended or allowed to extend beyond 
its permissible termination date in contravention of this section.so 
Instead Congress enacted the following amending language: 
No proclamation under this section shall be enforced in contra-
vention of any treaty or other international agreement to which the 
United States is or hereafter becomes a party; but no international 
agreement or amendment to an existing international agreement 
shall hereafter be entered into which does not permit the enforce-
ment of this section with respect to the Articles and countries to 
which such agreement or amendment is applicable to the full extent 
that the general agreement on tariffs and trade, as heretofore entered 
into by the United States, permit such enforcement with respect to 
the Articles and countries to which such general agreement is ap-
plicable ..•. 87 
This was the first explicit statutory reference to GATT,88 and, it 
may be argued, was express recognition by Congress of the existence 
and validity of GATT. 
82. A check of the index to 102 CONG. REc. and the CCH CoNG. INDEX for the 
84th Congress show that H.R. 5550 never came to a vote. After being reported to the 
House in H.R. REP. No. 2007, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956), it was given to the Committee 
of the Whole House on the State of the Union. No further congressional action was 
ever taken. 
83. Hearings on Extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Before the 
Senate Finance Comm., 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 155, IS55 (1958). 
84. 64 Stat. 261 (1950). 
85. 62 Stat. 1248 (1948). 
86. S. REP. No. 1375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1950); S. REP. No. 1!126, 81st Cong., 2d 
Sess. 5 (1950). 
87. 64 Stat. 261 (1950). 
88. Based on an extensive search through federal statutes and reading of the 
legislative history for the various reciprocal trade agreements acts. See note 91 infra. 
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In 1948 and 1949, Congress extended the Trade Agreements Act 
for the fifth89 and sixth00 times. Although neither extension men-
tioned GA TT, it was discussed in the legislative history; thus, argu-
ably, this re-enactment of the statutory authority under which the 
President claimed to enter GA TT comprises a "ratification" of 
GATT.91 The extensions, however, were for one year and two years 
respectively, instead of the usual three years, reflecting the uncer-
tainty over foreign economic policy which existed in Congress at 
that time.92 Administration officials testifying before Congress in 
1951 refused to raise the ratification argument.93 
The fortunes of politics change, however, and the 82d Congress 
had other ideas about GATT. The Trade Agreements Extension 
Act of 1951 provides, in section 10, the second explicit statutory 
reference to GA TT:94 
The enactment of this Act shall not be construed to determine 
or indicate the approval or disapproval by the Congress of the Exec-
utive Agreement known as the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade. 
This provision was repeated in the 1953, 1954, 1955, and 1958 
extensions of the trade agreements authority.95 Furthermore, in 
1951 Congress amended the Defense Production Act of 1950 by 
adding a section which required import quotas on fats, oils, and 
certain dairy products in contravention of GATT.96 In addition, 
89. 62 Stat. 105!! (1948). 
90. 6!! Stat. 697 (1949). 
91. This argument is implicit in an affidavit of Williard L. Thorp of the State 
Department made before the District Court of the United States for the District of 
Columbia in Rodes v. Acheson, Civil No. 3756-49 (1949): 
The justification for discriminations by a country in balance of payments difficulties 
under certain circumstances is recoguized by the United States and the 22 other 
parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (treaties and other 
international acts series 1700). The authority to negotiate for the excession of 
additional countries to this agreement has recently been extended by Congress 
without qualification (public law 307, 81st Congress), following hearings in which 
the provisions of the agreement, including those as to discriminations (Article 
XIV) were examined in detail (Finance Committee, Senate, extension of reciprocal 
Trade Agreements Act hearings, vol. 2, 1250 ff.). 
This affidavit was disapprovingly noted by Senator Milliken in Hearings on Extension 
of the Redprocal Trade Agreements Act Before the Senate Finance Comm., 82d Cong., 
1st Sess. ll91 (1951). 
92. In Territory v. Ho, 41 Hawaii 565, 567 (1957), the Court noted with respect 
to the Trade Agreements Act and GATT that, "[t]he constitutionality of the grant 
of such authority has been repeatedly questioned in and out of Congress. Nevertheless, 
Congress has extended from time to time the period during which the President may 
exercise such authority." 
93. Hearings on Extension of the Trade Agreements Act Be/ ore the Senate Finance 
Comm., 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 1191-92 (1951). 
94. 65 Stat. 72 (1951). 
95. 72 Stat. 673 (1958); 69 Stat. 162 (1955); 68 Stat. 360 (1954); 67 Stat. 472 (1953). 
96. 65 Stat. 1!11, 132 (1951). 
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that year Congress once again amended section 22(£) of the AAA, 
this time to read: 
No trade agreement or other international agreement heretofore 
or hereafter entered into by the United States shall be applied in a 
manner inconsistent with the requirements of this section.97 
This was done despite congressional recognition that this might 
require the United States to breach GATT,98 and, in fact, forced the 
President to obtain a GATT waiver to avoid such a breach.99 
These actions illustrated congressional hostility toward GATT, 
and caused the Randall Commission on Foreign Economic Policy 
to state in 1954: 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade has never been re-
viewed and approved by the Congress. Indeed, questions concern-
ing the constitutionality of some aspects of the United States par-
ticipation in the General Agreement have been raised in the Con-
gress. This has created uncertainty about the future role of the 
United States in the General Agreement.100 
When the OTC was submitted to Congress in 1956, Congressmen 
again complained that they had not had an opportunity to review 
GATT, since the Administration carefully avoided submitting it 
to them.101 
As a practical matter today, however, GA TT is recognized by 
Congress as well as the executive branch as an important corner-
stone of United States policy. The Kennedy Round of tariff negotia-
tions authorized by the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,102 makes 
very little sense without GATT. The evidence of congressional 
ratification of GA TT is thus equivocal. Immediately after GATT 
came into being Congress seemed to go along, at least until the 
ITO was scuttled. Then Congress backpedalled. Yet GATT has 
91. 65 Stat. 75 (1951). 
98. Congress recognized the possibility that this statutory provision would be 
inconsistent with GATT. See S. REP. No. 299, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1951); Hearings on 
the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 
82d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1951). See also Waiver Granted to the United States in Connec• 
tion With Import Restrictions Imposed Under Section 22 of the United States Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act of 1933, as amended, 3d Supp. BISD 32 (1955). 
99. Decision of the Contracting Parties of GATT of March 5, 1955, GATT, !Id 
Supp. BISD !12 (1955). 
100. COMMISSION ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC PoucY, REPORT ro THE PRESIDENT AND THE 
CONGRESS 49 (1954). 
IOI. H.R. REP. No. 2007, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (supplemental views of Honorable 
Thomas B. Curtis), 46 (minority views). 
102. 19 U.S.C. § 1821 (1964). See Hearings on the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 240 (1962) 
(memorandum on negotiating procedures under GAT'I). Compare 19 U.S.C. § 1882 
(1964), with GATT, art. XXIII. 
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been so central to Western foreign economic policies that Congress 
has as a practical matter recognized and accepted its existence. 
Court opinions. Another factor that reinforces the argument for 
the validity of GA TT is that it has been recognized by both federal 
and state (including territorial) courts. The specific issue of GATT's 
validity was raised in only one case, but that case was dismissed on 
other grounds.103 However, a number of other cases have resulted 
in decisions necessarily implying the validity of GA TT-partic-
ularly in tariff cases before the Customs Court and the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals.104 In fact, since tariff concessions 
embodied in GA TT are so extensive, the majority of cases in those 
courts now involve tariff rates proclaimed by the President pur-
suant to GA TT or amending protocols.105 Other than in these 
courts, only seven American cases, and three opinions of the Cali-
fornia Attorney General,1°6 have been found which explicitly cite 
or mention GATT.107 Of these, four were in state or territorial 
courts108 and three in federal courts.109 In each case GATT's va-
103. Morgantown Glasswork Guild v. Humphrey, 236 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1956). 
104. See, e.g., Berent-Vandervoort v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 942 (C.C.P.A. 
1957); George E. Bardwil &: Sons v. United States, 42 C.C.P.A. 118 (1955). 
105. Examination of any current volume of these courts' reports reveals that the 
vast majority of the cases cite a presidential proclamation which effectuates a GATT 
agreement. For instance, in vol. 44 only twelve out of fifty-three fully reported 
decisions do not cite such a proclamation. See app. C for presidential proclamation 
citations for various GATT agreements. 
106. The California Attorney General's opinions are 59-164, 34 Cal. A.G. 302; 
60-141, 36 Cal. A.G. 147; 62·165, 40 Cal. A.G. 65. 
107. The Shepard citators for all states and territories of the United States and 
for all federal courts of the United States were searched since 1947 to the most 
currently available supplement in June of 1967 for all cases which cite 61 Stat. pts. 
5 &: 6, at A 3. Since GATT is sometimes cited without using the "Stat." reference, it is 
possible that persons who prepare the citator could have missed some cases if they 
did not translate a different citation into the statutory citation. In addition to search-
ing the citators, various attorneys both in and out of government were contacted who 
might have knowledge of other cases. 
108. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. App. 2d 803, 25 Cal. 
Rptr. 799 (1962) (California "Buy American Act" held to be unenforceable because 
violative of GATT); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm'rs, Civil Nos. 899165 
&: 897591 (Super. Ct., County of Los Angeles 1966) (also challenged the California "Buy 
American" Act); Territory v. Ho, 41 Hawaii 565 (1957) (struck down as unconstitutional 
and contrary to GATT a territorial law requiring retailers selling imported eggs to 
advertise that fact); Texas Ass'n of Steel Importers v. Texas Highway Comm'r, 364 
S.W.2d 749 (Tex. Ct. App. 1963) (administrative ruling of the highway commission 
requiring the use of domestic steel in highway projects challenged as contrary to 
state law, the Constitution, and GATT-disposed of on state law grounds). The 
Bethlehem case held that Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton was controlling and that the plain-
tiffs had an adequate remedy at law and therefore denied a petition for a preliminary 
injunction. On May 2, 1967, defendant's motion to dismiss was granted. The author has 
been informed that the case has been appealed. See note 286 infra. See also Comment, 
GATT, The California Buy American Act, and the Continuing Struggle Between Free 
Trade and Protectionism, 52 CALIF. L. REv. 335 (1964); Note, 17 STAN, L. REv. 119 
(1964). 
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lidity was either assumed, upheld, or not decided. No opinion citing 
or mentioning GATT has yet been rendered by the United States 
Supreme Court. 
It is appropriate now to turn to the third question as to the 
statutory validity of GATT mentioned at the outset of this sub-
section: whether the administrative provisions110 of GA TT con-
stituted it an international organization which the President did 
not have the statutory power to join. Most previous United States 
trade agreements had provisions in them for certain types of 
administrative functions, 111 such as arrangements for consulting112 
or agreeing on changes in tariff commitments.113 Early in GA TT's 
drafting history it was recognized that some of these administrative 
functions would be necessary to implement GATT.114 It was hoped 
that the ITO would eventually assume these functions, but until 
that time a GA TT mechanism was required.115 Early GA TT drafts 
consequently provided for an "Interim Trade Committee."116 
Soon after these early drafts, and before negotiations opened at 
Geneva in the spring of 1947, House and Senate committees held 
extensive hearings on the proposed ITO and GATT negotiations.117 
Some members of Congress challenged the authority of the President 
to enter into GA TT on the specific ground that he was not autho-
rized to join an international "provisional organization."118 At 
subsequent GA TT drafting sessions in Geneva, the term "Interim 
109. Talbot v. Atlantic Steel, 275 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Morgantown Glassware 
Guild v. Humphrey, 236 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1956); C. Tennant, Sons &: Co. v. Dill, 
158 F. Supp. 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). 
110. These provisions are found in GATT, arts. XXII-XXXV. See app. A; text 
accompanying note 58 supra. 
111. See app. A for illustrative prior trade agreement provisions that correspond 
to various articles of GATT. 
112. E.g., Article XI of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement with Canada, 49 Stat. 8960 
(1935); art. XIV of the Trade Agreement with Mexico, 57 Stat. 888 (1943). 
113. E.g., Article XIV of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement with Canada, 49 Stat. 
3960 (1935). 
114. Report of the First Session of the Preparatory Committee of the U.N. Con-
ference on Trade and Employment, annexure 10, § i, at 51 (Oct. 1946). 
115. Id. 
116. Draft of GATT, arL XX in U.N. Doc. EPCT/C.6/W.58 (1947); Draft of GATT, 
art. XXII in EPCT/C.6/85 (1947); Draft of GATT, art. XXII in Report of the Drafting 
Committee on the Preparatory Committee of the U.N. Conference on Trade and 
Employment EPCT /34, at 78 (1947). 
117. Hearings on the Trade Agreements Act and the Proposed ITO Before the 
House Ways and Means Comm., 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); Hearings on Operation of 
the Trade Agreements Act and Proposed ITO Before the Senate Finance Comm., 80th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). 
118. Hearings on the Operation on the Trade Agreements Act and the Proposed 
ITO Before the House Ways and Means Comm., 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 191-95 (1947); 
Hearings on the Trade Agreements Act and the Proposed ITO Before the Senate 
Finance Comm., 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 74, 202, 385 (1947). 
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Trade Committee" was omitted and instead the term "Contracting 
Parties" was used.119 The expressed purpose of this change was to 
remove any connotation of formal organization.120 The Adminis-
tration has tried to maintain this fiction that GA TT is not an 
organization121-going so far, in the 1955 Senate hearings, as to 
characterize GATT as merely a "forum."122 Consistently, our con-
tributions to GA TT have been drawn from the State Department 
"Conferences and Contingency Fund" with the accounting entry 
listing GA TT as a "provisional organization."123 Furthermore, 
GA TT has never been designated as an "international organization" 
for purposes of the Privileges and Immunities Act.124 
Despite this fiction, GA TT has all the essential characteristics 
of an "international organization" -it utilizes a secretariat,125 it 
"contracts" with states,126 and it makes decisions which bind mem-
119. See Draft of GATT, art. XXIII, Joint Action by the Contracting Parties, in 
EPCT/135 (1947); Draft of GATT, art. XXIII, Joint Action by the Contracting Parties, 
in EPCT/189 (1947); GATT, art. XXV. 
120. U.N. Doc. EPCT/TAC/PV/12, at 3 (1947). See also GATT, .ANALYTICAL INDEX 
TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENTS 133 (2d rev. 1966). 
121. See Hearings on Extension of the Redprocal Trade Agreements Act Before 
the Senate Finance Comm., 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1080, 1456-57 (1949). 
122. Hearings on H.R. I Before the Senate Finance Comm., 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 
1254 (1955). In testifying further, however, Secretary Dulles did refer to GATT as an 
organization, "where representatives of some thirty-odd countries subscribed to 
certain, what you might call, good business principles, and it provides primarily a 
forum or a place for carrying on multilateral negotiations ••.• " See also H.R. REP. 
No. 2007, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1956). 
123. For fiscal year 1967, for example, the United States contribution to GATT 
($420,000) is listed on page 764 of the appendix to the budget, and is contained in the 
Department of State, Justice, Commerce and the Judiciary Appropriation Act for 
fiscal year 1967 under the general heading "International Organizations and Con-
ferences," and tbe specific heading "International Conferences and Contingencies." 
For previous years, the fiscal year and the page on which the GATT appropriation 
can be found are as follows: FY 1966, p. 690-91 of the app.; FY 1965, pp. 628-29 of 
the app.; FY 1964, pp. 642-43 of the app.; FY 1963, pp. 608-09 of the app.; FY 1962, 
pp. 862-63 of the app.; FY 1961, pp. 788-89 of the app.; FY 1960, pp. 819-20 of the 
budget; FY 1959, p. 769 of the budget; FY 1958, p. 872 of the budget; FY 1957, pp. 
891-92 of the budget; FY 1956, p. 901 of the budget; FY 1955, p. 874 of the budget; 
FY 1954, p. 858 of the budget; FY 1953, p. 907 of the budget; FY 1952, p. 767 of the 
budget; FY 1951, p. 985 of the budget. The 1951 fiscal budget appendix shows that 
GATT contributions were made as far back as 1949, but prior to the 1951 fiscal year 
report the budget item was not broken down to show the contribution to GATT. 
124. 22 U.S.C. § 288 (1964). Organizations are designated by executive order, and 
the 1967 supplement to U.S.C.A. does not list GATT among the organizations so 
designated. 
125. Technically, GATT does not have a secretariat, but it contracts for such 
services from the Interim Commission for the International Trade Organization 
(I.C.I.T.O.). See Rule 15 of the GATT Rules of Procedure, printed in GATT, 5th 
Supp. BISD 11 (1957). This technical distinction is one of form and not substance as 
the Secretariat concerned performs functions only for GATT and is generally rec-
ognized as the GATT Secretariat. See Jackson, The Puzzle of GATT-Legal Aspects of 
a Surprising Institution, l J. WORLD TRADE L. 131 n.3 (1967). 
126. Article XXXIII of GATT provides that non-member governments may accede 
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bers.127 This latter function is accomplished by the "Contracting 
Parties acting jointly,"128 but this seems to be a distinction without 
substantive difference. In fact, article XXV of GATT relating to 
such joint action is remarkably broad in scope: 
I. Representatives of the contracting parties shall meet from time 
to time for the purpose of giving effect to those provisions of 
this agreement which involve joint action and, generally, with a 
view to facilitating the operation and furthering the objectives 
of this agreement. Wherever reference is made in this agreement 
to the contracting parties acting jointly they are designated as 
the CONTRACTING PARTIES. 
3. Each contracting party shall be entitled to have one vote at all 
meetings of the CONTRACTING PARTIES. 
4. Except as otherwise provided for in this agreement, decisions of 
the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall be taken by a majority 
of the votes cast. 
In early years, GA TT was very cautious in developing useful 
institutions to carry out its work.129 But as the years passed, a series 
of committees gradually evolved into an institutional scheme.130 
GATT also broadened the scope of its attention and became a 
to GATT "on terms to be agreed between such government and the contracting 
parties." In practice, when a decision is made by the contracting parties to admit a 
new member [e.g., GATT, 14th Supp. BISD 13 (1966)], a protocol with that new 
member is opened for signature by all contracting parties. However, the protocol 
sometimes states that it will come into effect as soon as the new member signs it, 
which suggests that it is in essence a contract between the GATT contracting parties 
acting jointly, and the new member nation. See, e.g., protocol for the recession of 
Switzerland, GATT, 14th Supp. BISD 6 (1966). In addition, GATT has, through its 
I.C.I.T.O. Secretariat (see note 125 supra), made contractual arrangements with the 
host country (Switzerland) for loans for construction of headquarter space, and 
pursuant to art. XV entered into "Special Exchange Agreements" with several 
countries. 
127. Although executive branch officials of the United States try to play down 
this aspect of GATT [e.g., Secretary Dulles in the Hearings on Extension of the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Before the Senate Finance Comm., 84th Cong., 
1st Sess. 1239-67 (1955)], art. XXV certainly contemplates actions which must be 
considered to be "binding" as an international obligation on contracting parties. The 
principal such action is a waiver. 
128. GATT, art. XXV. 
129. See Report adopted by the Contracting Parties on December 16, 1950, GA TT 
Doc. CP.5/49, reprinted in GATT, 2 BISD 194 (1952); discussions at the fifth session 
of the Contracting Parties to GATT concerning intercessional arrangements for 
continuing administration, GATT Docs. CP.5/SR 17, SR 18, &: SR 25 (1950). 
130. The Council is perhaps the most significant of the GATT institutions and one 
of the most interesting in development. See GATT, 9th Supp. BISD 7 (1961). Other 
GATT standing committees include the Balance of Payments Committee, 7th Supp. 
BISD IO (1959), and the Trade and Development Committee, 13th Supp. BISD 75 
(1965). 
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policy-making body for a wide variety of subjects touching on inter-
national economics and trade.131 Is or was this aspect of GATT 
authorized? The administrative clauses of previous bilateral trade 
agreements furnish precedent and legislative history to show such 
authorization.132 Additionally, authority to enter "trade agreements" 
arguably implies authority to agree to necessary administrative 
provisions.133 Finally, it should be remembered that presidential 
powers may be the source of the requisite authority.134 
Even conceding that the President was authorized to join GA TT 
as it was constituted at its outset, it can be argued that there is no 
such authorization to adhere to the institution into which GATT 
has evolved. This is a difficult argument, however, and illustrates 
the problem of "static legalisms" in a dynamic world. The very 
practice which GA TT developed, step by step, in a sense furnishes 
its own precedent. Gradually, acceptance of changes in a viable 
institution lead after some years to acceptance of an institution 
radically different than its origins would have suggested. GA TT is 
not the first such phenomenon-it does, however, warrant special 
interest since it occurred in the international arena and has con-
stitutional implications. 
Thus, in answer to the question whether the President had 
statutory authority to enter GA TT, it seems clear that he did. The 
wording of the statute, legislative history, and the known precedents 
of prior trade agreements at the time of the 1945 Act combine to 
show a delegation of authority to enter into all particular portions 
of GA TT, subject to "existing legislation" under the Protocol of 
llll. See GATT, GAIT: WHAT IT IS, WHAT IT DOES, HOW IT WORKS (1966). Current 
GATT activities include administering the General Agreement itself, sponsoring tariff 
negotiations such as those in the Kennedy Round, undertaking studies of economic 
problems of less developed countries [e.g., Report of the Working Party of Economic 
Problems of Chad, GATT Doc. COM.TD/44 (1967)], and preparing studies of various 
aspects of international trade (e.g., the so-called Haberler Report, Trends in Inter-
national Trade, GATT Sales No. GATT/1958-3; Restrictive Business Practices, GATT 
Sales No. GATT/1959/-2). 
1!12. Examples of administrative provisions in previous bilateral trade agreements 
can be seen from the chart in app. A, provisions that correspond to arts. XXII-XX.XV 
of GATT. The fact that these trade agreements were known to Congress supports 
the argument that Congress contemplated such administrative provisions in the trade 
agreements which it was authorizing. 
13!1. This argument was made in congressional hearings: Hearings on Extension 
of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Before the Senate Finance Comm., 81st Cong., 
1st Sess. 1282 (1949); Hearings on Extending Authority To Negotiate Trade Agreements 
Before the Senate Finance Comm., 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 469, 471 (1948). 
134. The State Department has, in part, relied upon this source. See H.R. REP. No. 
2007, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 113 (1956); Hearings on the Trade Agreements Extension 
Act of 1951 Before the Senate Finance Comm., 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 1153 (1951); Hear-
ings on Extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Before the Senate Finance 
Comm., 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1051 (1949), partially reproduced in app. B. 
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Provisional Application, with the possible exception of some of the 
"administrative" clauses of GATT. Even agreement to these provi-
sions can be justified as implicit in the basic authority to enter trade 
agreements, and as being merely multilateral applications of clauses 
and principles previously established in the bilateral context. 
Nevertheless, the development of GATT has brought with it 
some important policy questions. Even assuming that GA TT is 
valid as a matter of United States domestic law, it is clear that the 
circumstances of its history have resulted in a considerable shift of 
power ~o the executive branch without the statutory framework 
which defines executive-legislative relations in connection with our 
participation in other international institutions, such as the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, and the United Nations.135 Lack of meaningful 
congressional participation in foreign affairs is a problem not 
unique to the economic sphere.136 Nevertheless, the regular renewal 
of the trade agreements acts137 does provide one opportunity for 
congressional review of trade policy, and informal and formal 
participation of Congressmen at GATT negotiations provides other 
opportunities.138 Whether or not this limited role relegated to the 
Congress in economic policy-making through GA TT is adequate, 
either from a policy or constitutional standpoint, may yet be legiti-
mately questioned. 
2. Constitutional Powers of the President 
The executive branch, in justifying our adherence to GA TT, 
has usually relied, at least in part, upon the constitutional powers 
of the President to conduct foreign affairs.139 A State Department 
memorandum, submitted during the 1949 Senate committee hear-
ings on the Trade Agreements Act, noted precedents for presidential 
agreements relating to foreign commerce.140 This memorandum 
135. See, e.g., United Nations Participation Act, 22 U.S.C. § 287 (1964); Bretton 
Woods Agreement Act, 22 U.S.C. § 286 (1964). 
136. E.g., Senator Fulbright's remarks reported in Kenworthy, Fulbright Sees Senate 
Influencing Policy Again, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1967, at 5, col. I. 
137. See app. D. 
138. Congressmen have participated informally in major GATT negotiations since 
the mid-1950's. This practice was formalized in the Kennedy Round. See Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962, § 243, 19 u.s.c. § 1873 (1964); 111 CONG, REc. 12348 (1965). 
The delegation included: Rep. Thomas B. Curtis, Rep. Cecil King, Sen. John Williams, 
Sen. Herman Talmadge, and alternates Sen. Frank Carlson and Sen. Abraham Ribicoff. 
For reports on these negotiations see 113 CONG. REc. 3819, 4128, 4891 (1967). 
139. See app. B. 
140. Hearings on the Extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Before 
the Senate Finance Comm., 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1051-55 (1949). 
December 1967] GA TT in U.S. Domestic Law 275 
further specified the sources of authority for this country's agree-
ment to each article of GATT, relying in a number of places, 
particularly as to the administrative provisions, on the President's 
constitutional authority. Arguments based on president authority 
are, however, weakened by a federal court of appeals case141 which 
held that the President overstepped his delegated powers when he 
entered into an agreement with Canada which regulated trade. The 
court's statement on this issue was unmistakable: 
The power to regulate foreign commerce is vested in Congress, not 
the executive or the courts; and the executive may not exercise the 
power by entering into executive agreements and suing in the 
courts .... 142 
The earlier discussion concerning statutory authority, however, 
demonstrates that it is probably unnecessary to rely upon indepen-
dent presidential authority for GATT, but to be able to do so 
would reinforce the basic proposition that United States participa-
tion in GA TT is valid. 
3. Later GA TT Agreements 
Heretofore, for purposes of clarity and simplicity, I have spoken 
of GATT largely as if it were a single agreement coming into force 
at one point of time. This is not the case-in fact, over I 00 inter-
national agreements (listed in Appendix C), some not yet in force, 
can officially be termed "GA TT agreements."143 In order completely 
to present the picture of GATT in United States domestic law, it 
would be necessary to analyze many of these later agreements with 
respect to the President's power to enter into them. This would, 
of course, be unduly cumbersome, and for that reason, will not 
be attempted. However, some generalizations can be made. 
In the first place, from I 945 down to the present except for 
several short gaps, there has been a statute in force with basic 
authorizing language similar to that of the 1945 Trade Agreements 
Extension Act.144 Consequently, the analysis of the statutory lan-
141. United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), affd on 
other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1954). 
142. 204 F.2d at 658. 
143. The definition of an "official" GATT agreement must be somewhat arbitrary, 
but it is convenient to include all those GATT agreements which were deposited with 
the United Nations prior to 1955 [and listed in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/3/Rev. 1 (1963)), 
and all those which have been deposited with the Executive Secretary of GATT 
since 1955 [and listed in Status of Multilateral Protocols of Which the Executive 
Secretary Acts as Depository, GATT Doc. PROT/2/Rev. 2 (1966) or in more recent 
CATT documents]. 
144. Appendix D contains a chart of each of these statutes with their respective 
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guage of the 1945 Act as a source of presidential authority will 
apply to these amendments and protocols, subject to some different 
limiting clauses in the subsequent acts.H5 Second, all such protocols 
and agreements which affect the general language of GATT, except 
for the later agreement adding Part IV and certain recent agree-
ments resulting from the Kennedy Round (which I shall discuss 
below), have concerned subject matter sufficiently close to the 
original GATT that the conclusions based on legislative history 
and other arguments as to the scope of authority under the 1945 
Act should be applicable in the case of these later protocols.Ho 
(This is especially so when it is remembered that Part II, the 
"safeguarding provisions," is subject to "existing legislation.")147 
Third, some of these subsequent protocols and agreements could 
as well be based on presidential power alone.148 For example, pro-
tocols of rectification are arguably within the executive's implicit 
power to continue to administer prior agreements.149 
At the close of the Kennedy Round negotiations on June 30, 
1967, a series of protocols and agreements were completed,150 four 
of which related to accession of new members,151 while four others 
embodied other results of the negotiations.152 Two of these latter 
time spans. In each statute, there is authority to "enter into foreign trade agreements" 
and to "proclaim such modifications" subject to certain limitations. See note 29 supra. 
145. These limiting clauses related primarily to the allowable percentage cuts in 
tariff rates and, in some of the statutes, to certain other negotiating limits (e.g., peril 
point or escape clauses). No instance of violation of negotiating limits has been found 
by this writer, but the subject is vast and technical since tens of thousands of items 
are involved. See note 56 supra. This author has been told that some specific minor 
portions of the proclamations for the original GATT agreement arguably exceed some 
of these limits. 
146. This is the judgment of the author. To analyze each clause of each amend-
ment and protocol in detail would be too cumbersome to include in this article. 
Nevertheless, the reader can see from the chart of amendments and protocols in app. 
C the general nature of those amendments and protocols. 
147. The general practice within GATT has been to assume that protocols amend-
ing Pt. II are subject to the Protocol of Provisional Application by which GATT was 
originally applied. One could argue that the subsequent protocols and amendments 
stand upon their own feet and thus circumvent the Protocol of Provisional Applica-
tion. A more appropriate analysis seems to be that technically the subsequent protocols 
or amendments are amendments to the Protocol of Provisional Application, which 
in tum incorporates by reference the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in-
cluding the amending article, which article provides the authority for amending the 
Protocol of Provisional Application. 
148. See discussion in text at pt. II.A.2. 
149. These protocols merely correct mistakes in prior protocols. See app. C. 
150. Final Act Authenticating the Results of the 1964-67 Trade Conference held 
under the Auspices of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, GATT Doc. L/2813 (1967). 
151. Argentina, Iceland, Ireland, and Poland. See app. C. 
152. Geneva (1967) Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; 
Agreement relating principally to Chemicals, supplementary to the Geneva (1967) 
December 1967] GATT in U.S. Domestic Law 277 
agreements are admittedly not authorized by the Trade Expansion 
Act of 1962, which is the current trade agreements legislation. Of 
these two, the Administration will probably ask Congress to pass 
legislation authorizing one, but argues that it has authority to carry 
out the other under existing statutes.153 
There is one problem as to these and other GA TT amendments, 
however, that is not only potentially troublesome in the GA TT 
context but could come up in relation to other international agree-
ments. This problem is posed by the inclusion of a power to amend 
in the agreement itself. Even if a procedure for adopting future 
amendments (article XXX in GATT) were built into the original 
agreement, a question exists as to the scope of the President's power 
to agree to new amendments. It was argued above that the amend-
ing clause of GA TT, like the other administrative provisions can 
be justified as within the congressional delegation of power either 
as a necessary and implicit concomitant to the trade agreement 
power, or by analogy to prior bilateral trade agreement provisions 
known to Congress.154 But as worded in GATT article XXX, there 
are no subject matter limits at all to this amending power.155 Can 
the President then argue that since Congress delegated to him the 
power to agree to amend GA TT, that any amendment he now 
desires to agree to is authorized by that congressional delegation? 
This bootstrap argument must be answered in the negative. If the 
amending clause were indeed that broad, it can simply be argued 
Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; Memorandum of Agreement 
on Basic Elements for the Negotiation of a W'orld Grains Arrangement; Agreement 
on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
See app. C. 
153. The Chemicals Agreement, note 152 supra, provides that the United States 
will eliminate the "American Selling Price" method of valuing certain goods (primarily 
Benzenoid chemicals) which is contrary to GATT art. VII but was "existing legisla-
tion" in 1947 when GATT was signed and therefore not contrary to GATT as 
applied by the Protocol of Provisional Application. The Administration will likely ask 
Congress to accept the ASP changes, but argues that it can implement the anti-
dumping provisions under art. VI of GATT without further legislative authority. 
See discussion in text at pt. III.B.2; note 153 supra. See also Dale, Jr., Details Emerge 
on Tariff Accord, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1967, at 29, col. 1; Lawrence, Single Trade Bill in 
'67 Seen Liltely, J. Commerce, July 12, 1967, at 1, col. l; GATT Doc. L/2375/Add. l at 
17 (1965). 
154. See discussion in text at pt. II.A.I. 
155. GATT, art. XXX reads: 
1. Except where provisions for modification is made elsewhere in this Agreement 
amendments to the provisions of Part I of this Agreement or to the provisions 
of Article XXIX or of this Article shall become effective upon acceptance by all 
the contracting parties, and other amendments to this agreement shall become 
effective, in respect of those contracting parties which accept them, upon accep-
tance by two-thirds of the contracting parties and thereafter for each other 
contracting party upon acceptance by it. 
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that it was not originally authorized and so is itself ultra vires. A 
better approach, however, would be to assume that the amending 
power itself is valid, but then to construe the President's authority 
to agree to amendments as limited in the same way as his power 
to enter into a trade agreement independent of the amending 
clause of GATT.156 In this connection, it is interesting to note that 
both the Bretton-Woods Agreements Act157-which governs our 
participation in the International Monetary Fund and in the In-
ternational Bank for Reconstruction and Development-and the 
United Nations Participation Act158 impose explicit limits on the 
presidential power to agree to amendments to the relevant inter-
national agreements. An argument could be made in favor of con-
gressional action to regularize United States participation in GA TT 
on the pragmatic ground that such an act would afford an op-
portunity to spell out explicitly the limits on the power of the 
executive to agree to amendments of GATT, thus obtaining greater 
congressional participation in any future major shift in GA TT 
policy.159 
The "Part IV amendments" to GATT, entitled "Trade and 
Development,"160 require separate analysis. These consist of three 
articles which detail matters relating to the use of trade to pro-
mote the economic development of less developed countries. The 
articles "commit" those members who are deemed developed 
countries to "accord high priority to the reduction . . . of barriers 
156. There is at this point another argument which could give some trouble, 
namely, that since the amending article was agreed to under the 1945 Statute, that 
that Statute gives the scope and limitation to the amending article for all future 
time. Following this analysis, later statutes of the United States which amend the 
Trade Agreements Act could not expand or contract the authority to amend art. 
XXX of GATT. This argument must be rejected, however, since not only is it 
impractical and unduly rigid, but the intent of Congress in delegating authority to 
enter into an agreement with an amending provision must have been that the amend-
ing provision wonld take on the scope of authority of future congressional acts • .Alter-
natively, it can be argued that each subsequent statutory amendment is an authoriza-
tion to the executive branch to continue to participate in GATT and the amending 
authority would take on the scope and extent of the then current statutory authority 
of the Executive. 
157. 22 u.s.c. § 286 (1964). 
158. 22 u.s.c. § 287 (1964). 
159. The arguments contained in this subsection concerning art. XXX apply also 
to the authority contained for joint action under art. XXV, including the authority 
to grant a waiver, and possibly certain other "joint action" provisions. Of course, for 
Congress to impose a tight rein on the President in connection with joint action of 
the contracting parties would be a mistake, since a certain amount of flexibility is 
essential. Congress might appropriately require specific reports of United States' votes 
at GATT meetings, however, so that the interested Congressional committee could 
have an opportunity to appraise the executive branch activities on a continuing basis. 
160. The text of pt. IV of GATT can be found in GATT Doc. IPRO/65-1 
(1965) and in 51 U.S. STATE DEP'T Bou. 922 (1964). 
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to products . . . of . . . export interest to less-developed contracting 
parties ... ," to refrain from fiscal measures that would hamper 
imports from less-developed countries, and to "make every effort," 
"give active consideration," and "have special regard" for certain 
similar policies that affect the economic development of less devel-
oped countries. The commitments are qualified by exceptions for 
"compelling reasons, which may include legal reasons." 
Part IV was completed February 8, 1965, and signed on that day 
by a number of nations. Some countries also agreed to apply Part 
IV de facto pending its entry into force on June 27, 1966.161 At 
this time, the statutory authority for the United States to enter 
trade agreements was the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 which con-
tained the standard language already discussed,162 authorizing "entry 
into trade agreements" and proclamation of duty modifications. 
Can the President's acceptance of Part IV be justified on the 
authority of this Statute? Two arguments can be made. First, we can 
reiterate the argument that separates the first clause from the limita-
tions of the second clause and thereby authorizes any "trade agree-
ment."163 Part IV deals with trade and so is arguably authorized. 
Second, insofar as Part IV clauses relate to other GA TT clauses, all 
the arguments made for the validity of GATT in 1947 apply to urge 
the validity of Part IV.164 However, Part IV is a most radical 
departure from prior GATT language. True, the "old GA TT" 
included article XVIII which contains elaborate provisions re-
garding economic development of less developed countries. But 
these provisions are exceptions to, or escapes from, the other GA TT 
commitments. No additional obligations, other than to consult and 
report, are imposed by article XVIII. Part IV, on the other hand, 
commits developed countries to "refrain from introducing" barriers 
on products from less developed countries (whether subject to 
tariff schedule concessions in GATT or not),1611 to refrain from new 
fiscal measures that would hamper exports from these countries,166 
161. GATI' Doc. IPRO/65-1 (1965). See also, GATI' Press Release 962 Gune 28, 
1966). 
162. 19 U.S.C. § 182l(a) (1964): 
(1) after June 30, 1962, and before July I, 1967, enter into trade agreements with 
foreign countries or instrumentalities thereof; and 
(2) proclaim such modification on continuance of any existing duty on other 
import restrictions such continuance of existing duty-free or excise treatment, 
or such additional import restrictions, as he determines to be required or 
appropriate to carry out any such trade agreement. 
163. See text accompanying notes 50-54 supra. 
164. See discussion in text at pt. II.A.I. and app. A. 
165. GATI', art. XXXVII, para. l(b). 
166. GATI', art. XXXVII, para. l(c). 
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and so forth. It further provides that GA TT shall establish institu-
tional arrangements to accomplish the purposes of Part IV.167 These 
commitments have purposes which arguably go beyond anything 
contemplated by the Trade Agreements Act of 1945.168 Does the 
1945 statutory language re-enacted in 1962 have a new and expanded 
meaning? There is some basis for the argument that it does.169 How-
ever, the failure of Congress to approve the OTC in 1956 argues 
against an expanding interpretation of the trade agreements au-
thority.170 Consequently, to justify United States entry into the Part 
IV amendments, it may be necessary for the President to rely on his 
executive powers. Since the commitments in Part IV are carefully 
hedged and expressly subject to contrary "compelling reasons, which 
may include legal reasons,''171 it is possible to argue that Part IV 
entry was within the presidential power even without statutory 
authority. I£ anything, the entry into Part IV demonstrates the 
anomaly of United States participation in GA TT without a stat-
utory framework for congressional participation, and shows to what 
extent foreign commerce matters have come under the control of 
the executive branch of the government. 
B. Is GATT "Law" in the United States'! 
A question separate from the validity of GATT as an inter-
national agreement of the United States is the "domestic law" effect 
of GATT within this country. To put it another way, the United 
States may have validly entered GA TT, but it may only obligate 
the United States internationally, without being directly applicable 
in domestic courts or proceedings. In this section will be examined 
the general question of whether GA TT has a domestic law effect 
in the United States, leaving for Part III the discussion of the extent 
and nature of that effect, if it does exist. 
First, some general propositions about international agreements 
under constitutional law must be reviewed. The reader will recall 
167. GATT, art. XXXVIII, paras. I & 2(f). 
168. Article XX.XVI, para. 2, for instance, states as a principle objective the "need 
for a rapid and sustained expansion of the export earnings of the less developed 
contracting parties." 
169. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 contains some recognition of the problems 
of less developed countries by providing for the possibility of free entry of tropical, 
agricultural, and forestry commodities. See 19 U.S.C. § 1833 (1964). An early proposed 
version of this statute listed as one purpose, "to assist in the progress of countries in 
the earlier stages of economic development." H.R. REP. No, 2518, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 
5 (1962). This was omitted at a later stage. 
170. See text accompanying note 101 supra. 
171. GATT, art. XXXVII, para. I. 
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the established rule that treaties, submitted only to the Senate, can 
be domestic law just as if the treaty were enacted by both houses 
as legislation.172 This is true, so the doctrine goes, if the treaty is 
"self-executing," which, in turn, is ascertained by examining the 
language of the treaty ("does it give direct rights to a litigant?") and 
the intent of its draftsmen.173 This rule contrasts with the law of 
many nations, particularly the Commonwealth and Scandinavian 
countries, where no international treaty or agreement has a domestic 
law effect.174 The doctrine for "treaties" also applies to executive 
agreements, both those entered pursuant to an act of Congress and 
those entered pursuant to the President's powers,175 as the well-
known Belmont116 and Pink177 cases illustrate. 
These propositions seem simple enough, and there is an exten-
sive literature concerning them,178 but the application of these 
rules can be very difficult, and specific situations give rise to ana-
lytical difficulties that lurk behind the generalities. 
I. An Agreement Authorized by Congress 
Examination of the domestic law effect of GA TT in this country 
must begin with the Trade Agreements Act as it existed in 1945. 
Once again we meet the interesting bifurcated power delegation to 
the President: 
(I) To enter into foreign trade agreements ... 
(2) To proclaim such modification of existing duties and other 
import restrictions ... [etc.,] ... as are required or appropriate 
to carry out any foreign trade agreement .... 119 
This language seems to indicate that only clause (2) authorizes a 
domestic law effect. To express it another way, this Statute appears 
172. Vv. BISHOP, GENERAL COURSE OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1965, 201 in 2 
ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, REcUEJL DES CouRS (1965); E. BYRD, TREATIES AND 
ExECUTIVE AGREEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES ch. 5 (1960); RF.5TATEMENT § 141. 
173. W. BISHOP, GENERAL CoURSE OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1965, 201 in 2 
ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, R.EcUEJL DES COURS (1965); RESTATEMENT § 141 
(comment and illustrations). 
174. w. BISHOP, GENERAL CoURSE OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw, 1965, 201 in 2 
ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, REcuEIL DES COURS (1965); I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES 
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 43 (1966); Buergenthal, The Domestic Status of the 
European Commission of Human Rights: A Second Look, 7 J. OF THE INT'L COMMISSION 
OF Juius-rs 55 (1966) (the author discusses the domestic law effect of treaties in a 
synoptic fashion for a number of European countries in relation to the European 
Convention of Human Rights). 
175. RESTATEMENT §§ 142, 143, &: 144. 
176. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). Of course, the extent of that 
domestic effect may differ. 
177. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1941). 
178. See notes 172-74 supra. 
179. See note 29 supra for the full text of § 350. 
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to distinguish the authority to obligate the United States inter-
nationally in clause (1) from the authority to make domestic law 
in clause (2).180 On this view, then, only the President's proclama-
tion and not the trade agreement, as such, has a domestic law effect. 
This hypothesis will now be tested by examining the statutory 
language, the legislative history of the Statute, the GA TT language 
and preparatory work, judicial decisions, and the presidential 
practice regarding proclamations. 
The statutory language. The bifurcated power delegation noted 
above does not necessarily lead to the conclusion stated by the 
hypothesis. One can argue that the word "proclaim" refers simply 
to a convenient symbolic act, a mere "announcement," in order that 
the public can take cognizance of the international agreement.181 
The notes to the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law 
provide some support for this view by indicating that "[ e ]xecutive 
[ a]greements are not usually proclaimed by the President unless 
they modify tariff schedules."182 Also, sometimes an international 
agreement will itself provide that it becomes effective upon "proc-
lamation,"183 simply because this is a convenient act to use as the 
"starting gun." Furthermore, the executive branch might be hesitant 
to accept the proposition that the domestic law effect of trade agree-
ments stems only from the "proclaiming power," since, as argued 
above, the "trade agreements" power might well be broader than the 
power to proclaim. 
The word "proclaim" is an interesting one in United States law, 
and seems to defy precise or narrow definition. A perusal of presi-
dential proclamations184 demonstrates that most are used to establish 
180. See State Department memorandum printed in H.R. REP. No. 2007, 84th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 113 (1956). 
181. For instance, art. XV of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Between the United 
States and Canada, 49 Stat. 3960 (1935) states: 
The present agreement shall be proclaimed by the President of the United States 
of America and shall be ratified by His Majesty the King of Great Britain ••• in 
respect of the Dominion of Canada. 
The entire agreement shall come into force on the day of the exchange of the 
proclamation and ratification at Ottawa. 
182. REsTATEMENT § 131 (Reporter's note). The Reporter's note to § 130 concerning 
treaties notes the use by the President of a proclamation to establish the entry into 
effect of a treaty. 
183. See note 181 supra. 
184. Many presidential proclamations are printed in the Federal Register and the 
Code of Federal Regulations as well as in the weekly compilation of Presidential 
Documents. The Proclamations are gathered each year in the United States Code and 
Congressional Service. See 1 C.F.R. §§ 7.1-7.6 (1966) as to the preparation of presidential 
proclamations and executive orders, excluding those proclaiming treaties or inter-
national agreements. 
In Texas Ass'n of Steel Importers v. Texas Highway Comm'n, 364 S.W .2d 749, 750 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1963), the Texas court used the term "proclamation" in connection 
with state laws and regulations as follows: Articles 6665 and 6666 provide for the 
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ceremonial days, or weeks, and holidays. But a sprinkling of other 
types exist.185 Proclamations have in the past, for instance, been 
used to establish the legal effect of statehood for new states.186 The 
language of the particular Statute involved here seems to use the 
word "proclaim" in a more significant sense than a mere signal, and 
the legislative history bears this out. 
Legislative history. The language of the Statute, including the 
bifurcated power approach, was probably chosen for the original 
1934 Act more as a result of tradition and precedent than for any 
calculated purpose. As early as 1798, an act empowered the President 
to undertake commercial intercourse with a foreign country (France) 
and "to make proclamation thereof."187 This terminology was 
followed in a series of other international trade statutes during 
the ensuing century. The 1897 Tariff Act, for example, gave the 
President power to enter into "commercial agreements" with foreign 
governments, and separately to suspend duties on products subject 
to the agreement "by proclamation to that effect."188 The Supreme 
Court, in passing on the constitutionality of the delegation of power 
to the President under the Tariff Act of 1890, held that no "legis-
lative power" was delegated because the President could only issue 
a proclamation based on particular findings of fact specified in the 
Statute.180 Later tariff statutes reinforced this practice of establish-
ing a proclamation power as the normal means for the President 
to implement tariff changes.190 
The 1934 legislative history does indicate, however, that the two 
powers delegated in the Statute were considered separate and dis-
tinct. Both the Senate Finance Committee and the executive branch 
organization of the Commission and for the establishment and public proclamation of 
all rules and regulations • • • ." This usage suggests that proclamation can be used 
almost synonymously with "issuing a regulation." 
185. See, e.g., Presidential Proclamation No. 3754, 3 C.F.R. 1966 Comp. 90 (effectuat-
ing the Florence Agreement on importation of educational, scientific, and cultural 
materials); Presidential Proclamation No. 3681, 3 C.F.R. 1964-1965 Comp. 139 (giving 
Australian Military Courts jurisdiction over offenses committed in the United States 
by .Australian servicemen). 
186. Enabling acts set forth the conditions which the state must meet to be ad-
mitted and, when those conditions were met, authorize the President to proclaim 
statehood. See, e.g., Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 139, 18 Stat. 474 (Colorado); Act of 
June 16, 1906, ch. 3335, 34 Stat. 267 (Oklahoma). See also J. SAX, WATER LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 355, 355 n.25 (1965). 
187. Act of June 13, 1798, ch. 53, 1 Stat. 565, 566. See Hearings on the Reciprocal 
Trade Agreements Act Before the Senate Finance Comm., 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 82 
(1934). 
188. Act of July 24, 1897, ch. 11, § 3, 30 Stat. 151, 203. 
189. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 681 (1892). 
190. See Hearings on the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Before the Senate 
Finance Comm., 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 82-95 (1934). 
284 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 66:249 
witnesses in the 1934 hearings appear to have recognized this separa-
tion, relying on the case of Field v. Glark191 to establish that neither 
delegation was unconstitutional.192 The 1934 House Report also 
stated: 
Former enactments have delegated to the President the power to 
fix tariff rates and have also delegated to the President the power 
to enter into executive agreements concerning tariff rates.193 
The Report went on to note that these enactments had not been 
held unconstitutional by the courts. 
The distinction was perhaps even more forcefully presented by 
Senator George speaking for the 1934 Act on the floor of the Senate. 
Although certain of his premises were either overbroad or need 
modification in the light of Belmont and Pink, his statement is 
certainly significant evidence of congressional intent: 
The well-recognized distinction between an executive agreement 
and a treaty is that the former cannot alter the existing law and 
must conform to all prior statutory enactments, whereas a treaty, 
if ratified by and with the advise and consent of two-thirds of the 
Senate itself becomes the supreme law of the land and takes prece-
dence over any prior statutory enactment. 
If the contemplated agreements to be effective should require 
Senate's ratification, there would be no need for the proposed legis-
lation, inasmuch as the President would then simply negotiate a 
treaty which, if ratified by the Senate, would itself have the effect 
of changing the tariff rates. However, in the present bill, the Con-
gress proposes to change the prevailing tariff law so that the proposed 
executive agreements may be made in harmony with the revised 
law. This is a fundamental distinction and answers the question as 
to why the bill is here. A mere executive agreement can be made by 
the President without the consent of Congress. It is equally true-
and the fact demonstrates beyond all question the real nature of 
the agreements-that the agreements contemplated in the present 
bill could not be made effective by the President without prior 
Congressional authorization.104 
The Senate and House Reports at the time of the Act's ex-
tension in 1943 reinforce this position. The Senate Report, for 
instance, stated: 
Under the Trade Agreements Act changes in our tariff rates are 
made, so far as our domestic law is concerned, by the President's 
proclamation under the authority of the Trade Agreements Act. 
191. 143 U.S. 649 (1892). 
192. See Hearings on the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Before the Senate 
Finance Comm., 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 59, 60 (1934). 
193. H.R. REP. No. 1000, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934). 
194. 78 CONG. REC. 10072 (1934). 
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Changes in the Tariff rates are not made by the agreements, 
per se .... 
It is precisely the same procedural principle as that on which the 
Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized by Congress to fix 
fair and reasonable railroad rates.195 
The congressional meaning of "proclaim" in the trade agree-
ments context, then, is not the simple ceremonial signal involved 
in a Thanksgiving Day proclamation, but rather is the means by 
which bargains struck with foreign trading nations are carried into 
law at home by the President. 
GA TT language and preparatory work. Even if, contrary to the 
view propounded above, the President was delegated the authority 
under the Act to enter a self-executing trade agreement, if he did 
not choose to enter this type of agreement (and the language of the 
agreement reflects this choice), then it would not be domestic law 
per se.196 An examination of the 194 7 trade agreement and its 
preparatory work is thus in order to ascertain if that agreement 
purported to be self-executing or non-self-executing. It can be 
argued that the latter is the better interpretation, although the 
evidence is at least equivocal. 
Many clauses of GA TT read as though they were meant to be 
directly applicable as domestic law.197 Moreover, several of these 
clauses were dravm from those portions of the ITO Draft Charter198 
which were intended to be applied in a self-executing manner.199 
However, it will be remembered that GA TT itself has never tech-
195. S. REP. No. 258, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 47, 48 (1943). 
196. REsTATEMENT § 143 (comment). 
197. For instance, para. 3 of art. VI of GATT begins: "No contravailing duty shall 
be levied on any product of the territory of another contracting party in excess 
of •••• " 
198. The general provisions of GATT are drawn mostly from what became ch. IV 
("Commercial Policy'') of the charter for the ITO. See Final Act, United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Employment, (1947-1948), reprinted in U.N. Doc. ICIT0/1/4 
(1948). In previous drafts of the ITO Charter this chapter was ch. V. See U.N. Doc. 
EPCT/34 (1947). The draft of GATT contained in U.N. Doc. EPCT/34, at 65 (1947) 
includes notes relating the GA TT articles to articles in the then ITO Charter draft. 
GATT, .ANALYTICAL INDEX TO TIIE GENERAL AGREEMENT {2d rev. 1966) also gives corre-
sponding numbers of the Havana Charter to the related GATT article. 
199. At the London meeting of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Employment, Harry Hawkins, representing the United 
States, said: 
This Charter would deal with the subjects which the Preparatory Committee has 
assigned to its five working committees. It should deal with these subjects in 
precise detail so that the obligations of member governments would be clear and 
unambiguous. Most of these subjects readily lend themselves to such treatment. 
Provisions on such subjects, once agreed upon, would be self-executing and could 
be applied by the governments concerned without further elaboration or inter-
national action. 
U.N. Doc. EPCT/CJ.I/PV2, at 8 (1946). 
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nically come into force: 200 it is applied by the United States and 
other original parties only by virtue of the Protocol of Provisional 
Application. The language of this Protocol is that of commitment 
to apply GATT, not language of immediate application.201 More-
over, there are other indications that the draftsmen of the Proto-
col did not intend a self-executing effect.202 For example, at one 
point the American delegate spoke as follows: 
[P]rovided there is simultaneous publication and entry into force 
of the document, there would be no objection if there were dif-
ferences in the actual time at which they were put provisionally 
into force, provided there was a date before which that must be 
done •... 203 
Since by definition a self-executing agreement requires no further 
steps to be put into force, this language is evidence of a non-self-
executing intent. 
Court application. Once again the American court treatment of 
GATT can be discussed in two parts. The Customs Court and the 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals uniformly refer to GATT 
by citing the relevant Presidential Proclamation as reprinted in the 
Treasury Decision series.204 In these courts, then, at least in tariff 
matters, it can be assumed that it is the proclamation which is the 
"law," not the executive agreement. 
200. See introduction to pt. II of the text. 
201. 61 Stat. pt. 6, at A2051 (1947); 55 U.N.T.S. 308 (1950): 
The Government of ••• [eight named nations including the United States] ••• 
undertake, provided that this Protocol shall have been signed on behalf of all 
the foregoing Governments not later than November 15, 1947, to apply provision-
ally on and after January 1, 1948: 
(a) Parts I and III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and 
(b) Part II of that agreement to the fullest extent not inconsistent with the 
existing legislation. 
2. The foregoing government shall make effective such provisional application 
of the General Agreement, in respect of any of their territories other than their 
metropolitan territories, on or after January 1, 1948, upon the expiration of 30 
days from the day on which notice of such application is received by the Secre• 
tary-General of the United Nations. 
3. Any other government signatory to this protocol shall make effective such 
provisional application of the General Agreement, on or after January 1, 1948, 
upon the expiration of 30 days from the day of signature of this protocol on 
behalf of such government. 
(Emphasis added.) Compare the discussion of self-executing treaties in W. BISHOP, IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW, CAsES AND MATERIAIS 146-49 (2d ed. 1962). In particular, the case 
of Robertson v. General Elec. Co., 32 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1929) which, in holding a 
treaty provision non-self-executing, noted that the language of the statute provided 
that a patent period "extension shall be made, not by the instrument itself, but by 
each of the high contracting parties.'' 
202. See U.N. Doc. F.PCT/TAC/PV.4 at 15, 19, 22 (1947). 
203. U.N. Doc. EPCT/TAC/PV.4 at 22 (1947). 
204. See note 105 supra. Although the chances are that at least some Customs Court 
or Court of Customs and Patent Appeals opinions fail to cite the proclamation refer-
ence when relying on GATT, no such opinion has been found and it is clear that the 
usual practice is to cite the Treasury Decision which incorporates the proclamation. 
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In other courts, usage is less clear. Apparently, only three federal 
court cases have cited GATT.205 Although the courts in these cases 
mentioned GA TT only by its name, or by the Statutes at Large 
reference206 (which does not contain the proclamation), the issues 
were such that GATT was not directly applied. In the only four 
state and teritorial court decisions which mention GATT, the situa-
tion differs. One of these was decided without ruling on the legal 
effect of GATT,207 but the other three purported to rely, at least in 
part, directly on GATT.208 In each of these latter cases GATT was 
treated as a "treaty," and applied as law without citing its proc-
lamation,209 although one court mentioned generally that such 
agreements were proclaimed.210 In three California Attorney Gen-
eral's opinions that involve GATT,211 there was also no mention of 
the proclamation. 
Yet in each of these seven cases and opinions, the provision of 
GATT involved was one which had in fact been proclaimed.212 So 
the distinction between the court's approach and that being pro-
205. See note 109 supra. 
206. Morgantown Glassware Guild, Inc. v. Humphrey, 236 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1956), 
simply mentions "General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Geneva, 1947." Talbot v. 
Atlantic Steel Co., 275 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1960) also merely uses the title of the agree-
ment. C. Tennant, Sons &: Co. v. Dill, 158 F. Supp. 63, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), refers to 
"General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, commonly known as GATT, 61 Stat., 
Part 5, pp. A3, A7 et seq." 
207. Texas Ass'n of Steel Importers v. Texas Highway Comm'n, 364 S.W.2d 749 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1963). 
208. Territory v. Ho, 41 Hawaii 565 (1967); Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Co. v. Superior 
Court, 208 Cal. App. 2d 803, 25 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1962); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board 
of Comm'rs, Civil No. 899165, 897591 (Super. Ct. County of Los Angeles 1966). 
209. For an example of this sort of judicial treatment of GATT when applied as 
law, see Territory v. Ho, 41 Hawaii 565, 568 (1967): 
This case poses the question: Is an executive agreement, such as the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, a treaty within the meaning of this constitu-
tional provision, [the supremacy clause of Article VI, Section 2] so that it has the 
same efficacy as a treaty made by the President by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate? We think it is, under the decisions of the Supreme Court 
of the United States in United States v. Belmont • • • and United States v. 
Pink •••• 
210. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. App. 2d 803, 820, 25 
Cal. Rptr. 799, 820 (1962). 
211. See note 106 supra. 
212. The Ho case invoked art. m, paras. I &: 4, and art. XX of GATT. These 
provisions were proclaimed in the United States by Presidential Proclamation No. 
2761A (3 C.F.R. 1943-1948 Comp. 139) and subsequent amendments to these pro-
visions were also proclaimed by Presidential Proclamations Nos. 2790 (3 C.F.R. 
1943-1948 Comp. 204), 3513 (3 C.F.R. 1959-1963 Comp. 246) and 2829 (3 C.F.R. 1949-
1953 Comp. 7). See app. C. The Baldwin-Lima case invoked art. III, paras. 2 &: 5 of 
GATT which were proclaimed by Presidential Proclamation No. 2761A (3 C.F.R. 
1943-1948 Comp. 139) and subsequently amended by Presidential Proclamation No. 
2829 (3 C.F.R. 1949-1953 Comp. 7). The Bethlehem Steel case relied on Baldwin-
Lima and, insofar as it depended upon GATT, involved the same articles. See note 
286 supra. 
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pounded in this article would not have led to a difference in result 
in the cases that have so far arisen. The careful attorney must, 
however, beware of possible pitfalls in the distinction between a 
trade agreement proclaimed and one unproclaimed, particularly 
as to those portions of GATT, or agreements concerning GATT 
obligations, which have not been proclaimed. 
The presidential practice of proclamation. Appendix. C contains 
a detailed analysis of the GA TT agreements and protocols, in-
cluding whether or not each has been proclaimed in whole or in 
part. This chart reveals an apparently bewildering diversity of 
treatment. Up to the time of this writing, there have been over one 
hundred international agreements of various labels which have been 
opened for signature to GA TT contracting parties, and deposited 
either at the United Nations (up to 1955) or at GATT head-
quarters (after 1955). About four-fifths of these have come into 
force. The United States has signed most of the GA TT agreements, 
and proclaimed a large number of those signed but some which it 
signed and which are in force have not been proclaimed, whereas 
some which it signed but which are not yet in force have been 
proclaimed.213 
Despite the apparent diversity of treatment, however, there is a 
discernible pattern in the proclamation practice. First, whenever 
a United States tariff rate is changed by an agreement, it has been 
proclaimed. 214 At times, for convenience, the proclamation may 
precede the effective date of the agreement, in which case the proc-
lamation specifies the condition subsequent which effectuates the 
changes.1n15 Second, a number of GATT agreements or parts of 
agreements which affect only tariff schedules of other countries have 
not been proclaimed by the United States.216 Since these are obliga-
tions running to this country, there is no need for a domestic law 
effect here, and it is reasonable to omit proclaiming them. In fact, 
in some of these cases the United States is not even a party to the 
agreements.217 Third, some of the unproclaimed agreements are 
short-term temporary measures or are confined to administrative 
matters for which it is difficult to see why domestic legal conse-
quences would or should occur.218 
213. See, e.g., agreements nos. 30 &: 52 in app. C. 
214. See agreements nos. 41, 52, 57 &: 83 in app. C. 
215. See agreement no. 57 in app. C. 
216. See, e.g., agreements nos. 18, 19, 29 &: 30 in app. C. 
217. See, e.g., agreement no. 48 in app. C. 
218. See, e.g., agreements nos. 4 &: 36 in app. C. 
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Most of the original GA TT agreement was proclaimed, of 
course, as well as almost all of the modifications to the general 
articles,219 except for the recently added Part IV which apparently is 
not intended to be domestic law.220 However, certain agreements 
which affect basic GATT obligations, but which do not actually 
modify the text, have not been proclaimed.221 In addition, some 
agreements providing for provisional accession of new members to 
GA TT have not been proclaimed, although it could be argued that 
such proclamation is unnecessary.222 
Sometimes there is a considerable time gap between entry into 
force of a particular GA TT agreement and its proclamation in this 
country. This may be due more to the political complexion of the 
executive branch than to the operation of any legal theory. Thus, 
during the mid-1950's, GATT agreements tended not to get pro-
claimed at all. It is difficult to ascertain from published sources 
whether this state of affairs was due to antagonism to GA TT and 
GA TT policy on the part of certain governmental officials, or to 
the Bricker Amendment223 "scare" which may have prompted the 
Republican Administration to avoid using executive agreements 
to generate domestic law whenever possible. These political factors 
might also explain the State Department position, taken in its 
letter to the Hawaii court,224 that GA TT has no legal effect on state 
law. In late 1962, with a new administration in office, there were 
several massive presidential proclamations which incorporated a 
number of early previously unproclaimed GATT agreements.225 
The presidential proclamation practice, then, supports the 
hypothesis that it is the proclamation which is domestic law. This is 
clearest when domestic tariff schedules are concerned. Whether it is 
also true when the general clauses of GA TT are involved cannot, 
perhaps, be inductively proved from the record. 
2. Presidential Power To Give Domestic Legal Effect 
to Trade Agreements 
Although it is clear that the President can, in some contexts, 
enter into an executive agreement which will itself have domestic 
219. See app. C. 
220. See agreement no. 98 in app. C. 
221. See agreement no. 59 in app. C. But see agreement no. 78 in app. C. 
222. See, e.g., agreements nos. 87 & 92 in app. C. 
22!!. See W. BISHOP, INTERNA110NAL I.Aw, CAsEs AND MATERIALS 104-05 (2d ed. 
1962); P. KAUPER, CoNSTITUTIONAL I.Aw, CAsEs AND MATERIALS 265 (3d ed. 1966). 
224. See note 288 infra. 
225. Presidential Proclamation No. !1513, !! C.F.R. 1959-1963 Comp. 246. See app. C. 
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legal consequences,226 there has been no assertion of this power in 
connection with GATT.227 Insofar as the President makes agree-
ments pursuant to the power delegated to him by the various trade 
agreements acts, it seems very dubious that he can give them 
domestic legal effect without proclaiming them. 
The court of appeals opinion in the Capps case, mentioned 
earlier, 228 while holding that the executive agreement there involved 
was ultra vires and void, announced another reason for not enforc-
ing a contract which was made pursuant to the agreement: 
There was no pretense of complying with the requirements of this 
statute. The President did not cause an investigation to be made 
by the Tariff Commission, the Commission did not conduct an 
investigation or make findings or recommendations, and the Presi-
dent made no findings of fact and issued no proclamation. • • .229 
Although the Supreme Court did not discuss this aspect while affirm. 
ing on different grounds, the Capps case suggests that where regula-
tion of foreign commerce is involved, the statutory scheme must be 
followed. If this suggestion were accepted, few if any trade agree-
ments could have domestic law validity through the exercise of 
presidential powers. The statutory scheme would need to be fol-
lowed, and as argued above, proclamation would be essential for 
domestic law validity. It may be noted that the government's peti-
tion for certiorari in the Capps case took a less restrictive view of 
the executive's power.230 
C. Summary 
To summarize the analysis of GATT's place in United States 
domestic law, it seems that insofar as GA TT (including all its 
related protocols) is entered into by the President pursuant to the 
trade agreements acts, it becomes domestic law only by virtue of 
a "proclamation." Both the statutory language and the legislative 
history lead to this conclusion. The practice of the courts and the 
presidential proclamation practice have not, at least, been incon-
226. E.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 
U.S. 324 (1937); Rll.sTATEMENT § 144. 
2'l:l. This statement is limited to the GATT agreements listed in app. C. 
228 See United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), aff'd on 
other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1954): text accompanying note 141 supra. 
229. United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655, 658 (4th Cir. 1953), aff'd 
on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1954). 
230. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit, United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 195!1), 
atfd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1954). 
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sistent with this proposition. Moreover, this method of handling 
the domestic law effect of executive agreements has many admirable 
features from a policy viewpoint. One of the difficulties in deter-
mining the domestic legal effect of treaties and international agree-
ments is the question of whether they are self-executing or not.231 
In the case of executive agreements, this difficulty can be largely 
overcome if a domestic legal effect results only from a proclamation 
or other domestic law-giving action. Not only are some ambiguities 
resolved by this methodology, but in certain circumstances this 
technique adds flexibility to the conduct of foreign relations. For 
example, the effectiveness or domestic application of an interna-
tional agreement can be conditioned upon factual or other condi-
tions precedent, with the proclamation being the certification of 
the meeting of the conditions. Additionally, and speaking prag-
matically, this technique gives the President affirmative control over 
the domestic legal effect which he may need to exercise in some cases, 
even if it means a breach of an international obligation. It also 
gives Congress greater flexibility and control since Congress can 
prescribe limits to the power to proclaim, just as it may prescribe 
limits to the power to enter into agreements, and the extent of the 
two powers need not always coincide. 
On the other hand, requiring a presidential proclamation is 
cumbersome and, because of the technical nature of the subject, 
may lead to error.232 A court confronted with a case where the 
proclamation deviated from the trade agreement for no apparent 
reason would probably find a way to follow the trade agreement 
language,233 either by "construing" the proclamation to be con-
sistent with the agreement, or by concluding, in the face of the 
arguments to the contrary, that the agreement had a direct legal 
effect on domestic law. Perhaps an appropriate solution in future 
trade agreement legislation would be to abandon the old two-part 
formula, which, it will be remembered, stemmed from a period 
when fear of Supreme Court invalidation on grounds of delegation 
231. See REsl'ATEMENT §§ 141 (comment), 142 (comment). 
232, See, e.g., Presidential Proclamation No. 2865 (recital no. 10), 3 C.F.R. 1949-1953 
Comp. 38; Presidential Proclamation No. 3190 (recital no. 13), 3 C.F.R. 1954-1958 
Comp. 118; Presidential Proclamation No. 3278, 3 C.F.R. 1959-1963 Comp. 9; Presi-
dential Proclamation No. 3562, 3 C.F.R. 1959-1963 Comp. 315; Presidential Proclama-
tion No. 3597, 33 C.F.R. 1964 Supp. 51. As to the formalistic nature of the recitals, 
see H.R. REP. 1761, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1958) (minority views). 
233. Of course, if the differential were substantial or based on substantive reasons, 
the proclamation would be followed as domestic law. An example of a proclamation 
deviating from the related GATT agreement is Presidential Proclamation No. 3040 
(para. 8 relating to Uruguayan accession to GATT), 3 C.F.R. 1949-1953 Comp. 211. 
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of legislative power were greater, and when (prior to Belmont and 
Pink) executive agreements were even less understood than they are 
today. The advantages of the old formula, mentioned above, could 
be retained and some of the disadvantages discarded if a regulation 
procedure were adopted authorizing the President or his delegate 
to take action which would give domestic legal effect to a trade agree-
ment to the extent desired by the President and within his power 
as delegated by Congress. 
III. THE EXTENT OF GAIT'S DOMESTIC LAW EFFECT 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
Part II dealt with the question whether GATT has any domes-
tic law effect in the United States. The conclusion reached was that 
to the extent GA TT and subsequent protocols have been "pro-
claimed" by the President they have a domestic law effect. It was 
suggested that it was very dubious that GA TT agreements and 
protocols would have domestic legal effect in the United States per 
se, that is, without proclamation. Since the original GA TT agree-
ment and many amending protocols have, in fact, been pro-
claimed, 234 the next question concerns the relationship of this 
GATT "law" to both federal and state law in the United States. 
To put it another way, assuming GATT is "law" in the United 
States, at least to the extent that it has been proclaimed, is that 
law superior or inferior to other federal or state laws? 
Two GA TT provisions have a profound influence on this 
question; consequently, much of this part of the article is concerned 
with interpreting these two clauses. First, and most significant, is 
the clause in the Protocol of Provisional Application (through which 
GA TT is applied) which states that governments will apply "Part 
II of that Agreement to the fullest extent not inconsistent with 
existing legislation."235 Second, of concern only to the relation of 
GATT to state or territorial law, is paragraph 12 of article XXIV 
which states: 
Each contracting party shall take such reasonable measures as may 
be available to it to ensure observance of the provisions of this 
Agreement by the regional and local governments and authorities 
within its territory.2as 
234. See app. C, and text accompanying note 105 supra. 
235. 61 Stat. pt. 6, at A2051 (1947); 55 U.N.T.S. 308 (1950). 
236. GATT, art. XXIV, para. 12. Originally this was art. XXIV, para. 6 of GATT, 
but the amendments contained in the "Special Protocol Relating to Art. XXIV" 
(see app. C. agreement no. 7) renumbered the paragraphs. 
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A. GATT and Federal Law 
The general principles of American law concerning executive 
agreements which have domestic law effect are typically stated as 
follows: (1) executive agreements pursuant to acts of Congress super-
sede prior inconsistent legislation and are superseded (as domestic 
law) by subsequent inconsistent legislation; (2) executive agree-
ments pursuant only to the President's independent authority do 
not supersede inconsistent legislation, whether prior or subse-
quent.237 For this purpose GATT would probably be considered 
an executive agreement by most lawyers and officials, but since it 
derives its domestic law effect from the presidential proclamations, 
it is technically more precise to analyze these proclamations as if 
they were regulations issued by the executive.238 As regulations, 
however, they apparently have the same impact on prior and subse-
quent legislation as executive agreements: if pursuant to congres-
sional authority, the later in time prevails; if not, the legislation 
prevails.239 
Analysis of GATT vis-a-vis federal law must give separate treat-
ment to Part II, which alone is subject to the "existing legislation" 
clause of the Protocol of Provisional Application. The others-
Parts I, III, and IV-may be treated as ordinary executive agree-
ments. 
I. Parts I, III b IV of GATT 
Parts I and III were part of the original GA TT and were pro-
claimed by the President.240 The more recent addition, Part IV, has 
not been proclaimed,241 and therefore probably has no domestic law 
effect.242 In any case its provisions are such as to make it unlikely 
2!17. R.FsrATEMENT §§ 142, 14!1, 144. See authorities cited in note 172 supra. 
2!18. See the discussion in text at pt. II.B. 
2!19. Of course, if a court were faced with such a case, an attempt would be made 
to construe so as to avoid inconsistency. Also, a regulation would probably yield even 
to prior legislation unless the legislation authorizing that regulation clearly manifested 
an intent to override prior legislation. See, e.g., United States v. Mersky, !161 U.S. 4!11 
(1960). However, it has been the general practice of the courts to give precedence to 
the tariff proclamations (a form of regulation) over such prior inconsistent legislation 
as the Tariff Act of 19!10. See authorities cited in notes 104 &: 105 supra. 
240. See app. C. 
241. The text of Pt. IV of GA'IT is contained in GA'IT Doc. IPRO/65-1 (1965), 
and at 51 DEP'T STATE BULL. 922 (1964). Part IV entered into force for the countries 
which had signed it on June 27, 1966. GATT Press Release 962 (June 28, 1966). 
242. As contended in the text, a proclamation is probably necessary for domestic 
law effect. It could be argued, however, that Pt. IV was entered into pursuant to 
presidential constitutional powers and not pursuant to authority delegated by the 
Trade Agreements Act, thus, no proclamation would be needed to give domestic 
law effect. Indeed, as indicated in the discussion in the text at Pt. II.B., there may be 
1ome difficulty in tying United States entry into Pt. IV to authority under the Trade 
294 Michigan Law Review [Vol 66:249 
that a concrete case could come up in domestic law, 243 and its lan-
guage strongly suggests that it was not intended to be self-execut-
ing.244 
Part I, containing the most-favored-nations and tariff concession 
provisions, and Part III, consisting mostly of administrative provi-
sions, as proclaimed, appear to supersede prior inconsistent federal 
legislation.245 This is clearly the case where domestic tariff rates are 
involved; the courts have uniformly held the latest GATT protocols 
to be the current law.246 Indeed, no case holding a pre-GATT federal 
law superior to Part I or Part III of GA TT has been found. Subse-
quent federal legislation would, of course, prevail under the "later 
in time" rule.247 
2. Part II of GATT and the "Existing Legislation" Clause 
The major example of subsequent United States legislation in-
consistent with Part II of GATT is the 1951 amendment to the 
AAA248 requiring certain agriculture import quotas to be imposed 
Agreements Act. On the other hand, the language of Pt. IV can also be read as non-
self-executing. I have intentionally set out the alternatives in a qualified and tentative 
manner to illustrate the ambiguous position that Pt. IV has in United States law. 
243. See discussion in text at II.A.3. Part IV consists primarily of general principles 
and objectives, or procedures for consultation. The article involving commitments, 
art. XX.XVII, is qualified by the language "to the fullest extent possible," or phrases 
such as "make every effort" or "give active consideration." 
244. The qualifying language mentioned in the previous footnote also suggests that 
Pt. IV is not self-executing. 
245. Unless specific exception for prior legislation is made in a particular clause, 
such as that in art. II, para. l(b). 
246. See text accompanying note 104 supra. 
247. In a 1951 statute, for example, Congress stipulated as follows: 
As soon as practicable, the President shall take such action as is necessary to 
suspend, withdraw or prevent the application of any reduction in any rate of 
duty, or binding of any existing customs or excise treatment, or other concession 
contained in any trade agreement entered into under authority of section 350 of 
the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended and extended, [the Reciprocal Trade Agree-
ments provisions] to imports from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and to 
imports from any nation or area dominated or controlled by the foreign govern-
ment or foreign organization controlling the world communist movement. 
At that time Czechoslovakia was the only communist country which was a party to 
GATT, and the President withdrew GATT "application" from that country. 
Presidential Proclamation No. 2935, 3 C.F.R. 1949-1953 Comp. 121, carried out by letter 
to the Secretary of the Treasury (reproduced in T.D. 52837). This action may have been 
inconsistent with GATT, although the United States obtained a "declaration" from 
GATT which "took note" of the United States action and may constitute a waiver 
under art. XXV of GATT, BISD II/36. See also Jackson, The Puzzle of GATT-Legal 
Aspects of a Surprising Institution. 1 J. OF WORLD TRADE L. 131, 153 (1967). 
In other post-GATT statutes, "escape clause" language was adopted that did not 
coincide with the relevant GATT clause in art. XIX. 65 Stat. 7!. (1951); 69 Stat. 166 
(1955). The United States Executive, however, apparently took the position that 
the 1951 statute was consistent with art. XIX. Report on Trade-Agreement Escape 
Clauses. Message from the President, H.R. Doc. No. 328, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952). 
But cf. s. METZGER, TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE KENNEDY ROUND 47 (1964). 
248. See text accompanying note 87 supra. 
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irrespective of GATT commitments contained in article XI, Part II 
of GA TT. This example confirms the superiority of later federal 
legislation over GA TT in United States domestic law. 
More interesting, however, is the case of pre-GA TT legislation. 
Because the Protocol of Provisional Application applies Part II of 
GATT subject to "existing legislation,"249 the usual rule making 
executive agreements superior to prior inconsistent legislation is 
reversed. Although the Administration has undertaken to furnish 
Congress2r;o and, later, GA TT headquarters251 with a listing of such 
prior inconsistent legislation, there are several interpretative diffi-
culties relating to the terms "existing" and "inconsistent" in the 
Protocol. 
As to "existing," the question naturally arises: "existing when?" 
This ambiguity was considered in an early GATT session and 
was resolved there when the Contracting Parties "accepted" a ruling 
by their chairman that "existing legislation" refers "to legislation 
existing on 30 October 1947, the date of the Protocol as written at 
the end of its last paragraph."252 The argument that the relevant 
point of time is the date on which a given nation signed the proto-
col was not adopted.253 Another puzzle relating to the meaning of 
"existing" is the treatment of amendments to Part II. For example, 
a sequence such as the following could occur: (1) October 30, 1947, 
the Protocol of Provisional Application is signed agreeing to apply 
GATT; (2) in 1950, United States legislation consistent with the 
existing GATT is enacted; (3) in 1955, a protocol amending GATT 
249. 61 Stat. pt. 6, at A2051 (1947); 55 U.N.T.S. 308 (1950). 
250. Hearings on Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 Before the Senate 
Finance Comm., 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 1195 (1951). See also Note, 61 CoLUM. L. REv. 
505 (1961). 
251. See GATT Doc. L/2375/Add.l, at 17 (1965), which reproduces information 
submitted by governments in January 1955 and previously included in document 
L/309/Add. I &: 2. This list, and that cited in note 250 supra, may not be all inclusive 
-see the language used to introduce those lists. 
252. Ruling by the Chairman on Aug. 11, 1949, GATT, 2 BISD 35 (1952); GATT 
Doc. CP.3/SR.40, at 4-7 (1949). See Jackson, supra note 247, at 139. 
253. Protocols that involved accession of new contracting parties under art. XXXIII 
of GATT, subsequent to the Protocol of Provisional Application, have been more 
explicit as to the date of "existing legislation." See, e.g., the Annecy Protocol of Terms 
of Accession in GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX 173 (2d rev. 1966); The Protocol for the 
Accession of Switzerland, GATT, 14th supp. BISD 6 (1966). As to countries which 
became GATT contracting parties through sponsorship under art. XXVI, it is not 
clear what is the relevant date for "existing legislation," although technically it is 
probably that date which was the relevant date for the sponsoring contracting party. 
This would be consistent with the view that the sponsored government accepts GA TT 
on the terms and conditions "previously accepted by the metropolitan government on 
behalf of the territory in question." See Report adopted on December 7, 1961 by the 
Contracting Parties, GATT, 10th supp. BISD 69, 73 (1962). Jackson, supra, note 247, at 
144. 
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enters into force, and this protocol is inconsistent with the 1950 
statute. What would be the status of the 1950 legislation? Techni-
cally, the later in time would prevail, which here is the GA TT 
protocol. Since the GA TT amending provision254 states that amend-
ments are applicable only to those nations which accept them, the 
President can always refuse to accept an amendment which is incon-
sistent with domestic law if he desires to avoid the inconsistency.255 
An interpretative difficulty also turns on the word "inconsistent." 
The following hypotheticals will assist in forming the issues: 
A. Legislation at the time the United States entered GA TT au-
thorized the President to impose quotas on widgets, and previ-
ously the President had imposed such a quota. 
B. Similar legislation existed when the United States entered 
GATT, but the President only later imposed the widget quota. 
C. Existing legislation required the President to impose the quota 
whenever he found fact X, and the President had previously 
found that fact and imposed the quota. 
D. Similar legislation existed when GATT was entered, but only 
later did the President find fact X and impose the quota. 
Under interpretations developed in the practice of GATT, cases 
A and B would not be "inconsistent" and would be violations by 
the United States of its international obligation if the quotas were 
permitted to continue. Cases C and D, however, are "inconsistent" 
and would not be such violations. The GA TT interpretation is 
that measures are within the "existing legislation" clause, provided 
that the legislation on which it is based is by its terms or expressed 
intent of a mandatory character-that is, it imposes on the executive 
authority requirements which cannot be modified by executive 
action.256 This interpretation is supported by statements in the 
preparatory work of GATT which will be discussed below.257 
But what is the domestic law effect of cases A through D? Where 
254. GATT, art. XXX. 
255. The President could, if he had the trade agreements authority to do so, 
always enter a trade agreement which was inconsistent with GATT, but refuse to 
proclaim it. In this event, the agreement would not have a domestic law effect, and 
would not override the domestic law. The United States would be in a technical 
breach of its international obligation, but the President might decide to do things in 
this manner in the hope that a change in the legislation could ultimately be obtained 
to bring it into conformity with the international obligation. Of course, a more 
desirable procedure might be to sign the international agreement ad referendum 
and then seek congressional approval. 
256. Report approved by the Contracting Parties on August 10, 1949, GATT Doc. 
CP.3/60/REV.l, para. 99, reprinted in GATT 2 BISD 49, 62 (1952). See the discussion 
of GATT preparatory work contained in text at pt. II.B.1.; Jackson, supra note 247, 
at 140. See also GATT documents reproduced in GATT, 7th supp. BISD 104-07 
(1959), 6th supp. BISD 60-61 (1958), 3d supp. BISD 249 (1955), 1st supp. BISD 61 (1953). 
257. See text accompanying note 277 infra. 
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the legislation, although inconsistent with Part II of GATT, is not 
deemed a violation of the international obligation pursuant to the 
"inconsistent legislation" clause (cases C and D), it would seem 
clear that it should be considered superior to GATT as domestic 
law even though GA TT is subsequent.258 This puts the domestic 
law interpretation of the "inconsistent legislation" clause in line 
with the international obligation, and recognizes the superiority of 
the domestic law. 
In case B, the quota imposed, being subsequent to GA TT, 
would prevail in domestic law under the "later in time" rule, even 
though this would be a clear violation of the international obliga-
tion.259 Case A, however, is more difficult. If for domestic law pur-
poses an inconsistency is found, then the "later in time" rule would 
provide that the previously established quota was abrogated auto-
matically when GATT became domestic law. But the scope of the 
President's proclamation should be determinative of this question 
as to domestic law, and the impact on the previous inconsistent 
quota would depend on the tenor and interpretation of the subse-
quent GATT proclamation. 
B. GATT and State Law 
When GA TT is considered in relation to inconsistent state 
law, both of the "problem" clauses of GA TT, the "existing legisla-
tion" clause already discussed and the "local governments" clause, 
are involved. Additionally, an important constitutional problem is 
presented: whether federal control of "foreign commerce" is exclu-
sive and precludes any state regulation of foreign imports or exports. 
The classic case, of course, was Brown v. Maryland in 1827,260 
holding invalid a state law requiring an importer of foreign goods 
to obtain a state license for a fee. In recent years, several cases in-
258. There is a logical circularity involved in cases C and D in a nation like the 
United States where an executive agreement pursuant to legislative authority can 
override previous legislation. Since the Protocol of Provisional Application clause on 
"existing legislation" was intended to make GATT apply to the fullest extent of 
executive authority, if the Executive has the authority to enter into and proclaim 
an international agreement which then has the domestic law effect of overriding 
previous legislation, it could be argued that GATT, even if applied by the Protocol 
of Provisional Application, should override previous legislation, if this country is to 
fulfill its international obligations. However, the whole gist of the preparatory work 
of GATT, and the representations made by the executive branch to Congress, is to 
the effect that existing legislation would not be affected by GATT without further 
action by Congress. Thus, despite the fact that to apply GATT to the fullest extent of 
executive authority would be to override previous federal legislation, it is clear that 
that was not the intent of the GA TT draftsmen. 
259. See authorities cited in note 237 supra. 
260. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827). 
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valving various types of local government regulation of imports261-
for example, labeling regulations262 and state agency purchasing 
preferences263-have been decided, including one Supreme Court 
case concerning a tax which discriminated against imports.264 It is 
not my intention here to deviate from the purpose of this article 
to examine this constitutional question in detail. I do want to draw 
the reader's attention to the issue, however, and note that it can be 
used as an alternative argument for the invalidity of state law in 
virtually every case involving a conflict between GA TT and state 
law.205 
I. The "Existing Legislation" Clause 
In the four state or territorial cases found which cite GA TT,266 
Part II clauses have been invoked to override a state law. Some of 
261. The four state and territorial cases involving GATT cited in note 108 
supra are among those cases. In addition, there have been several such cases which do 
not make any reference to GATT. These include, for example, Ness Produce Co. v. 
Short, 263 F. Supp. 586 (D. Ore. 1966), aff d., 385 U.S. 537 (1967) (holding that a meat 
labeling law which was based on country of origin, not quality, was not a valid 
exercise of police power); Tuppman Thurlow Co., Inc. v. Moss, 252 F. Supp. 641 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1966) (holding invalid a Tennessee meat labeling statute); Tuppman Thurlow 
Co., Inc. v. Todd, 230 F. Supp. 230 (M.D. Ala. 1964) (holding invalid an Alabama 
Meat Inspection Law which had resulted in seizure of meat imports); Cunard S.S. 
Co. v. Lucci, 94 N.J. Super. 440 (Super. Ct. 1966) (holding unconstitutional a state 
statute requiring that every advertisement for maritime passage indicate the flag of 
registry of the vessel); City of Columbus v. Miqdadi, 25 Ohio Op. 2d 337, 195 N.E.2d 
923 (Mun. Ct. 1963); City of Columbus v. McGuire, 25 Ohio Op. 2d 331, 195 N.E.2d 
916 (Mun. Ct. 1963). 
262. The Tennessee Tuppman-Thurlow and Ness cases cited in note 261 supra 
involved labeling statutes. 
263. The Baldwin-Lima and Bethlehem Steel cases (see note 108 supra), as well as 
the California Attorney General's opinions, cited in note 106 supra, involved state 
"Buy American" statutes. The opinion in the Bethlehem Steel case suggests that even 
this type of statute is unconstitutional under the federal Constitution. See note 286 
infra. This view is propounded by Note, 12 STAN. L. R.Ev. 355 (1960). 
264. Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341 (1964). 
265. Since GATT is entirely concerned with the question of international trade 
within the definition of "foreign commerce" in the United States Constitution, it can 
be seen that every portion of GATT in relation to state laws involves this constitu-
tional issue. Presumably, the federal power over foreign commerce, even if it is 
exclusive and pre-empts state regulation of foreign commerce, would have to be 
balanced against the police power of the state and necessary state regulation for the 
health, welfare, and morals of its citizenry. GATT, art. XX excepts from the applica-
tion of GATT measures "necessary to protect public morals," "necessary to protect 
human, animal, or plant life or health," and similar purposes, provided that "such 
measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary 
or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, 
or a disguised restriction on international trade • • • ." It is possible that as the cases 
and United States constitutional law develop, this article of GATT may play a part 
in defining the borderline between federal pre-emption in matters of foreign commerce, 
and state regulation for the protection of the health, welfare, and morals of its 
citizens. 
266. See note 108 supra. 
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these laws existed prior to the signing of the Protocol on October 
30, 1947,267 the relevant date for the "existing inconsistent legisla-
tion" exemption.268 There is some question whether this clause was 
meant to apply to local as well as federal legislation. Three sources 
of interpretive evidence relating to this question will be examined: 
the GATT preparatory work, GATT practice, and United States 
government interpretations and practice. 
The first several drafts of GA TT did not mention an exception 
for "existing legislation" for any part of GATT.269 After tariff 
negotiations had begun at Geneva, however, all participating delega-
tions were asked whether their respective governments could put 
GATT into effect at the end of the conference.27° From the answers 
received, it was learned that a number of governments, while having 
authority to agree to lower tariffs, could not, without parliamentary 
approval, agree to those portions of GA TT which dealt with non-
tariff barriers and other general matters, most of which were con-
tained in Part II of GATT.271 Some delegates, therefore, urged 
postponing GA TT's entry into force until the end of the Havana 
Conference (when the ITO Charter would be complete),272 but 
others feared that such a postponement would be dangerous, since 
the momentum of the tariff negotiations would be lost, leaks in 
information might occur, political opposition to the tariff conces-
sions might develop, and disruption in international trade could 
result.273 The alternative of putting the tariff concessions into effect 
without any general non-tariff provisions was unacceptable to some 
representatives, who felt that the tariff commitments could be too 
easily evaded without the additional protective clauses of Part II.274 
Consequently, when a working party reported a full draft of GA TT, 
its recommendation was to include, as an article of GATT, a clause 
similar to the "existing legislation" language ultimately adopted 
in the Protocol of Provisional Application. The working party's 
explanation was as follows: 
It will be noted that application of Part II is to take place "to the 
fullest extent not inconsistent with existing legislation." The posi-
267. This is true for this California statute invoked in the California cases and in 
the California Attorney General's opinions. 
268. See text accompanying note 252 supra. 
269. The latest of these early drafts is contained in Report of the Drafting Com-
mittee of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Employment, U.N. Doc. EPCT/34, at 65 (March 5, 1967). 
270. U.N. Doc. EPCT/100 Gune 18, 1947). 
271. U.N. Doc. EPCT/135 Guly 24, 1947). 
272, U.N. Doc. EPCT/TAC/PV/4, at 8 (Aug. 20, 1947). 
273. U.N. Doc. EPCT/TAC/PV/1, at 3 (Aug. 5, 1947). 
274. U.N. Doc. EPCT/TA.C/PV/1, at 24 (Aug. 5, 1947). 
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tion of governments unable to put Part II of the Agreement fully 
into force on a provisional basis without changes in existing legis-
lation is, therefore, covered.275 
Later, this clause was taken out of the Agreement itself, and put 
into the separate Protocol.276 
Explanations of the "existing legislation" clause were made on 
several occasions. A committee, reporting on the countries that 
would be able to give provisional application to GA TT, stated 
that "provisional application is interpreted as meaning that action 
in accordance with Article XXXII which can be taken by executive 
action."277 At another point in the deliberations, an American 
delegate explained the clause as follows: 
I think the intent is that it should be what the executive authority 
can do-in other words, the Administration would be required to 
give effect to the general provisions to the extent that it could do 
so without either (1) changing existing legislation or (2) violating 
existing legislation. If a particular administrative regulation is neces-
sary to carry out the law, I should think that that regulation would, 
of course, have to stand; but to the extent that the Administration 
had the authority within the framework of existing laws to carry 
out these provisions, it would be required to do so.278 
Thus the purpose of the "existing legislation" clause is clear: it was 
to enable governments which would not otherwise be legally able 
to do so, to put GA TT into provisional effect soon after the Geneva 
Conference closed. Additionally, it was realized that the Havana Con-
ference might result in some changes to portions of the GA TT 
agreement, particularly Part II,279 and it seemed reasonable to allow 
countries with inconsistent legislation to wait until the results of 
that conference were knovm before taking legislative action. In any 
event, it appears that the clause thus excepted from GA TT only 
those laws that could not be affected by executive action without the 
help of the legislature. 
As previously indicated, the Administration in 1951 presented 
to Congress a list of legislation it deemed inconsistent with 
GATT.280 No state legislation was contained in this list. This could 
be taken as evidence that it was felt that the "existing legislation" 
275. U.N. Doc. EPCT /135, at 9 Guly 24, 1947). 
276. U.N. Doc. EPCT/196 (Sept. 13, 1947). 
277. U.N. Doc. EPCT/W/301, at 7 (Aug. 15, 1947). 
278. U.N. Doc. EPCT/TAC/PV/5, at 20 (1947). See also U.N. Doc. EPCT/TAC/ 
PV/23, at 15-16 (1947). 
279. See GATT, art. XXIX, para. 2. 
280. See note 250 supra. 
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clause was not intended to exempt state legislation. A counter 
argument, however, would be that the Administration did not 
believe it was necessary to bring state legislation under the "existing 
legislation" clause because, under article XXIV:12, it was not af-
fected anyway. More likely, the Administration simply was not 
aware of this problem when the list was compiled. 
As to the practice of GA TT, a thorough search for relevent 
documents turned up only one instance when the issue of the rela-
tion of the "existing legislation" clause to state legislation was 
recognized. This was in the report of India in response to a request 
for a list of "existing legislation" from each GA TT party: 
At the outset it is necessary to point out that in India the powers 
to legislate over matters affecting trade and commerce vest not only 
in the Indian Parliament but also in the Legislatures of the States 
(formerly Provinces of British India and Indian States). Within 
the time given, no attempt whatsoever could be made to examine 
the legislation of the various States and no idea can, therefore, be 
formed at this stage of the possible scope of the Government of 
India's obligation under paragraph 12 of Article XXIV.281 
What, then, can one conclude about state "existing legislation" 
and GA TT? I suggest that, based on the preparatory works of 
GA TT, the purpose of the "existing legislation" clause was to 
require a country to apply GA TT to the fullest extent of its "ex-
ecutive power." In the context of the preparatory meetings, "execu-
tive" meant federal executive. Following this line of reasoning, the 
question depends on whether the federal executive authority can 
override state legislation. In the United States it is settled that a 
valid executive agreement is superior to state law.282 Additionally, 
a President's valid proclamation or regulation is, under the suprem-
acy clause, superior to state legislation.283 Thus, it can be concluded 
that state legislation "existing" at the time of GATT was not within 
the meaning of the exception in the Protocol of Provisional Applica-
tion. 
This position can also be supported as a matter of policy. The 
need for federal control over matters affecting foreign commerce, 
recognized in the Constitution, should tip the scales in favor of 
federal law. This rationale has, as was discussed above, led a number 
281. GATT Doc. L/2375/Add.I, at 11 (1965), reproducing GATT Doc. L/309 (1955). 
282. See cases cited in note 226 supra; REsTATEM:ENT §§ 141-44 (1965). 
283. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Illinois Brick Co., 297 U.S. 477 (1936) (holding regulations 
of the Interstate Commerce Commission superior to state law). Consequently, insofar 
as the President's order is pursuant to delegation of Congress, this case supports the 
proposition in the text. 
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of courts to negate state laws affecting foreign commerce without 
relying on GATT at all. Where federal law on the subject exists, 
there is even more reason to hold that the states cannot regulate. 
2. The "Local Government" Clause 
Even if state law is not excepted from GATT superiority by 
other provisions of the agreement, it has been argued284 that it 
is made so exempt by the language of Article XXIV, paragraph 12: 
Each contracting party shall take such reasonable measures as may 
be available to it to ensure observance of the provisions of this 
Agreement by the regional and local governments and authorities 
within its territory.2s5 
Simple and straightforward as it appears, this language contains 
an ambiguity that has an important impact on the domestic law 
application of GATT. The opposing interpretations can be ex-
pressed as follows: 
(A) The language does not change the binding application of 
GATT to political subdivisions, but it recognizes that in a 
federal system certain matters are legally within the power of 
subdivisions and beyond the control of the central government. 
In such a case, the central government is not in breach of its 
international obligations when a subdivision violates GATT, 
as long as the central government does everything within its 
power to ensure local observance of GATT. 
(B) On the contrary, this language indicates that GATT was not 
intended to apply as a matter of law against local subdivisions 
at all, and even when the central government has legal power 
to require local observance of GATT, it is not obligated under 
GATT to do so, but merely to take "reasonable measures." 
If the second interpretation is correct, then GA TT cannot be 
invoked as a matter of law in any state proceeding involving state 
law. This precise issue has arisen in several cases, including a very 
recent California case.286 The unanimous conclusion of the courts 
284. Brief for Petitioner, Bethlehem Steel v. Board of Comm'rs, Civil Nos. 899165, 
897591 (Super Ct. County of Los Angeles 1966). The argument is discussed in l!6 CAL. 
ATT'Y GEN. OP. 147, 148-49 (1960). 
285. This paragraph was originally numbered 6 of art. XXIV, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 
(1950). Subsequently, amendments to art. XXIV (see authorities cited in note 236 
supra) changed the number to 12. 
286. Bethlehem Steel v. Board of Comm'rs, Civil Nos. 899165, 897591 (Super. Ct. 
County of Los Angeles 1966). The court, while finding that the Baldwin-Lima case 
(see note 108 supra) was controlling, indicated that if the case were one of first 
impression that he would hold that "the Buy American Act is a violation of the 
commerce clause of the United States Constitution." Further, relying on the Imposts 
December 1967] GATT in U.S. Domestic Law 303 
thus far has been that GATT does apply to and override state or ter-
ritorial law.287 However, the State Department took the contrary 
position in a letter to the Hawaii Territorial Supreme Court in 
the earliest of these cases. This letter,288 signed by the then State 
Department Legal Advisor, Herman Phleger, referring to Article 
XXIV:12, stated: 
This provision . . . has always been interpreted as preventing the 
General Agreement from overriding legislation of political sub-
divisions of contracting parties inconsistent with the provisions of 
the Agreement; by placing upon contracting parties the obligation 
to take reasonable measures to obtain observance of the Agreement 
by such subdivisions, the parties indicated that as a matter of law 
the General Agreement did not override such laws. . . . In light of 
the provisions of paragraph 12 of Article XXIV ... the reliance 
by the Supreme Court of the Territory on Article VI, clause 2 of 
the United States Constitution to invalidate the legislation would 
appear to have been based on a misconception of the General 
Agreement and of its effect on the legislation of the parties to it ... 
it is suggested that you might desire to request a rehearing of the 
case on the basis that the particular constitutional grounds relied 
on are not appropriate in view of paragraph 12 of Article XXIV. 
This letter is consistent with the testimony of a State Depart-
ment official in hearings before a Senate Committee in 1949, one-
and-one-half years after GA TT was signed. Referring to article 
XXIV: 12, the colloquy was as follows: 
Senator MILLIKIN. Well, with reference to that, what can we 
do about it? Supposing any of our States, within their proper con-
stitutional authority, put up a ta.x. that is inconsistent with the pro-
and Duties clause of the Constitution (art. I, § 10), the court stated that a state could 
not constitutionally impose such a "complete embargo" as results from the Buy 
American Act. The court did not undetrake to examine the bases of GATT in United 
States law, but accepted it as superior to state legislation without discussion, while 
denying the injunction petition on grounds of existence of an adequate remedy at law. 
Oral Opinion of the Court, Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Commr's, supra, Judge 
Charles A. Loring, rendered December 22, 1966. Copy on file Michigan Law Review 
office. On May 2, 1967, the court granted defendant's motion for summary judgement. 
Letter from Kenneth W. Downey, Deputy City Attorney of Los Angeles, dated May 
9, 1967; copy on file Michigan Law Review office. It is understood that the decision is 
being appealed. 
287. The Texas case turned on another legal issue, but the remaining state and 
territorial cases (see cases cited in note 108 supra) so applied GATT. 
288. Letter from Herman Phleger, Legal Advisor of the Department of State, to 
Mr. Sharpless, Acting Attorney General of Hawaii, February 26, 1957. This letter is on 
file in the Department of the Attorney General of Hawaii, as contained and certified 
in an affidavit of April 5, 1967, by Burt T. Kobayashi, Attorney General of the State 
of Hawaii, It was filed by the attorneys for plaintiff in Bethlehem Steel Corporation 
v. Board of Comm'rs, Civil Nos. 899591 (Super. Ct. County of Los Angeles 1966). 
Portions of this letter are also quoted in L. EBB, REGULATION AND PROTECTION OF INTER· 
NATIONAL BUSINESS, CAsES, COMMENTS AND MATERIALS 76!1 (1964). 
304 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 66:249 
visions of this article which we have been discussing? What is our 
obligation? 
Mr. BROWN. I do not think we could do anything about it, 
Senator. 
Senator MILLIKIN. Have we promised, or held out an implied 
promise, to do something that we could do anything about? 
Mr. BROWN. I don't think so. 
Senator MILLIKIN. Let us read that. 
Mr. BROWN. Let me just check. 
The only commitment that we have taken, on that point, Senator, 
is in the last paragraph of article XX.IV, page 82. 
Senator MILLIKIN. Article XX.IV of GATT? 
Mr. BROWN. Article XX.IV of the general agreement; yes. 
Because it was recognized that the Federal Government did not have 
the power to compel action by the local government. It only had 
powers of persuasion. 
Senator MILLIKIN. Well, can we accept it as beyond "iPs," 
"hut's," "maybe's" that it is not intended that the Federal Govern-
ment shall attempt to conform State laws by any method whatso-
ever, to the provisions of this agreement? 
Mr. BROWN. That may be taken categorically, but that does 
not mean that the Federal Government might not get in touch with 
a governor and suggest to him that he consider that a course of 
action which the State is following has certain effects. But that 
would be simply a matter of persuasion and consultation. 
Senator MILLIKIN. Would the provisions of this article or 
any other part of GATT impose upon the Federal Government 
any duties to do anything as to local State laws or movements, 
which are intended to promote State products, such as "Buy Georgia 
Peaches," "Buy Colorado Cantaloupes," state advertising campaigns 
out of public funds to promote those local buying movements? 
Mr. BROWN. No, sir. 
Senator MILLIKIN. Is there anything in this agreement any 
place that imposes any obligation on the Federal Government to 
stop anything of that sort? 
Mr. BROWN. I don't think so, sir. 
Senator MILLIKIN. Is there any question about it? 
Mr. BROWN. No; I don't know of anything. It was not in-
tended.289 
The actual drafting history of GATT, however, leaves one with 
a somewhat different impression. The language of article XXIV:12 
was drawn directly from an identical provision that was in the draft 
ITO Charter290 at the time the GATT draft was formulated.291 
289. Hearings on H.R. 1211, Extension of Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, 
Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1161-62 (1949). 
290. This so-called Geneva draft of the ITO Charter, the result of the Geneva 
meeting, is contained in the Report of the Second Session of the Preparatory Com-
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A later attempt to delete this language from GA TT was rebuffed at 
Geneva, with the United States delegate explaining: 
Mr. Chairman, this particular paragraph was drawn from the 
Charter and I think some rather careful consideration went into 
its framing. I believe it is necessary to distinguish between central 
or federal governments, which undertake these obligations in a firm 
way, and local authorities, which are not strictly bound, so to speak, 
by the provisions of the Agreement, depending of course on the con-
stitutional procedure of the country concerned. 
I think it really would be preferable to retain this language; it 
has some relationship with references in other parts of the Agree-
ment dealing with action taken by governments. I am afraid that if 
we change the language of Paragraph 7 we shall probably disturb 
some of the interpretations and understandings that have been 
arrived at with respect to other parts of the Agreement, as well as 
raising questions with regard to the Charter when we get to Havana. 
Therefore I should be rather inclined to take the present draft.292 
A previous attempt to transfer the clause to Part II of GA TT, so 
that it would be subject to "existing legislation," also failed.293 
In working back into the history of this language as it developed 
in the ITO Charter, it appears that the question of treaty applica-
tion to federal subdivisions came up very soon after the start of the 
first preparatory meeting in London in 1946. In connection with a 
draft commitment to prevent internal tax and regulatory discrim-
ination against imported goods (compare article III of GATT), 
Australia noted: 
Where the matter is one solely of action by a state, and our "external 
powers" laws do not give the Commonwealth authority to act, we 
would agree to use our best efforts to secure modification or elimina-
tion of any practice regarded as discriminatory.204 
And, at a later point, a United States delegate noted: 
The obligation to accord fair and equitable treatment in award-
ing contracts applied to both central and local government where 
mittee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, U.N. Doc. 
EPCT/186 (1947). Article 99, para. 3 of this draft is the language identical to the 
present art. XXIV:12 of GATT, except for minor changes reflecting the difference in 
the instruments in which the language is located. Earlier GATT drafts likewise had 
included ITO Charter versions of this same clause. 
291. The earliest Geneva draft of GATT, following the fairly complete redraft 
of the ITO Charter, is contained in EPCT /135 (1947). At this point the local 
government clause was in art. XXII of GATT. Subsequent drafts of GATT carried 
this language forward without change. See art. XXII of U.N. Doc. EPCT/189 (1947); 
art. XXIV of U.N. Doc. EPCT/196 (1947); art. XXIV of U.N. Doc. EPCT/214 (1947). 
292. U.N. Doc. EPCT/TAC/PV/19, at 32-33 (1947). 
29!1. U.N. Doc. EPCT/TAC/PV/11, at 43-46 (1947). 
294. U.N. Doc. EPCT/13, at 1 (1946). See also U.N. Doc. EPCT/C.II/7 (1946). 
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the central government was traditionally or constitutionally able 
to control the local government. Although he could not speak 
decisively, he thought that the United States Government would be 
able to control actions of states in this matter.295 
A subcommittee later reported as follows: 
Several countries emphasized that central governments could not in 
many cases control subsidiary governments in this regard, but agree 
that all should take such measures as might be open to them to 
ensure the objective.296 
Therefore, the subcommittee proposed the addition of a new clause 
which read: 
Each member agrees that it will take all measures open to it to 
assure that the objectives of this Article are not impaired in any 
way by taxes, charges, laws, regulations or requirements of subsid-
iary governments within the territory of the member govemments.297 
This language, as a part of the "national treatment article," was 
carried over to the next preparatory meeting in New York in early 
1947. At this meeting, the clause was changed to read: 
Each accepting government shall take such reasonable measures as 
may be available to it to assure observance of the provisions of this 
Charter by subsidiary governments within its territory.298 
It was further pointed out that this problem of federal-state power 
allocation also applied to other parts of the draft charter. The 
clause was then transferred from the article on national treatment to 
a general miscellaneous article.299 It was in this form that the clause 
first found its way into the draft GATT,300 only to be changed later 
to accord with the draft ITO Charter changes as they occurred.301 
Before drawing some conclusions from this history, one com-
plicating factor must be mentioned. An interpretative note in 
Annex I to GATT, relating to paragraph I of article III, states: 
The application of paragraph I to internal taxes imposed by local 
governments and authorities within the territory of a contracting 
295. U.N. Doc. EPCT/C.Il/Zl, at I (1946). 
296. U.N. Doc. EPCT/C.II/54, at 4 (1946). See also U.N. Doc. EPCT/C.II/64, at !I 
(1946). 
297. U.N. Doc. EPCT/C.II/54, at 6 (1946). 
298. U.N. Doc. EPCT/34, at 52 (art. 88, para. 5 of the Geneva draft of the ITO 
Charter), 79 (art. XXV, para. 5 of the then GATT draft) (1947). 
299. U.N. Doc. EPCT/C.6/6, at 3 (1947), U.N. Doc. EPCT/C.6/55 at 5-6 (1947). 
300. U.N. Doc. EPCT/C.6/W.58 (art. XXII, para. 5) (1947). 
301. See note 290 supra. Ultimately, the "Havana Charter," the final version of the 
ITO Charter as drafted at Havana in the early part of 1948, included the local 
government clause as art. 104, para. 3. U.N. Doc. ICITO/1/4 (1948). 
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party is subject to the provisions of the final paragraph of Article 
X..XIV. The term "reasonable measures" in the last mentioned para-
graph would not require, for example, the repeal of existing national 
legislation authorizing local governments to impose internal taxes 
which, although technically inconsistent with the letter of Article III, 
are not in fact inconsistent ·with its spirit if its repeal would result 
in a serious financial hardship for the local governments or authori-
ties concerned. With regard to taxation by local governments or 
authorities which is inconsistent with both the letter and spirit of 
Article III, the term "reasonable measures" would permit a con-
tracting party to eliminate the inconsistent taxation gradually over 
a transition period, if abrupt action would create serious adminis-
trative and financial difficulties. 
This note was explained in the 1949 Senate hearings: 
Senator MILLIKIN. Well, is it understood that this does not 
apply to the United States? 
Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir, because it applies only to a national law, 
and we don't have any.so2 
It can be argued that the interpretative note indicates that GATT 
was not intended to apply to state law, since it interprets "reason-
able measures" not to require immediate overriding of a state law. 
One could argue, however, that this note applies only to national 
legislation. A look at the history of this troublesome note may 
help elucidate its meaning. 
The note was drafted at the Havana Conference on the ITO 
Charter in early 1948, some months after GATT was signed.303 In 
September 1948, at the Second Session of the Contracting Parties of 
GA TT, protocols were drafted to amend some specific portions of 
GA TT to take account of changes made at Havana in the corre-
sponding ITO articles.304 Among the changes made to GATT were 
those that tightened up article III, dealing with "national treat-
ment."305 Since the Havana Conference had added an interpretative 
note to the Charter when it changed the corresponding provision, 
the same note was carried over into GATT when the changes were 
!102. Hearings on H.R. 1211, Extension of Redprocal Trade Agreements Act Before 
the Senate Finance Comm., 81st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1162 (1949). 
!10!1. Final Act and Related Documents of the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Employment, Havana, Cuba (1947-1948), U.N. Doc. ICITO/1/4, at 62 (1948). This 
interpretive note was in the ITO Charter at annex P, art. 18, para. 1. 
!104. See GATT Doc. CP.2/SR.1-25 (1948); Report adopted by the contracting 
parties (1948), GATT Doc. CP. 2/22/"RJ!.V. 1, reprinted at GATT, 2 BISD !19 (1952); 
GATT, 2 BISD para. !12, at 45 (1952). 
!105. GATT, 2 BISD 40 (1952). 
!106. See authorities cited in notes !10!1 & !104 supra. 
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made to ~rticle III.806 Reports of the Havana Conference807 suggest 
that the interpretative note was a result of a compromise and a desire 
to accommodate several countries who feared the political and 
administrative consequences, including the revenue loss to sub-
sidiary governments, of immediate revocation of discriminatory 
internal taxes.808 The solution agreed upon was to permit gradual 
elimination of such taxes, but it was thought easier to handle this 
in an interpretative note than in the text of the article itself.309 It 
seems doubtful that this note was intended to affect the language in 
article XXIV:12 at all. Its placement as a note to the "national 
treatment" article confirms this view.810 
What, then, can be concluded from the preparatory history of 
article XXIV:12? The fragments of that history which were recorded 
suggest that this clause was intended to apply only to the situation 
in which the central government did not have the constitutional 
power to control the subsidiary governments. Australia and other 
countries made reference to this situation. The United States 
delegate did likewise, adding his tentative judgment that the United 
States did not find itself in this circumstance. Thus, it can be argued 
that interpretation (A) which was presented at the outset of this 
section is the correct one, despite the opposing view expressed in 
the 1949 Senate Finance Committee hearings. It should be added 
that the witness at that hearing may have been suffering under a 
misunderstanding of United States law at the time of his testimony. 
He said that "it was recognized that the Federal Government did 
not have the power to compel action by the local government,"811 
but the supremacy clause of the Constitution seems to belie that 
statement. Furthermore, this hearing was held at a time when 
political opposition to ITO and GA TT was apparently growing, 
and several of the Senators at the hearing were obviously hostile 
and were challenging the validity of GA TT in its entirety. Under 
these circumstances, it is natural that the Administration spokesman 
would desire to play do·wn the scope of GATT.812 
307. U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, Reports of Comm. &: Principle 
Subcomm., U.N. Doc. ICITO/1/8, at 62 (Report of Subcomm. A of the 3d Comm. on 
arts. 16, 17, 18 &: 19, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.3/59, at para. 38) (1948). 
308. U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.S/A/ 
W.30, 31-35, 47, 52 (1948); U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.3/SR,40, at 2 (1948). 
309. U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.3/A/W.30, at 1 (1948); U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.3/A/ 
W .50, at 3 (1948) 
310. U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.3/A/W.50, at 3 (1948). 
311. Hearings on H.R. 1211, Extension of Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, Before 
the Senate Comm. on Finance, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1161 (1949). 
lll2. See authorities cited in note 223 supra and accompanying text. 
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One can, of course, also raise the question of the comparative 
relevance to GA TT legal questions of the GA TT preparatory work 
as against United States Senate hearings. Theoretically, the prepar-
atory work should weigh more heavily.318 Indeed, the legislative 
hearings that occurred after GATT was in force are arguably ir-
relevant, although in practice, they are accepted as having some 
value.314 Yet the practical problem in attempting to ascribe any 
meaning at all to certain GA TT provisions has been the diffi-
culty of finding and obtaining access to any GATT interpreta-
tive materials. The legislative hearings are relatively easy to find 
and read, whereas GATT preparatory work is just the opposite. 
For a number of years, the preparatory work material was re-
stricted and unavailable for public use-even now, only a few 
libraries or locations have a reasonable collection.315 Moreover, the 
sheer volume is so great316 and indexing so poor (or non-existent),317 
that even with access the attorney needs a wealthy and willing client 
to be able to undertake the necessary search. There is something 
of an anomaly in the fact that an instrument can have legal force in 
domestic law while important interpretative material relating to 
that instrument is, as a practical matter, unavailable to the domestic 
lawyer or court. The anomaly is even more difficult to accept when 
313. The Restatement's "criteria for interpretation" of treaties and executive 
agreements include "the circumstances attending the negotiation of the agreement," 
and "drafts and other documents submitted for consideration, action taken on them, 
and the official record of the deliberations during the course of the negotiation ••• .'' 
R.EsTATEMENT § 147. 
314. Id. This section does not consider legislative discussion of an international 
agreement subsequent to the time the agreement enters into force to be relevant, 
although subsequent practice of one party, if the other party or parties knew or had 
reason to know of it, is relevant. Id. § 147(f). As a matter of practice, legislative 
materials of a major member of an international organization tend to be regarded as 
significant in interpreting the agreement, even by the international staff. See Gold, 
Interpretation by the International Monetary Fund of Its Articles of Agreement: II, 
16 INT'L &: COMPARATIVE LAW Q. 289, 296 (1967). The Supreme Court of the United 
States has recognized the relevance of administrative interpretations of international 
agreements by the department charged with its negotiation and enforcement. Kolovrat 
v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933). 
315. GATT headquarters in Geneva, of couISe, has a very complete collection. In 
the United States, fairly complete collections exist at the United Nations Headquarters 
Library, at the State Department offices in Washington, and at the International 
Monetary Fund offices in "\'\Tashington. The situation has improved, however, as most 
of the preparatory work is now available on microfilm. Also, GATT has recently 
liberalized its restrictive policy as to current documents. See GATT Doc.5. INF/121 &: 
INF/122. 
316. I would estimate that the volume of materials comprising the preparatory 
work for GATT and ITO (which is intermingled), amounts to something on the 
order of 27,000 pages-about 100 volumes. 
317. A very small number of references to the preparatory work can be found in 
GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT (2d rev. 1966). 
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these materials are available only to government attorneys. This 
situation is not unique to foreign trade matters; indeed, it is 
pervasive. Such a situation can have the practical effect of giving 
the administering government agency undue influence on the ulti-
mate interpretation of important domestic laws.318 Interestingly 
enough, however, in the one clear case in which a government 
agency has tried to influence a state court's interpretation of GATT, 
the agency's position has so far not been followed.319 
Since there are these problems in using the preparatory work or 
United States legislative history concerning GATT, and since these 
materials are contradictory, it is worthwhile to note briefly some 
policy arguments relating to GATT's position vis-a-vis state or local 
law. There are two broad policy groupings that any state court will 
face in the appraisal of the significance of GA TT to state law. The 
first group will consist of the policies of the particular state law 
being compared with GA TT, whether explicitly admitted by the 
court or not. If the court feels, for example, that a state "Buy 
American" statute is based on weak or faulty premises, it will be 
more likely to apply GA TT to override this statute, particularly 
if it feels the legislature is not likely to correct defects in the 
law. The second policy group involves basic questions of constitu-
tional law and the powers of the federal government to control 
foreign commerce. Various non-tariff trade barriers can be even 
more inhibiting to international trade than tariffs. This fact has 
clearly been recognized by both the legislative and executive 
branches of the federal government.320 Local government actions 
are certainly capable of frustrating international trade almost as 
significantly as federal government actions.321 Therefore, mean-
ingful international agreement on trade matters must regulate local 
government actions. In this country, the Constitution gives the 
federal government power so to affect local actions.322 
318. These interpretations are likely to be influenced by current policy positions 
of the government agency, which in turn usually reflect current political conditions. 
It is fundamental to an independent judiciary that there be free access to relevant 
interpretive materials in order to formulate its conclusions independently of the 
administration, even though the final result may be the same. 
319. See text accompanying note 288 supra. 
320. See authorities cited in note 62 supra. 
321. See note 261 supra and accompanying text. See also excerpts from the memo-
randum of the United States as amicus curiae in Tuppman-Thurlow Co. v. Moss, 252 
F. Supp. 641 (M.D. Tenn. 1966), reproduced in 5 AM. Soc'y OF INT'L LAW, INT'L LEGAL 
MATERIALS 483 (1966). 
322. U.S. CONST., art. VI (the "supremacy clause'); art I, § 8 ("to regulate commerce 
with foreign nations .• .'); art. I, § 10 ("no state shall, without the consent of the 
Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports •• .'). 
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But such general statements do not answer the GATT question: 
Is there any reason peculiar to GATT for interpreting it (or not) 
to override directly state law? The policies already expressed seem 
to indicate that in case of doubt GA TT should be so applied. 
But countering this are the following arguments: (1) to interpret 
article XXIV:12 of GATT in this manner means that GATT will 
apply to different countries in different ways depending on their 
constitutional structure; and (2) United States constitutional uncer-
tainty and controversy regarding executive agreements should lead 
courts to be cautious in applying such agreements to override state 
law. 
In reply to the first argument, it may be said that uniformity 
of application is not essential, especially when the mechanism for 
registering complaints and urging corrective action exists within 
GATT.323 Ivforeover, the "existing legislation" clause of the Pro-
tocol of Provisional Application clearly already allows non-uni-
formity depending on constitutional structure.324 Indeed, it can be 
argued that such international recognition and allowance for indi-
vidual national constitutional differences is salutary and analogous 
to the policies of federalism within nations. As to the second argu-
ment, while self-restraint by the federal legislative and executive 
branches is well received in many contexts, once the executive agree-
ment has become effective the courts should not be deterred by this 
argument from giving full force under the supremacy clause to such 
agreements when other policies urge such effect. Both the supremacy 
clause and the foreign commerce clause of the Constitution should, 
in the context of GA TT, lead to a presumption that federal law, 
including proclaimed executive agreements on trade, supersedes 
state law. 
Furthermore, this country is likely to have future occasion to 
protest the use of foreign regional and local laws to restrict our 
exports. In such a case, the United States, an exporting nation, will 
be in a stronger position to use diplomatic means to obtain revoca-
tion of those laws, if, within this country, state and local laws are 
automatically subject to GA TT. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The legal position of GATT in United States domestic law turns 
out to be surprisingly complex. This may be only a natural result-
32!1. GATT, arts. XXI1 8e XXlII (nullification and impairment, and the complaint 
procedure); GATT, art. XXV (waivers and joint action). 
324. See discussion in text at pt. III.B.1. 
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GA TT itself was a highly intricate and perplexing instrument 
when born. Years of amendments and subtle changes in practice 
have made it even more difficult to understand fully. It appears, 
however, that the following generalizations can be made about the 
domestic legal position of GATT: 
I. GATT is a valid executive agreement, entered into by the 
United States pursuant to authority of congressional legis-
lation.325 
2. To the extent entry into GATT is pursuant to congressional 
authority, its domestic legal effect is probably achieved only 
through "proclamation." Not all parts of GATT have been pro-
claimed, but proclaimed parts do include all changes to United 
States tariff schedules and notes, as well as the original full text 
of GATT's general provisions, but not some subsequent textual 
amendments.326 
3. Part II of GATT is expressly subject to pre-GATT federal legis-
lation, pursuant to the Protocol of Provisional Application 
(which was proclaimed). It is inferior to subsequent federal legis-
lation by virtue of the usual legal principles concerning execu-
tive agreements. Thus, Part II of GATT is inferior to any 
inconsistent federal legislation. Parts I and III are superior to 
pre-GA TT legislation, and Part IV is probably not domestic 
law in the United States.327 
4. It is this author's opinion that GATT is directly applicable to 
state and local governments in the United States, and supersedes 
state or local law even when that law is not automatically pre-
empted by federal law, and even when such law existed prior 
to GATT.328 
325. See discussion in text at pt. II.A.I. 
326. See discussion in text at pt. II.B. and app. C. 
327. See discussion in text at pt. III.A. 
328. See discussion in text at pt. III.B. 
APPENDIX A 
Analysis of GATT in Relation to 1945 United States Statutory Authority, Congressional History, and Prior Trade Agreements 
The following chart briefly presents for each article of GATT (1) its general subject matter, (2) its statutory basis, (ll) the relevant congressional 
history, and (4) similar provisions in various trade agreements entered into by the United States prior to the 1945 Trade Agreements Extension Act. 
Abbreviations used arc as follows: 
CR: 91 CoNG. R:Ec. (1945). The number which follows is the page. 
EXC: "Exception" (meaning the article can be justified under the Statute as being merely an exception to commitments otherwise authorized). 
HH: Hearings on the Extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Before the House Ways b Means Comm., 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945). 





H.R. REP. No. 594, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945). The number which follows is the page. 
"Implied" (suggesting that the article is an administrative provision that can be justified as impliedly authorized by the Statute as a 
necessary measure to carry out the other commitments). 
"Import Restrictions" (referring to this language in the TAEA). 
Hearings on the Extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Before the Senate Finance Comm., 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945). The 
number which follows is the page. 
TAEA: § 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930 as amended by the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 and extended by the Trade Agreements Exten-
sion Act of 1945 [19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1964)]. If a small letter follows, it refers to a subsection of 350. If a number follows, it refers to another 
section of the same Act. 
I, etc: Relevant articles in prior trade agreements. 
N.l, etc: Notes at the end of the chart. 
It should be noted that the congressional history on any clause is often extensive, and that only one illustrative reference may have been selected 
for inclusion on this chart. This analysis does not purport to show that explicit congressional approval existed for any specific clause, but merely that 
the general subject matter of each GATT article was mentioned in the congressional history, and thus is arguably within the intended scope of the 
legislative delegation of power. It should also be noted that, even though unmentioned in legislative history or prior precedents, clauses which are 



















APPENDIX A c.,o 
Prior U.S. Trade Agreements 
,_. 
Congrcs- ~ 
GATT sional Mexico Uruguay Other Trade Agreement 
Article General Subject Statute History 1942 1942 Precedents 
Part I 
I Most-Favored-Nation Clause TAEA CR-5071 I I 
II Commitment on Maximum Tariffs TAEA HH-274 VII, VIII VII, VIII 
Part II-Safeguarding Provisions IR,N.l HR-8 
III Internal Taxation and Regulations TAEA(c) CR-4999 III, IX II Canada (1938), V 
IV Cinematograph Films IR,EXC 
~ V Freedom of Transit IR CR-4999 XIII ... 
VI Anti-Dumping IR CR-5071 Costa Rica (1936} XI ~ ;::i.. 
VII Customs Valuation IR HH-274 XII X 
El Salvador (1 37), XI ~-
l:i 
VIII Customs Fees and Formalities TAEA(c) CR-4999 VI 
~ 
IX Marks of Origin IR Canada (1938), IX l.""1 t::) 
X Publication/Administration, Customs ~ 
Regulations TAEA(c) HH-274 VI VI 
~ XI Quantitative Restrictions TAEA(c) HR-8 III,X XI ~ XII Quantitative Restrictions (BOP Exception) TAEA(c),EXC HR-8 111,X ~-
XIII Quantitative Restrictions (MFN) TAEA(c) HR-8 lll,X III Sec Peru (1942), III ~ 
XIV Quantitative Restrictions (BOP Exception) TAEA(c),EXC HR-8 III,X 
XV Currency Manipulations and BOP IR CR-4886 IV IV 
XVI Subsidies on Exports or to Reduce Imports IR CR-5070 
XVII State Trading &: State Monopolies IR CR-5071 V V 
XVIII Assisting Economic Development EXC 
XIX Escape Clause EXC HR-8 XI 
XX Health and Morals Regulations IR,EXC CR-4999 XVII xv 1 XXI National Security Exce}?tions EXC CR-5070 XVII xv 
XXII Consultation IMP HH-274 XIV XII Cl> Cl> 
XXIII Nullification (Sanction) IMP HH-409 XIV XII ~ 
"' 
GATT 
Article General Subject 
Part III-Administrative 
XXIV Territorial, Application/Regional Blocs 
XXV Voting, Decisions, Waivers 
XX.VI Acceptance, Entry in Force 
XXVII Withholding Concessions to Nonmembers 
XXVIII Negotiating and Modifying Tariff 
Concessions 
XXIX Relation to ITO 
XXX Amending GATT 
XX.XI Withdrawal from GA TT 
XX.XII Contracting Parties Defined 
XXXIII Accession of new Members 
XXXIV Annexes Incorporated by Reference 
XXXV Withholding Application of GATT to 
New Members 
Part IY-Trade and Development 
Annexes: Relate to specific GATT articles 
Schedules: Contain tariff concessions and 
relate to art. II 
Some special clauses: 
"Exports" 
"Principal Supplier Rule" in tariff negotiations 
"Provisional Application" of the Protocol 
"Local Governments," (XXIV:12) 
























Prior U.S. Trade Agreements 
Mexico Uruguay Other Trade Agreement 














































Part II is subject to "existing legislation." See discussion in text at 11.B.I, 
The joint action provisions of art. XXV can also be justified as administrative l?rovisions necessarily implied in the authority delegated 
to enter GATT. The language of art. XXV, however, is very broad on its face; 1t may well be argued that it should be limited by the 
scope of GATT itself or at least that United States representatives should be subject to some limitations in voting to exercise joint 
action. 
Since ITO was intended to be submitted to Congress, it can be argued that a provision governing the relationship to ITO was not 
beyond the scope of the trade agreements delegation. Some provisions of art. XXIX, however, provide positive commitments them-
selves. Paragraph I commits parties to observe chapters I to VI and IX of the ITO Charter "to the fullest extent of their executive 
authority," thereby ducking the ultra vires problem. Paragraph 6 provides that GATT parties "shall not invoke the provisions" of 
GATT to prevent operation of any provision of the Havana Charter, but this seems merely an exception to GATT, not an additional 
commitment. In practice the ITO Charter has apparently become a dead letter, other than as a generalized statement of principle. 
The amending article, like art. XXV, is probably justified as a necessary administrative clause. This article is discussed in more detail 
in the text at II.A.3. 
Articles XXXIII (new members) and XXXV (withholding application of GATT to a new member) must be read together. Article 
XXXV simply gives an option to new or old parties of GATT not to apply GATT to each other. This is analogous to a refusal to 
enter a· bilateral trade agreement, and is a remnant of bilateralism in GATT. 
At the time GATT was negotiated, the President had other statutory authority over exports (see note 60 to text supra). Even if that 
authority would not expressly support the clauses in GATT, it is evidence that the President had general authority to negotiate on 
export matters. In addition, prior trade agreements dealt with exports. 
These provisions of GATT are not needed in a bilateral agreement because the same purposes could be effectuated by bilateral 
negotiations. 
Definitional clauses or incorporating clauses do not need authorization. 
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APPENDIX B 
State Department Memorandum 
The following is an excerpt from a memorandum submitted by the State Department 
at the Hearings on Extending the Trade Agreements Act Before the Senate Finance 
Committee, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., at 1054-55 (1949): 
ANALYSIS BY ARTICLES 
The following analysis of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade briefly 
indicates the principal authority for the inclusion in the agreement of the basic 
provisions of each article. Several of the substantive articles also contain pro-
visions as to consultation with respect to the matter covered, which are clearly 
within the President's general authority as to consultation with other govern-
ments in the carrying out of international agreements, or exceptions which in 
one way or another merely limit the extent of the substantive commitments. 
Moreover, the provisions of part II of the agreement, that is, articles III through 
XXIII, are applicable only to the extent not inconsistent with legislation existing 
on October 30, 1947. 
Article I-General most-favored-nation treatment as to customs duties, the treat-
ment of imports, with limited geographical exceptions as to duties: Under 
authority for continuance of duties, customs treatment, and treatment of 
imports, most-favored-nation treatment also being recognized in generaliza-
tion provision of section 350 (a) and preferences by section 350 (b). 
Article II-Giving effect to tariff concessions with provisions as to excise, valua-
tion, and government-monopoly treatment to protect concessions: Under 
authority to modify and continue duties, and continue customs and excise 
treatment and the treatment of imports. 
Articles III and IV-Nondiscriminatory treatment of imports, as compared with 
domestic products, in respect of taxes and other regulations: Under authority 
as to continuance of excise treatment and treatment of imports. 
Article V-Transit rights: Under authority as to continuance of duties, customs 
treatment, excise treatment, and the treatment of imports . 
.Article VI-Antidumping and countervailing duties: Under authority as to con-
tinuance of duties and customs treatment. 
Article VII-Valuation for customs purposes: Under authority as to continuance 
of duties and customs treatment. 
Article VIII-Customs formalities: Under authority as to continuance of customs 
treatment, including charges. 
Article IX-Marks of origin: Under authority as to continuance of customs treat-
ment. 
Article X-Publication and administration of trade regulations: Under the Presi-
dent's general authority as to international relations (especially as to publica-
tion) and authority as to continuance of customs treatment. 
Articles XI and XII-Elimination of quantitative restrictions and exceptions there-
to for balance of payment and other reasons: Under authority as to modification 
of import restrictions, continuance of customs treatment, and treatment of 
Arti~~o~II and XIV-Nondiscriminatory application of quantitative restrictions 
and exceptions thereto for balance of payment and other reasons: Under 
authority as to continuance of customs treatment and treatment of imports. 
Article XV-Cooperation with International Monetary Fund on exchange matters: 
Under the President's general authority as to international relations, relations 
with the fund having been recognized by Public Law 171, Seventy-ninth Con-
gress, first session (see especially sec. 14), and authority as to continuance of 
customs treatment. 
Article XVI-Consultation as to subsidies: Under the President's general authority 
as to international relations, subsidies having been recognized as capable of 
impairing trade agreement benefits • 
.Article XVII-State trading activities: Under authority as to continuance of customs 
treatment, and the treatment of imports, state trading practices having been 
recognized as capable of impairing trade-agreement benefits. 
Article XVIII-Exceptions for the assistance to industrial development: Under 
authority as to modifications and continuance of duties and import restrictions 
and treatment of imports. 
Article XIX-Escape clause in case of domestic injury: Under authority as to 
modification of duties and import restrictions and expressly recognized by 
congressional report as desirable. 
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Article XX-General exceptions: Under the President's general authority as to 
international relations and authority as to continuance of customs treatment, 
and treatment of imports, also recognized in numerous laws as those relating 
to sanitary regulations and trademarks. 
Article XXI-Security exceptions: Under the President's general authority as to 
international relations and authority as to continuance of customs treatment, 
and treatment of imports, also recognized in numerous laws such as regulation 
of arms traffic and export-control legislation. 
Article XXII-Consultation as to customs and related matters: Under the Presi-
dent's general authority as to international relations, also recognized by au-
thority as to continuance of customs treatment and treatment of imports. 
Article XXIII-Permissive action in case of nullification or impairment: Under 
the President's general authority as to international relations and authority as to 
modification of duties and import restrictions. 
Article XXIV-Territorial application and certain territorial exceptions from most-
favored-nation treatment: Under the President's general authority as to inter-
national relations, territorial exceptions to most-favored-nation treatment hav-
ing been recognized by section 350 (b). 
Article XXV-Joint action: Under the President's general authority as to inter-
national relations, especially the effective execution of multilateral international 
agreements, and authority as to modification of duties and import restrictions 
and termination of proclamations under last sentence of section 350 (a) (as to 
withholding of benefits under paragraph 5 (b)). 
Article XXVI-Procedures as to entry into force following provisional application: 
Under the President's general authority as to international relations to include 
appropriate procedural provisions in agreements. 
Article XXVII-Withholding and withdrawal of concessions: Under authority as to 
modification and continuance of duties and import restrictions and termination 
of proclamations under last sentence of section 350 (a). 
Article XXVIII-Modification of schedules: Under authority as to modification and 
continuance of duties and import restrictions and termination of proclamations 
under section 350 (a) with recognition of termination provisions as to trade 
agreements in section 2 (b) of Trade Agreements Act. 
Article XXIX-Relation to International Trade Organization: Under the Presi-
dent's general authority as to international relations to include appropriate 
termination provisions in agreements, with recognition of section 14 of Public 
Law 171, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, and intention to submit Inter-
national Trade Organization Charter to Congress . 
.Article XXX-Amendments: Under the President's authority as to international 
relations, and authority as to modification of import restrictions, and treatment 
of imports. 
Article XXXI-Witlidrawal from the agreement: Under the President's general 
authority as to international relations, with recognition of section 2 (a) of Trade 
.Agreements Act as to termination of agreements, and authority to terminate 
proclamations under the last sentence of section 350 (a). 
Articles X."{XII to X.UIV-Certain procedural provisions, including accession: 
Under the President's general authority as to international relations to include 
appropriate procedural provisions in agreements (new tariff negotiations in 
connection with accession would be in accordance with procedures of Trade 
Agreements Act). 
Article XXXV-Withholding application: Under the President's general authority 
as to international relations, with recognition of procedures provided for in the 
Trade Agreements Act. 
APPENDIX C 
GA.TT Agreements and United States Proclamations 
Listed below arc all "official" GATT agreements, as of October 15, 1967. "Official" GATT agreements arc arbitrarily defined as those which have 
been deposited with the United Nations (prior to 1955) and listed in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/3, Rev. 1, ch. X, subch. 1 and those which have been 
deposited with the Executive-Secretary of GATT since 1955 which arc listed in GATT Doc, PROT/2 (as revised to August 1967). The United 
States proclamation listed is the principal one for that agreement, although others may also affect domestic application of the agreement. Other 
agreements relating to GATT, such as Final Acts or various bilateral trade agreements, arc not listed here. Those other bilateral agreements 
which the United States has entered and which have also been proclaimed by the President can be found in the compilation of Presidential 
Proclamations in the annual United States Code Congressional Service. Proclamations which arc also published as Treasury Decisions arc contained 
in the Treasury Decision Reports (T.D,) or the new Customs Bulletin, and arc listed in the index under the heading "Presidential Proclamations." 
Additional proclamations affecting United States obligations to GATT may also be found in these reports. 
In the chart which follows, these abbreviations and symbols are used: 
- / -: The number before the slash indicates the volume; the number following indicates the !?age. 
G : Indicates that the document is deposited at GATT headquarters. The number following indicates the list number (PROT/2), if known. 
U Indicates that the document is deposited at U.N. headquarters. The number following indicates the list number (ST/LEG/3, Rev. 1), if 
known, 
NC Indicates that the agreement did not change the United States schedule. This does not imply that omission of that statement elsewhere 
means that an agreement did change the United States schedule. 
None Indicates that none was found, but proving a negative is very difficult and these proclamations are verbose and technical, so no warranty is 
made that "none" exists. 
Footnotes (a, b,, etc,) arc located at the end of chart. 
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Signed Date Stat. or Fed. 
Date by In U.N.T.S. U.S.T. Pres. Reg, T.D. 
# Done Title U.S. Force Cite Cite Proc. Cite Number 
I 10/30/47 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
Ul 55/194 61/Pt. 5, 6 276IAn 12/8863 51802 
2 10/30/47 Protocol of Provisional Application of the 
U2 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade X 1/1/48 55/308 61/Pt. 5, 6 2761A 12/8863 51802 
3 3/24/48 Protocol of Rectifications to the General 
U3 Agreement on Tariffs and Trade X 3/24/48 62/2 62/1988 2790b 13/3269 51939 
4 3/24/48 Declaration Signed at Havana 24 March 1948 ~ U4 X 3/24/48 62/26 62/1962 None None None .... 
5 3/24/48 Protocol Modifying Certain Provisions of the g.. 
U5 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade X 3/24/48 62/30 62/1992 2790 13/3269 51939 <§' 
6 3/24/48 Special Protocol Modifying Article XIV of the ;:! 
U6 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade X 5/9/49 62/40 62/2000 2790 13/3269 51939 
~ 
7 3/24/48 Special Protocol Relating to Article XXIV of 1:1 
U7 the General Agreement on Tariffs and ~ 
Trade X 6/7/48 62/56 62/2013 2790 13/3269 51939 ::i:J 8 9/14/48 Second Protocol of Rectifications to the Gen- ~ us eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade X 9/14/48 62/74 62/3671 2829 14/1151 52167 .... 
9 9/14/48 Protocol Modifying Part I and Article XXIX Cl> 
U9 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and ~ 
Trade X 9/24/52 138/334 3/5355 2829 14/1151 52167 
10 9/14/48 Protocol Modifying Part II and Article XXVI 
UlO of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade X 12/14/48 62/80 62/3679 2829 14/1151 52167 
11 9/14/48 Protocol for the Accession of Signatories of 
Ull the Final Act of 30 Oct. 1947 X 9/14/48 62/68 62/3663 2829 14/1151 52167 
12 8/13/49 Third Protocol of Rectifications to the Gen- 1 Ul2 era! Agreement on Tariffs and Trade X 10/21/51 107 /311 3/57 2867 14/7723 52373 
13 8/13/49 First Protocol of Modifications to the General 
. 
Cl 





14 8/13/49 Protocol Modifying Article XXVI of the Gen- l 
UI4 eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 3/28/50 62/II4 2/1583 2867 14/7723 52373 ~ 
15 8/13/49 Protocol Replacing Schedule I of the General ... co 
UI5 Agreement on Tariffs and Trade X 10/21/51 107/83 3/123 2867 14/7723 52373 .§ 
16 8/13/49 Protocol Replacing Schedule VI of the Gen-
UI6 eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade X 9/24/52 138/346 3/5383 2867 14/7723 52373 
17 10/10/49 The Annency Protocol of Terms of Accession 
UI7 to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
~ Trade X II/30/49 62/122 64/BI39 2867c 14/7723 52373 
18 4/3/50 Fourth Protocol of Rectifications to the Gen- "":l 
UIS eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade X 9/24/52 138/398 3/5399 None (NC) None None "":l 
19 12/16t0 Fifth Protocol of Rectifications to the General ;:;· UI Agreement on Tariffs and Trade X 6/30/53 167/265 4/29 None (NC) None None 
20 4/21/51 Decision by the Contracting Parties Agreeing ~ U20a to the Accession of the Republic of Austria 
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and ~ 
Trade X 6/21/51 142/9 3/597 Noned None None t::, 
21 4/21/51 Decision by the Contracting Parties Agreeing C 
U20b to the Accession of the Federal Republic of ~ 
Germany to the General Agreement on ~ 
Tariffs and Trade X 6/21/51 142/13 3/600 Noned None None .... ... 
22 4/21/51 Decision of the Contracting Parties .Agreeing 
() 
U20c to the Accession of the Republic of Korea t"'I 
~ to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
X 6/21/51 142/18 El Trade 3/603 Noned None None 
23 4/21/51 Decision of the Contracting Parties Agreeing 
U20d to the Accession of Peru to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade X 6/21/51 142/22 3/606 Noned None None 
24 4/21/51 Decision by the Contracting Parties Agreeing 
U20e to the Accession of the Republic of the 
Philippines to the General Agreement on 
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Date by In U.N.T.S. U.S.T, Pres. Reg. T.D. 
# Done Title U.S. Force Cite Cite Proc. Cite Number 
25 4/21/51 Decision by the Contracting Parties Agreeing 
U20f to the Accession of the Republic of Turkey 
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade X 6/21/51 142/30 3/612 Noned None None 
26 4/21/51 Torquay Protocol to the General Agreement 
U21 on Tariffs and Trade X 6/6/51 142/34 3/588 2929 16/5381 527ll9 
27 4/21/51 Declaration on the Continued Application of ~ 
U22 the Schedules to the General Agreement on .... 
Tariffs and Trade X 10/24/52 147/390 3/1802 None None None ~ 
28 10/27/51 First Protocol of Rectifications and Modifica- ~-~ 
U23 tions to the Texts of the Schedules to the ;:g 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade X 10/21/53 176/2 4/2313 ll5lll 28/107 55816 1:-"1 
29 10/27J51 First Protocol of Supplementary Concessions A 
U2 to the General Agreement on Tariffs and ~ 
Trade (Germany &: S. Africa) X 5/25/52 131/316 3/3963 None(NC) None None ::,;:, 
30 11/8/52 Second Protocol of Rectifications and Modifi- (\I 
U25 cations to the Texts of the Schedules to the ~ .... 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade X 2/2/59 321/245 10/1098 None (NC) None None (\I 
31 11/22/52 Second Protocol of Supplementary Conces• 
~ 
U26 sions to the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (Austria and Germany) 8/30/53 172/340 4/1631 None(NC) None None 
32 10/24/53 Third Protocol of Rectifications and Modifi-
U27 cations to the Texts of the Schedules to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade X 2/2/59 321/266 10/347 None (NC) None None 
3ll 10/24/53 Declaration on the Continued Application of 
U28 Schedules to the General Agreement on 
1 Tariffs and Trade X 1/1/54 183/351 4/2755 None None None M 3/24/48 Havana Charter for an International Trade 





35 9/14/48 Agreement on Most-Favored-Nation Treat- ~ 0" U-C2 ment for Areas of w·estern Germany under ~ 
Military Occupation X 10/14/48 18/267 62/3653 Nonce None None ... 
36 8/13/49 Memorandum of Understanding Relative to <O Cl 
U-C2 Application to the Western Sectors of .:::I 
Berlin of the Agreement on Most-Favored-
Nation Treatment for Areas of Western 
Germany Under Military Occupation X 8/13/49 42/356 63/2795 Nonce None None 
37 10/24/53 Declaration Regulating the Commercial Rela- ~ GI tions Between Certain Contracting Parties 
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and ,., 
Trade X ll/23/53 None 5/219 None None None ,., 
38 2/1/55 Proces-Verbal Extending the Validity of the .... 
G2 Declaration of 24 Oct. 1953 Regulating ;g 
the Commercial Relations Between Certain 
~ Contracting Parties to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade and Japan X 2/4/55 None 6/6163 None None None :'l 
39 3/7/55 Fourth Protocol of Rectifications and Modifi- t::, 
G3 cations to the Annexes and to the Texts of C 
Schedules to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade X 1/23/59 324/300 10/213 3513 28/107 55816 
~ 
~ 
40 3/10/55 Declaration on the Continued Application of .... .... 
G4 Schedules to the General Agreement on ~ 
Tariffs and Trade X 7/1/55 220/154 None None None t 41 3/10/55 Protocol AmendinJ{ Part I and Articles XXIX ~ 
G5 and XXX of e General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade X Not yet None 3513 28/107 55816 
42 3/10/55 Protocol Amendini the Preamble and Parts 
G6 II and III of t e General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade X 10/7/57 278/168 8/1767 3513 28/107 55816 
43 3/10/55 Protocol of Organizational Amendments to 
G7 the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
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# Done Title U.S. Force Cite Cite Proc. Cite Number 
44 3/10/55 Proces-Verbal of Signature Concerning the 
GS Protocol of Organizational Amendments to 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
None None Trade X Not yet None None 
45 3/10/55 Agreement on the Organization for Trade 
G9 Co-operation X Not yet None None None None 
46 6/7/55 Protocol of Terms of Accession of Japan to 
GI0 the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
~ Trade X 9/10/55 220/164 6/5833 3105 20/5379 53865 
47 6/15/55 Protocol of Rectification to the French Text 
.... 
() 
Gll of the General Agreement on Tariffs and ;:r, 
Trade X 10/24/56 253/316 7/2943 3513 28/107 55816 i' 
48 7/15/55 Third Protocol of Supplementary Concessions ~ 
GI2 to the General Agreement on Tariffs and !:""I Trade (Denmark &: Germany) 9/19/56 250/292 7/2393 None (NC) None None i::o 
49 7 /15/55 Fourth Protocol of Supplementary Conces- ~ 
G13 sions to the General Agreement on Tariffs ::tl and Trade (Germany &: Norway) 9/19/56 250/297 7/2407 None (NC) None None (11 
50 7 /15/55 Fifth Protocol of Supplementary Concessions <::! .... 
Gl4 to the General Agreement on Tariffs and (11 
Trade (Germany & Sweden) 9/19/56 250/301 7/2421 None (NC) None None ~ 
51 12/3/55 Proces-Verbal of Rectification Concerning the 
GI5 Protocol (Amending Part I and Art. 29 and 
30 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, the Protocol Amending the Pre-
amble and Parts II and III of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the 
Protocol of Organizational Amendments to 
'<! the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade X 10/7/57 278/246 3513 28/107 55816 ~ 
52 12/3/55 Fifth Protocol of Rectifications and Modifica- "' "' GI6 tions to the Texts of the Schedules to the Ni 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade X Not yet None 3513 28/107 55816 "'" <Q 
t::, 
53 5/23/56 Sixth Protocol of Supplementary Concessions i Gl7 to the General .Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade X 5/23/56 244/2 7 /1083 3140 21/4237 54108 [ 
54 2/19/57 Seventh Protocol of Supplementary Conces- -GIB sions to the General Agreement on Tariffs 10 0l 
and Trade (Austria 8e Germany) 9/1/58 309/364 10/1720 None (NC) None None .::3 
55 4/ll,57 Sixth Protocol of Rectifications and Modifica-
GI tions to the Texts of the Schedules to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade X Not yet None 3513 28/107 55816 
56 6/20/57 Eighth Protocol of Supplementary Conces- ~ G20 sions to the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (Cuba and U.S.) X 6/29/57 274/322 8/1343 3190 22/4705 54398 ~ 
57 11/30/57 Seventh Protocol of Rectifications and Modifi- ~ 
G21 cations to the Texts of the Schedules to the .... 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade X Not yet None 3513 28/107 55816 ~ 
58 11/30/57 Declaration on the Continued Application of ~ G22 Schedules to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1/1/58 285/372 None None None :.IJ 
59 11/30/57 Declaration Extending the Standstill Provi- b 
G23 sions of Article 16:4 of the General Agree- C 
ment on Tariffs and Trade X 5/11/59 328/290 10/1842 None None None ~ 
60 11/2~58 Proccs-Verbal Extending the Validity of the ~ ..... 
G2 Declaration Extending the Standstill Provi- .... (") 
sions of Article 16:4 of the General Agree-
5/ll/59 328/298 10/1848 ['-'i ment on Tariffs and Trade X None None None 
~ 
61 11/22/58 Ninth Protocol of Supplementary Concessions ~ 
G25 to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (Finland 8e Germany) Not yet None None (NC) None None 
62 11/22/58 Declaration on the Provisional .Accession of 
G26 the Swiss Confederation to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade X 1/1/60 350/2 11/745 3513 28/107 55816 
63 12/31/58 Protocol Relating to Negotiations for the 
G27 Establishment of New Schedule III-Brazil 
-to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
3/15/61 398/318 3517 Trade X 28/1195 55830 t)0 
N> 
Ct 
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# Done Title U.S. Force Cite Cite Proc. Cite Number 
64. 2/10/59 Process-Verbal Containing Schedules To Be 
G28 Annexed to the Protocol Relating to Nego• 
tiations for the Establishment of New 
Schedule III-Brazil-to the General Agree• 
ment on Tariffs and Trade X Not yet None None None None 
65 2/18/59 Eighth Protocol of Rectifications and Modifi-
G29 cations to the Texts of the Schedules to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade X Not yet None None (NC) None None ~ 66 3/10/59 Proces-Verbal Containing a Schedule To Be .... 
G30 Annexed to the Protocol Relating to Nego• g. 
tiations for the Establishment of a New i' Schedule III-Brazil-to the General Agree• 
ment on Tariffs and Trade (Brazil- ~ 
Benelux) Not yet None None None None t-,4 
67 5/18/59 Proces-Verbal Containing Schedules To Be ~ 
G!ll Annexed to the Protocol Relating to the ~ 
Negotiations for the Establishment of New ~ 
Schedule III-Brazil-to the General Agree· Cl) 
ment on Tariffs and Trade (Brazil &: U.K.) Not yet None None None None <:! .... 
68 5/23/59 Proccs-Verbal Supplementary to the Proces• 
Cl) 
G!l2 Verbal Containing Schedules To Be An• 
~ 
nexed to the Protocol Relating to Negotia• 
tions for the Establishment of New Schedule 
Ill-Brazil-to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (Brazil & U.S.) X Not yet None 3517 28/1195 55830 
69 5/25/59 Declaration on Relations Between Contracting 
G33 Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade and the Government of the 
1 Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia X 11/16/59 346/312 10/2142 None None None 70 5/29,59 Declaration on the Provisional Accession of 
G3 Israel to the General Agreement on Tariffs 8l 
and Trade X 10/9/59 344/304 10/2135 None None None ~ 
~ 
ti 
71 8/17/59 Ninth Protocol of Rectifications and Modifi-
,. 
n 
G35 cations to the Texts of the Schedules to the 8 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade X Not yet None None(NC) None None C' 
72 11/9/59 Declaration on Relations Between Contracting ij ... G36 Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs <O 
0> and Trade and the Government of the .:::l 
Polish Peoples Republic X ll/16/60 381/386 11/2580 3513 28/107 55816 
73 11/12/59 Declaration on the Provisional Accession of 
G37 Tunisia to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade X 5/21/60 376/406 11/1538 3513 28/107 55816 
~ 74 II/13/59 Proces-Verbal Containing Schedules To Be 
G38 Annexed to the Declaration on the Provi- ~ sional Accession of the Swiss Confederation ~ to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
ll/1299 ... Trade Gapan and Switzerland) 4/29/60 358/258 None None None ~ 
75 11/19/59 Proces-Verbal Further Extending the Validity s G39 of the Declaration Extending the Standstill 
Provisions Article 16:4 of the General ~ 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade X 1/1/60 349/314 None None None 
b 76 11/18/60 Declaration on the Provisional Accession of C 
G40 Argentina to the General Agreement on ~ Tariffs and Trade X 10/14/62 442/302 13/2190 3513 28/107 55816 ~ 
77 11/19/60 Declaration on the Continued Application of Did not .... ... 
G41 Schedules to the General Agreement on enter ("\ 
Tariffs and Trade into ~ 
force None None None None t::i 
78 11/19/60 Declaration Giving Effect to the Provisions ~ 
G42 of Article 16:4 of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade X II/14/62 445/294 13/2605 3513 28/107 55816 
79 11/19/60 Declaration on the Extension of Standstill 
G43 Provisions of Article 16:4 of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade X 11/14/62 445/304 15/2571 None None None 
80 12(:J;I Proces-Verbal Extending the Declaration on 
the Provisional Accession of the Swiss Con-
federation to the General Agreement on 
12/9/61 424/324 13/184 None None None (.)0 Tariffs and Trade X N) 
-..:r 
~ 
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81 11/12/61 Proces-Verbal Extending the Declaration on 
G45 the Provisional Accession of Tunisia to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade X 1/8/62 424/334 13/189 3513 28/107 55816 
82 4lfJ:2 Protocol for the Accession of Israel to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade X 7/5/62 431/244 13/2806 3479 27/5929 55649 
83 4/6/62 Protocol for the Accession of Cambodia to the 
G47 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade X Not yet None 3513 28/107 55816 ~ 84 4/6/62 Protocol for the Accession of Portugal to the .... 
G4S General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade X 5/6/62 431/208 13/2739 3479 27/5929 55649 
c-. 
~ 
85 1116t62 Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs i' G4 and Trade Embodying Results of the ~ 1960-61 Tariff Conference X 8/15/62 440/2 13/2885 3513 28/107 55816 
3517 28/1195 55830 t'-1 
86 11/7/62 Proces-Verbal Extending the Declaration on i:l 
G50 the Provisional Accession of Argentina X 11/20/62 452/290 13/3900 3517 28/1195 55830 
~ 
87 11/13/62 Declaration on the Provisional Accession of ~ 
G51 the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia ~ ~ 
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and .... Cl> 
Trade X 4/28/63 462/330 None None None ~ 
88 11/13/62 Declaration on the Provisional Accession of 
G52 the United Arab Republic to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade X 1/9/63 452/298 14/292 3596 29/9419 None 
89 1/28/63 Tenth Protocol of Supplementary Concessions 
G53 to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (Japan &: New Zealand) 8/15/63 476/254 14/1052 None(NC) None None 
90 5/6/63 Protocol Supplementary to the Protocol to the 
G54 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade '<! Embodying Results of the 1960-61 Tariff 
7/7/63 501/304 None(NC) None None ~ Conference. 
O'I 
91 1/7/63 Protocol for the Accession of Spain to the O'I 




Second Proces-Verbal Extending the Declara- ,. n 
G56 tion on the Provisional Accession of Tunisia 8 to the General Agreement on Tariffs and er 
Trade X 11/24/64 525/278 None None None ~ 
93 3f5J64 Second Declaration on the Extension of the -tO 
G7 Standstill Provisions of Article 16:4 of the C, 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade X 3/5/64 525/308 None None None 
.::? 
94 3/5/i64 Declaration on the Provisional Accession of 
GB Iceland to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade X 4/19/64 496/326 15/2067 None None None 
~ 95 10/30/64 Second Proces-Verbal Extending the Declara-
G59 tion on the Provisional Accession of the ~ Swiss Confederation to the General Agree-
~ ment on Tariffs and Trade X 11/25/64 525/270 15/2425 None None None 
96 10/30/64 Second Proces-Vcrbal Extending the Declara- ;;· 
G60 tion on the Provisional Accession of Argen-
tina to the General Agreement on Tariffs 
11/25/64 525/288 15/2417 
s 
and Trade X None None None ~ 
97 10/80/64 Proces-Verbal Extending the Declaration on b G61 the Provisional Accession of the United 
Arab Republic to the General Agreement C 
X 11/25/64 525/298 15/2409 ~ on Tariffs and Trade None None None 
~ 98 2/8/65 Protocol Amending the General Agreement ..... .... 
G62 on Tariffs and Trade to Introduce a Part C'\ 
IV on Trade and Development X 6/27/66 None None None None t"'I 
99 12/14/65 Third Proces-Verbal Extending the Declara- l::i 
G63 tion on the Provisional Accession of Tunisia ~ 
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade X 1/6/66 None None None None 
100 12b1:J65 Third Proces-Verbal Extending the Declara-
tion on the Provisional Accession of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade X 12/28/65 None None None None 
101 12/l•r5 Proces-Verbal Extending the Declaration on 
G6 the Provisional Accession of Iceland to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade X 12/28/65 None None None None (;I) N) 
~ 
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102 4/1/66 Protocol for the Accession of Switzerland to 
G66 the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade X 8/1/66 None None None None 
10!) 7/20/66 Protocol for the Accession of Yugoslavia to 
G67 the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade X 8/25/66 None None None None 
104 11/17 /66 Third Proces-Verbal Extending the Declara• 
G68 tion on the Provisional Accession of Argen- ~ tina to the General Agreement on Tariffs ... 
and Trade X 1/9/67 None None None None B-
105 11/17 /66 Second Proces-Verbal Extending the Declara- i' G69 tion on the Provisional Accession of the 
United Arab Republic to the General ~ 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade X 1/18/67 None None None None t--i 
106 3/2/67 Protocol for the Accession of Korea to the 
~ 
G70 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 4/14/67 None None None None 
~ 
107 10~1/62 Long-Term Agreement Regarding Interna- ~ 
G l(a) tional Trade in Cotton Textiles,f X 10/1/62 471/296 ~ 
108 5~1/67 Protocol Extending the Agreement Regarding 
... 
~ 
G l(b) International Trade in Cotton Textiles of ~ 
I October 1962,f X 10/1/67 None 
109 6/30/67 
G72 
Geneva (1967) Protocol to GATTg X 
110 6/30/67 Agreement Relating Principally to Chemicals, 
G73 Supp. Geneva Prot. X 
Ill 6/30/67 Memorandum of Agreement on ••• World 
G74 Grains Arrangement X 
112 6/30/67 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI X 1 G75 
1111 6/30/67 Protocol for the Accession of Argentina X 10/11/67 
0, 
0, 
G76 ~ ""' 10 
114 6/80/67 Protocol for the Accession of Iceland 
G77 
115 6/80/67 Protocol for the Accession of Ireland 12/22/67 
G78 
116 6/80/67 Protocol for the Accession of Poland 10/18/67 
G79 
a Supplemented by Presidential Proclamations 2764, 2769, 2782, 2784, 2791, 2792, 2798, 2829, 2865. Certain parts of GATT, namely, the foreign 
nation tariff schedules and certain annexes, were not proclaimed. The object of Proclamation 2761A is to proclaim "such modifications of existing 
duties and other import restrictions of the United States of America and such continuance of existing customs or excise treatment of articles imported 
into the United States of America as are specified or provided for in parts I, II, and III, annexes D, H, and I, and part I of, and the general notes in, 
schedule XX of said general agreement •••• " GATT is in force only through the Protocol of Provisional Application (#2). 
b Supplemented by Presidential Proclamation 2809. 
c Supplemented by Presidential Proclamations 2874, 2884, 2888. 
d These are not international agreements but decisions under art. XXXIII of GATT and probably need not have been deposited. The practice in 
later years has been not to deposit decisions regarding accession. 
o These three agreements, although listed in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/8, Rev. 2, Ch. 1, are not truly "GATT agreements." Since they relate so 
closely to GATT, it is convenient to include them here. 
t The Cotton Textile agreements are deposited at GATT since, although they do not modify GATT, they relate to GATT. Consideration of 
these agreements is outside the scope of this article. 
g This and the next seven agreements were the results of the Kennedy Round trade negotiations which were completed June 80, 1967. As of this 
writing, only two had entered into force although others should do so in the near future. The author has been informed that the United States will 
























APPENDIX D ~ N) 
United States Trade Agreements Acts 
The following list of the trade agreements acts since 1934 sets out the period when each act's trade agreement authority was effective. In some 
acts, portions of the authority granted lapsed after a given time, while other portions retained effectiveness until specifically repealed. Where this is 
the case, only the former expiration date is listed. Numbers separated by a slash indicate volume before, page number or public law number after. 
Pub. Date Date House Senate Congress/ 
Year Title Stat. 19USC §§ Law Effective Expired Report Report Session 
1934 An act to amend the Tariff Act of 1930, 
Part III 48/943 1351-66 316 6/12/34 6/12/37 1000 871 73d/2d 
1937 Joint Resolution to extend the authority 
~ of President under § 350 of the Tariff 
Act of 1930, as amended 50/24 1351-66 •10 3/1/37 6/12/40 166 lll 75th/1st 
.... s. 1940 Joint Resolution to extend the authority i' of the President under § 350 of the 
Tariff Act of 1930, as amended 54/107 1351-66 •61 4/12/40 6/12/43 1594 1297 76th/3d ;:3 
1943 Joint Resolution to extend the authority t--t 
of the President under § 350 of the I:) 
Tariff Act of 1930, as amended 57/125 1351-66 66 6/7/43 6/12/45 409 258 78th/1st ~ 
1945 An act to extend the authority of the :=ti 
President under § 350 of the Tariff Act ~ 
of 1930 and for other purposes 59/410 1351-66 129 7/5/45 6/12/48 594 352 79th/1st i::! .... 
~ 
1948 Trade .Agreements Extension Act of 1948 62/1053 1351-66 792 6/26/48 6/30/49 2009 1558 80th/2d ~ 
1949 Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1949 63/697 1351-66 307 9/26/49 6/12/51 19 107 81st/1st 
1951 Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 65/72 1351-66 50 6/16/51 6/12/53 14 299 82d/1st 
1953 Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1953 67/472 1351-66 215 8/7/53 6/12/54 521 472 83d/1st 
1954 .An act to extend the authority of the 
President under § 350 of the Tariff Act 
464 1777 of 1930, as amended 68/360 1351-66 7 /1/54 6/12/55 1605 83d/2d 
1955 Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955 69/162 1351-66 86 6/21/55 6/30/58 50 232 84th/1st 
1958 Trade Agreements Extension .Act of 1958 72/673 1351-66 85-686 8/20/58 6/30/62 1761 1838 85th/2d 
1962 Trade Expansion Act of 1962 76/872 1801-1991 87-794 10/11/62 6/30/67 1818 2059 87th/2d 
• Public Resolution. 
